

CENTER FOR NEW YORK CITY AFFAIRS
THE NEW SCHOOL

THE RACE FOR GOVERNOR & ATTORNEY GENERAL

Campaign Roundtable 2010

Wednesday, December 1, 2010

**THE RACE FOR GOVERNOR AND ATTORNEY GENERAL:
CAMPAIGN ROUNDTABLE 2010**
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All roundtable photos by Mike DiVito.

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AND ATTORNEY GENERAL:
2010 Campaign Roundtable
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Edited by Carin Mirowitz

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The Center for New York City Affairs is dedicated to advancing innovative public policies that strengthen neighborhoods, support families and reduce urban poverty. Our tools include rigorous analysis; skillful journalistic research; candid public dialogue with stakeholders, and strategic planning with government officials, nonprofit practitioners and community residents.

Andrew White, *Director*
www.centernyc.org

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FROM THE DEANS

An education in international affairs, public policy, and management is an education in decision making. Here at The New School, we teach our students to apply sound decision-making skills to complex issues, to understand situations with many moving parts, to see the broader picture, and to always keep an eye toward the future.

A political campaign is a chance to see these skills in motion and deepen our insights into the interplay of politics and society. In any campaign, decisions must be made quickly, under tremendous pressure, and in a rapidly shifting context, with each decision carrying the potential of significant consequences for the candidates and the political conversation. In The New School's campaign roundtables, organized by The Center for New York City Affairs, we explore in detail the decisions, large and small, that shape campaigns, and we come to understand the policies and exigencies that drive these decisions. We delve into the issues and hear the voices that dominate the debate, and the cultural hopes and fears that propel public response. It is a chance to understand in full the political context that will shape the government for the coming years. In this way, we increase our understanding not only of New York City politics, but of our city itself, and by extension, urban life on a global scale.

In our roundtables, the campaign participants tell their stories. It is an opportunity to clear the air, to listen to each other, and to learn. It is rare in campaigns to have such a candid look within the inner operations, and it is instructive to see the dynamics at play.

The complex interrelatedness of politics and policy and personality is a critical component to understanding power and leadership. New School students include current and future leaders, nonprofit leaders, labor and community activists, legislative staffers, and private-sector executives. Campaign roundtables offer our students a window into the workings of these campaigns, so that they may develop their skills in navigating campaigns as they advocate for a better world.

—Neil R. Grabois

Dean, Milano The New School for Management
and Urban Policy and the Graduate Program in
International Affairs

—David Scobey

Executive Dean, The New School for General
Studies, and Milano The New School for
Management and Urban Policy

PROGRAM

8:00–8:30 a.m.

Continental breakfast

8:30–8:45 a.m.

Welcome remarks

Neil Grabois

Fred Hochberg

Andrew White

8:45–10:15 a.m.

Roundtable I: The Race for Attorney General

10:15–10:30 a.m.

Break

10:30 a.m. to 12:00 p.m.

Roundtable II: The Race for Governor

ROUNDTABLE PARTICIPANTS

MODERATOR

David Chalian, PBS NewsHour

Ben Smith, POLITICO

CAMPAIGN REPRESENTATIVES

Richard Brodsky for Attorney General

Jon Lipshutz

Sean Coffey for New York Attorney General 2010

Eduardo Castell

Bruce Gyory

Tammy Sun

Dinallo for Attorney General

Josh Brumberger

John Kenny

Andrew Cuomo 2010

Phil Singer

Dan Donovan 2010 - New York Attorney General

Virginia Lam

Marcus Reese

Bradley Tusk

Kathleen Rice 2010

Eric Phillips

Lazio 2010

Kevin Fullington

Barney Keller

Levy for NY

Michael Dawidziak

Paladino for the People

Michael Caputo

John Haggerty

Schneiderman for Attorney General

Emily Arsenault

Mike Rabinowitz

Blake Zeff

ROUNDTABLE I: THE RACE FOR ATTORNEY GENERAL

WHO'S WHO

Moderators

David Chalian
Ben Smith

Campaign Representatives

Richard Brodsky for Attorney General
Jon Lipshutz

Sean Coffey for New York Attorney General 2010
Eduardo Castell
Bruce Gyory
Tammy Sun

Dinallo for Attorney General
Josh Brumberger
John Kenny

Dan Donovan 2010 - New York Attorney General
Virginia Lam
Marcus Reese
Bradley Tusk

Kathleen Rice 2010
Eric Phillips

Schneiderman for Attorney General
Emily Arsenault
Mike Rabinowitz
Blake Zeff

THE PRIMARY ELECTION

MR. NEIL GRABOIS: Good morning. My name is Neil Grabois, I'm the Dean of the Milano School and the Graduate Program in International Affairs. And I'm really delighted to welcome you to this campaign roundtable where we'll get to understand what really took place, and we have a very distinguished panel that's going to help us understand what seems to have been a rather complicated and interesting set of elections in the United States. I'd like, first, to thank the underwriters of this program—Rob Dyson and the Dyson Foundation. Unfortunately, Mr. Dyson wasn't able to be with us today, but it was his generosity that made this program possible. I've heard, I'm relatively new, I've heard a great deal, however, about this particular program and I'm really looking forward to hearing from colleagues. I also want to acknowledge Susan Halpern, who's an alum of Milano, a board member of the division, a trustee of the university and a very generous supporter through the Sirius Fund, where she serves as president. And lastly and for me, particularly, importantly, I want to thank Fred

Milano Dean Neil Grabois welcomes the roundtables participants and audience.

Hochberg, my predecessor as Dean of the Milano School, somebody about whom I've heard a great deal and somebody whose shoes I find it very difficult to fill. It was Fred's vision and Fred's idea to establish this election roundtable series when he was Dean of the school.

And he's continued to serve as our convener, despite the fact that he now has to journey all the way from Washington—I'm sure he's delighted to get out of Washington to come back to wonderful New York, so we're really pleased to have Fred with us. And would you please join me in thanking the Dyson Foundation, Susan and Fred, and all of The New School's generous donors and volunteers.

[Applause]

The Center for New York City Affairs at Milano organized this event as part of its larger mission and one of the ten thousand things that Andrew White does to promote policy innovation, public understanding of the political process in New York and in its neighborhoods. The Center's work includes applied policy research on public education, human services and immigration, perhaps he can go down to Washington and help with the immigration, we need some help there. The Center's combination of policy research, journalism and exploration of the role of politics in local and government policy represents a critically important aspect of this school. The Center's director is here, right over here, Andrew White, and I want to acknowledge him for his leadership in creating the roundtable series, and to Carin Mirowitz for





Fred Hochberg, former dean of Milano, opens the day's discussion.

[Applause]

MR. FRED HOCHBERG: Neil, thank you—shoe size is ten and a half E or eleven D, depending. It's very good to be back and the air conditioning still doesn't work in this room, so that's a good sign, some things are the same. When you're a Dean it's always, you work hard at doing a number of things and you'd like to know that some of them have a life beyond your time here, so it's very exciting for me that this is the fourth campaign roundtable we've convened at Milano and that it has a life and it has its own value. And those of us who are here today in a longer life in terms of the publication that will follow from this, I think that we've got an exciting line-up today, and we have two real veterans who are moderating—David Chalian, who actually was, in the words of Dean Atcheson, “present at the creation.” He was here in 2004 when Mark Halpern first kicked it off here at Milano, in 2005 when we did the mayor's race, and then in 2006 for the governor's race. And Ben Smith who is now at POLITICO and we met, I'm trying to remember, you were at *The Observer*, no, *The New York Sun*, from when he was at *The New York Sun* at a CBC dinner, that's where we met and then went onto *The Observer* and now POLITICO and is very well regarded and really has his pulse on what's going on politically.

making today's program happen. Milano has a special commitment to the field of politics and advocacy through a number of courses for Masters and PhD students on lobbying, media/community organizing, strategic communications and campaign development. Milano students include current and future leaders, nonprofit leaders, labor and community activists, legislative staffers and private sector executives.

They work for the government in organizations with social missions, and social justice is one of the key catch phrases for The New School in general, and for Milano in particular. A Milano education—combining policy and practice prepares our alumni to be especially effective in the urban policy arena. Now I would like to call on Fred to help us get underway—Fred Hochberg.

So, let's get on with the program. Let me turn it over to Ben and David, and I think we're in to learn a lot and probably a drop of entertainment, as well, so, David.

MR. DAVID CHALIAN: Thank you, Fred, thank you, everyone. A couple quick housekeeping notes and a plea and then I will hand it over to Ben who will get started with the AG primary race. First and foremost, you all know this is on the record and it's being recorded and this will have a transcript. In order for that to happen you need to speak into the microphone every time you speak so that it can be recorded and

CAMPAIGN TIMELINE: ATTORNEY GENERAL'S RACE

HOW THE RACE WAS PORTRAYED IN THE NEW YORK PRESS

May 11, 2007

Attorney General Andrew Cuomo registers a PAC called “Andrew Cuomo 2010” for the attorney general race.

February 5, 2009

Cuomo insists during an interview on Albany's Talk 1300-AM radio that his only political plans are to seek re-election as attorney general.

October 15, 2009

Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP announces that Senior Partner John P. “Sean” Coffey will retire to explore a potential bid to become the next attorney general.

December 15, 2009

New Republican State Chair Ed Cox reportedly speaks with Staten Island District Attorney Dan Donovan about

the possibility of running for attorney general.

December 22, 2009

The New York Times cites Republican operatives saying potential candidates include District Attorneys Daniel M. Donovan of Staten Island, Kathleen B. Hogan of Glens Falls and William J. Fitzpatrick of Syracuse.

January 23, 2010

The Wall Street Journal describes the candidates as “treading lightly” on Wall Street.

February 18, 2010

State Senator Eric Schneiderman announces three new staffers for his re-election campaign fund-raising team, following news that Nassau County District Attorney

It was important for us to start early for a couple of reasons, but really tied to the fact that Eric had not been in elective politics before and needed both to introduce himself to the people in that world, get our campaign set up, and also begin raising money. Without money, we wouldn't have been taken seriously.

—John Kenny

that everybody can hear you, so just please make sure to pull the microphone up to you every time you guys are speaking. And now, the plea—this will work best if you guys are as candid as you can be. I understand it's on the record, I don't for a second think that means—I don't delude myself into thinking we're going to have as candid a conversation as we would have off the record, but use this less for therapeutic purposes and score settling and try to resist that temptation as best you can, and use it a little more for history and for your successors in running campaigns statewide here in New York, because it really will be an invaluable guide. Obviously, some of you will be running those campaigns in the future, but so will those coming behind you, and it will be a very valuable guide to them if you are as candid as possible about how decisions were made, why they were made, the challenges that cropped up that you didn't expect. That is really good information to have on the record, and in this sort of final product that gets published, so that everyone can sort of explore what went on here in 2010 and in the form of some reality and so, not sort of the spin reality, but the reality of what went on in 2010.

So as close as you all can help us get to that, that will make this the most successful event. I now turn it over to Ben.

THE STARTING GATES

MR. BEN SMITH: Thanks David and thanks Fred, for starting this institution, which I've been attending since '05 and often produces very interesting stuff. The attorney general primary was kind of a short race because everyone waited for Cuomo to get in. I think it really began in earnest in April, ran for about five months. And I think we'll try to move chronologically in a rough sort of way through it, but because it was so abbreviated there wasn't that much chronology. But I did want to start and if we could just basically go around the room, and I see the Dinallo guys aren't sitting together and I don't know which one of you guys wanna speak for the campaign first and how you're gonna communicate that, but—hand signals or, you know. But just to really, very quickly explain the theory of the case you had going in, what you were telling your candidate, each other, donors—about how this was going to work, what the path to victory was and then what the first thing was that went wrong, what the first thing was that you had to adjust that theory. So I don't know which one of you guys wants to start. So I guess we'll start with Brodsky.

MR. JOHN KENNY: I think that the essential plan was based on who the candidate was and what his experience was and what his ability to be—

MR. SMITH: And this is the Dinallo campaign?

MR. KENNY: Correct, Eric Dinallo. That really was the underlying theory that guided both Eric's decision to get into the race and what we did, especially early on. And I'd add that our campaign started in the summer of 2009. We created our committee in August. It was important for us to start early for a couple of reasons, but really tied to the fact that Eric had not been in elective politics before and needed both to introduce himself to the people in that world, get our campaign set up, and also begin raising money.

Because without money, we wouldn't have been taken seriously. I think Eric and Josh, in the first six months, really had a focus on fundraising. We turned in an initial filing of a million eight in January of 2010

Kathleen Rice has hired Tracy Sefl and Celeste Morris, and Coffey has hired Bruce Gyory for a campaign for attorney general.

March 4, 2010

Schneiderman hires consulting firm BerlinRosen, which is headed by two of his former staffers.

March 12, 2010

Ten Democratic County Chairs endorse Eric Dinallo, former Superintendent of Insurance for New York State, for attorney general.

March 25, 2010

NY1 speculates on the field of candidates for attorney general, naming Schneiderman, NY Assemblyman Richard Brodsky, State Senator John Flanagan, Coffey, Donovan, Rice, Dinallo, and Denise O'Donnell, the Commissioner of Criminal Justice Services.

April 1, 2010

Schneiderman sends out a press release to announce travel upstate to meet with "voters, community activists, labor leaders, county chairs and elected officials." He has not officially declared intent to run for attorney general.

and I think that was a qualitative change in the way that we were viewed, at least in the press and in the political world as going from someone who, yes—he’s an interesting guy, smart, capable, but does he have a chance to, maybe he does have a chance, maybe he’s more serious than we thought—again, when we came in with that kind of number. So the early start for us, I think, was important. Obviously, it didn’t get us to the finish line on election day or on primary day, but I think it did color the campaign generally and it gave us a chance that we wouldn’t have otherwise, if we had waited even probably a few more months, even into the fall, I don’t think we would have had a chance to be in the mix the way that we were.

MR. JOSH BRUMBERGER: And I’d add a couple more things, because I think you specifically said, “Where did it go wrong?” One addition to John’s point—after we raised what was a significant amount of money, I think, I’d argue for this race, for someone who hadn’t

We needed something that would break through and for us, I think that was The New York Times.

—Josh Brumberger

done this before, was we sort of looked around and thought, “Where else could we put up points?” And we saw the DRC and we did well at the DRC. I think people thought, “Could he raise the money?” We proved we could, and then could we gain political, could we garner political support? And I think the DRC showed we could do that. So we looked anywhere we could for opportunities to put up points, but where I think the race went wrong for us was *The New York Times*. We had a lot riding on *The New York Times*. We needed something, we didn’t have union support, we didn’t have a lot of elected official support. We needed something that would break us through and for us, I think that was *The New York Times*.

MR. SMITH: Okay, and I’ll definitely get back to that later. Jon?

MR. JON LIPSHUTZ: You know, I would say that how we tried to define our race also led to probably one of our biggest challenges, and it really just boiled down to experience.

MR. SMITH: And this is, sorry, Jon Lipshutz from the Brodsky campaign.

MR. LIPSHUTZ: Thank you. As I said, experience was basically our biggest issue. I think Richard—he tried to portray Richard, and fairly effectively so, as someone who had the experience to go after those who really were looking to do harm to New Yorkers, that he wasn’t afraid to back down from a fight, he had been there, he had fought the good fights. It just so happened it was in a very tough year to come from

Jon Lipshutz of the Brodsky campaign discusses their strategy.



April 2, 2010

Brodsky casts himself to *The New York Daily News* as the only Democratic attorney general hopeful with the ability to bridge the right-left political divide.

April 5, 2010

State Senator Liz Krueger hosts a “Women for Schneiderman” fundraiser.

April 6, 2010

Kathleen Rice hires several campaign staffers, adding Robin Chappelle Golston as political director, as well as three fund-raisers and former Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee spokesman Shams Tarek to do press. Sean Coffey hires Tammy Sun.

April 9, 2010

Rice sends a letter to Democratic state committee members asking for their support for her bid for attorney general. She casts herself as “not a Wall Street or Albany insider.” She neglects to mention her past affiliation with the Republican party.

April 11, 2010

Schneiderman announces his bid for attorney general.

April 13, 2010

The New York Observer announces that Harlem City Councilwoman Inez Dickens, an influential district leader in the Manhattan Democratic County Organization, is endorsing Schneiderman.

the legislature in New York. Now clearly, Senator Schneiderman did win, but I mean, I would say that I think there was maybe even a little more animosity towards the Assembly, maybe so, than the Senate, and maybe that's just my bias, I dunno. But it was a tough year, where clearly trying to be the outsider was one of the key buzzwords in our race, to be pegged as so much of an insider was certainly a challenge. Again, I think we, in my mind, we did a fairly good job of trying to differentiate Richard as not your typical elected official, that he is someone that has kind of marched to the beat of his own drummer and gone against the party, at times, when need be, and really stood out on his own. But I certainly think it had an impact. I mean, as far as when we really thought that we were going to have problems, it really came down to fundraising. When I joined the campaign, I think it was in late March or early April of 2010, but the January filing for the campaign was, I think 1.4 to 1.5 million.

Which, I know folks within Richard's organization thought that would really be a good head-start, and of course, he filed, and I think we were in fourth place in the January reports. I think just the amount of money that was being raised in the primary, especially from some of the front-runners ended up becoming a huge challenge of just having the necessary resources. And then, like Josh said, we also were banking fairly heavily on a *Times* endorsement. That was certainly a big turning point, as well. But even before then, I think, not being able to raise as much money as some of the others was going to be the biggest challenge.

But it was a tough year, where clearly trying to be the outsider was one of the key buzzwords in our race, to be pegged as so much of an insider was certainly a challenge.

—Jon Lipshutz

MR. SMITH: Okay, thank you. Eric Phillips from the Rice campaign.

MR. ERIC PHILLIPS: Thank you. Yeah, like John said, I think our campaign saw it as important at the start to get out as the perceived front-runner in a campaign that wanted to be the front-runner, and embraced that because of the short time span of the race. I mean, we viewed this as a sprint and not a marathon. And for the most part, I think that helped our amazing fundraising team amass the war chest that we did and made us a credible candidate very early on. So I think while in a lot of races you may not want that label, it was something we didn't mind, given the calendar of the race. It's tough, and we knew this going in, for a relatively moderate prosecutor from Long Island to win a five-rate Democratic primary in the state of New York. And we knew that other campaigns would try to push us left and we didn't want to go that way, mostly because that's not who the DA is, but also, we didn't want there to be a real substantial pivot after the primary and heading into the general election, which we anticipated would be a difficult general election.

So that said, we positioned ourselves, hopefully, as left-of-center, but as a tough prosecutor from Long Island, because that's who she was, and in a position where we thought we'd be a viable general election candidate, as well. And the front-runner status of being able to raise money really added a lot of credibility to the race. Where we started to have problems, I think, was early on in the spring, I believe, and I don't remember the exact timeline of how they rolled out. But when the Schneiderman campaign really started coalescing, a lot of the major labor support around the state was something that we were concerned about. Because we thought we could keep a lot of those unions, at least frozen, maybe not some of them, but the majority of them. And then we'd scoop up some of the building trades. And some of that happened, but they ended up putting together a lot more political support from the institutional players, which mattered hugely in this race. And we knew that early on—I think it was early summer that we started noticing that they were amassing more than we anticipated.

April 14, 2010

The head of the Dutchess County Democratic Committee gives Schneiderman his first county-level endorsement. The healthcare workers union 1199/SEIU also endorses Schneiderman.

April 15, 2010

Elizabeth Holtzman, a former New York City Comptroller, releases a poll saying she'd

be ahead if she entered the attorney general race. The poll showed that in a hypothetical seven-way race, Holtzman would have the lead with 29 percent, over Rice's 9 percent. Schneiderman and Denise O'Donnell had 4 percent each, while Brodsky had 2 percent and Dinallo and Coffey each had 1 percent of the vote.

April 16, 2010

Coffey issues a letter to supporters stating that he is committing \$2 million toward his campaign for attorney general.

April 19, 2010

All the Democratic candidates appear at the Somos El Futuro conference. Schneiderman, introduced as an "honorary Dominican," is one of the hosts

of the reception. Gov. David Paterson speaks warmly of Schneiderman but stops short of an official endorsement.

April 22, 2010

Coffey officially announces his bid for attorney general.

MR. SMITH: Thank you, I guess we're up to the Coffey campaign.

MR. BRUCE GYORY: We had a plan and the plan was to see that upstate is key. We had tracked that the upstate share of the vote in a Democratic primary had grown to 30 percent. In this primary, it amounted to 31 percent when the votes were counted. No candidate had an automatic base upstate, and in a five-way divided field, if you could establish upstate as the base, and we felt we matched up well with upstate on any number of grounds, so we attempted to do that. The second part of the strategy was to finish second everywhere else, which meant in New York City and in the suburbs. There, that's where we fell down. And the key was *The Times*, for a bunch of reasons, especially if you could package *The Times* the way, for instance, Cy Vance had done, and pick up *The Post* and/or *The Daily News* and *Crain's* in that, so that you had, in effect, an editorial sweep.

We were not able to do that. Since you're going to get to *The Times*, I think that's a fascinating story, although, it's our perception of what happened there. Now where we fell down, part of that strategy was to play the old David Garth playbook. And it is amazing to me how few people play the David Garth playbook, which is, the conventional wisdom is, wait till Labor Day to gun your TV advertising—that's when people pay attention. When, in fact, David Garth has proven time and time again—with Hugh Carey in '74, with Ed Koch in '77, even to an extent, Bloomberg, although that's a little different situation. That you take advantage of the summer, define the campaign, go out early on the TV ads, and even though people are intermittently away on vacation, you build up momentum for when the tabloids take over the race after Labor Day, when the free press drives the coverage rather than everybody's ads crossing out. And I think our mistake was, and this was an internal debate in the campaign between fields—which you needed for downstate and TV, which you needed for upstate—was we did not start that TV campaign in early August when we originally planned to, and started contemporaneously with the Rice campaign around the 17th or 18th or 19th that week, and that didn't give

us sufficient time. Though we did well upstate—we got 28 percent of the vote, we finished a strong second to Rice, led me to joke to Sean to please never drive alone in Nassau County after this primary because you won't get out alive. Habeas Corpus will be suspended because I think it's clear when you study the numbers, that Coffey's rise from nothing to 28 percent upstate is what opened the door for the Schneiderman downstate strategy to work.

And part in parcel of that was that the suburbs, in a Democratic primary, is too narrow a base to build the Democratic primary victory. Ed Koch found that out in 1982 when this was the highest suburban vote share it's ever been. It was 17 percent. But it's usually 15 percent, so even if you sweep the suburbs or Long Island, which is about two thirds of the suburban vote by a large margin, it's not nearly enough. The other thing is, just 'cause I'm a geek who likes to study historical voting trends, this turnout was the closest match to the Democratic registration base, broken down regionally, of any primary in the history of New York politics. The registration base breakdown for the Democratic party is 53 percent from upstate, 29 percent from—53 percent from New York City, 29 percent from upstate and eight percent from the suburbs. The actual turnout was 52 percent of the vote came from New York City, 31 percent, upstate and 17, the suburbs. So where we fell down was not going out early enough and then *The Times* allowed Eric Schneiderman to recast the campaign and tribute to them for the way they rolled it out.

I think that a lot of folks thought turnout was going to be low. I don't know if anybody thought it was going to be this low. I mean, it was amazingly low.

—Mike Rabinowitz

April 23, 2010

Coffey is the first candidate to hit the airwaves, releasing an ad about fighting for “the little guy.”

Dinallo announces new hires in his campaign: election lawyer Jerry Goldfeder, who served as a campaign lawyer for Bill Thompson's mayoral campaign and Mark Green's public advocate campaign, as well as for Andrew Cuomo; Kirk

Swanson, a former political director for RWDSU; and Lauren Passalacqua, who has been named press secretary. Jack Downey assumes the title of deputy campaign manager, and Lisa Hernandez Gioia and the Esler Group will be supporting the campaign through fundraising.

April 26, 2010

Both Schneiderman and Brodsky are endorsed by State Senator Suzi Oppenheimer.

May 1, 2010

The Democratic Rural Conference straw poll results are announced, with Eric Dinallo in the lead, followed by Rice, Coffey, Schneiderman and Brodsky, in that order.

May 6, 2010

EMILY's List endorses Rice for attorney general.

May 11, 2010

Citizen Action endorses Schneiderman.

May 12, 2010

Denise O'Donnell endorses Rice, ending speculation that O'Donnell herself might run.

Our path to victory was to use who our candidate was, his strengths as a progressive.

—Emily Arsenault

MR. SMITH: So I assume your strategy was purely to woo *The New York Times*.

MS. EMILY ARSENAULT: That was very interesting. This is Emily from the Eric Schneiderman campaign. I think, just briefly, our path to victory was to use who our candidate was, his strengths as a progressive. And obviously, we knew going in that New York City, as you said, was a huge share of the primary vote and we did do a lot of focusing on that.

I think it was tough being a state senator, like you said. And being from that body this year. And then also, I think one of our challenges that maybe was a downfall for us in the beginning, was our fundraising didn't begin very well. We had to sort of catch up. I think that hurt us a little bit. We could have come out a little stronger if we'd had a little bit more resources. But I think you're right, *The New York Times* was hugely helpful to us, and it was part of our strategy. Blake and Mike, do you want to add something?

MR. MIKE RABINOWITZ: This is Mike from Berlin Rosen, the Schneiderman campaign. I think one other piece is that if you look at the results, I think one place we were pleasantly surprised was where Schneiderman did in the northern suburbs and the Hudson Valley. And part of that is that they're part of the New York media market and so, when you're focusing on New York, at least with TV, you do get the ancillary benefit of communicating with a significant portion of New York City or the suburban primary voters. And so, obviously, I think it's a testament to Eric's message that

Mike Rabinowitz of the Schneiderman campaign talks about the primary in the race for Attorney General.

the same message was able to bring out the vote in both places.

MR. SMITH: And the message was to run left, right? And I guess I wonder, was that there from the start? Or was that a reaction to the field?

MR. BLAKE ZEFF: It was both. I mean, look, so Eric Schneiderman's the candidate, obviously he's very progressive. This is not the year to run as you know, we've got the Albany experience—that clearly is not the message that's going to work. But I think as a general rule in a Democratic primary, where the voters are coming out in what was thought would be a relatively low turnout primary, running as the most progressive candidate is something that seemed like a very natural, obvious fit. And I realize that not every—is that better? I realize that not every campaign or candidate had that kind of natural fit. For us, it was a very natural fit and I think that with attorney general races or controller



May 16, 2010

Donovan announces he will be running for attorney general on the theme of cleaning up Albany. He receives Mayor Michael Bloomberg's endorsement.

May 18, 2010

Rice says that she plans to sue the federal government over the Defense of Marriage Act if she becomes New York's

next attorney general. She is criticized for her stand on the Rockefeller Drug Law Reform, which she had formerly not endorsed.

May 19, 2010

Schneiderman receives the endorsement of the Long Island Progressive Coalition.

May 20, 2010

A group of Working Families Party members sends a letter to their fellow members, calling Schneiderman the "only choice" to receive the labor-backed party's endorsement.

May 24, 2010

A Siena College poll finds Donovan trailing Rice by 18 points. Donovan is behind Coffey 35-27; Brodsky 34-28;

Schneiderman 33-28; and Dinallo 32-28.

May 25, 2010

New York State Democrats decided to allow a place on the primary ballot for all five candidates for attorney general. Schneiderman picks up two United Auto Workers endorsements as he heads into the Democratic convention.

racers, there may be a temptation to kind of talk about the position and talk about issues that are seen as very relevant to the office.

But I think as a matter of strategy, being the most progressive candidate and really hammering that every single day, which we did, was very effective for us. And also, very frankly, in response to your question about the field, we did regard Rice as our chief competitor. We didn't take anyone for granted. I mean, we were very concerned that we were somewhat demographically similar to Richard Brodsky, we were aware that Dinallo had a good story to tell and had raised money early on and obviously did quite well at the DRC. Coffey, obviously, had the money to spend and a good team behind him. But Rice was really the big concern upfront because she was leading in the early polls, had a lot of money, had a very good demographic profile, was perceived to have the support of some very powerful forces, which I'm sure will come up later in this discussion. So, as a result, that was also a very natural contrast for us. We were sure that we could get the progressive versus conservative or moderate wedge, if you will, to effect. And that really was the strategy that we used throughout the primary.

MR. SMITH: Thanks, Blake. I'm like, slightly reminded, I think it's in the Harry Potter books where you're not allowed to mention the name Voldemort because he appears? But actually, Azi Paybarah from WNYC, has a question on that point and he'll take the risk.

COURTING CUOMO

MR. AZI PAYBARAH: Thank you very much. Thanks for opening the door to that question, Blake. I'm kind of curious as to—from each of the campaigns, it was pretty clear that Andrew Cuomo was going to be the person at the top of the ticket, sort of leading the Democrats this year. And I'm wondering what level of communication and what sort of contact did you guys have with the campaign? And how did you guys position yourselves?

But I think as a matter of strategy, being the most progressive candidate and really hammering that every single day, which we did, was very effective for us.

I don't think we ever really thought we had a serious shot at getting the attorney general's endorsement, so just to be clear about that. We were never trying to get his endorsement. It was stopping Kathleen Rice from getting it.

—Blake Zeff

'Cause it seemed like everyone was going for that endorsement. And how much did you guys want it versus how much you were trying to navigate around other people getting it. So the Andrew Cuomo question.

MR. SMITH: And I think I'd like to start with Eric on that.

MR. PHILLIPS: We wanted it. I think, in terms of communication, I suspect from a staff level there was very little if not no communication, and I suspect that that was similar from staff sort of across the board. And when you're talking about actual principles, I think or at least suspect that the frequency of our contact with the governor elect was similar to the contact that every other candidate, probably, in the race had. And just from a Democratic Party standpoint, I think that was set up that way. But surely I think everybody in the race wanted it. I don't think anybody's going to say they didn't. Though to us, I think it became relatively clear, probably in an earlier stage than people would guess, that he was going to stay out. It was just our

May 27, 2010

At the State Democratic Convention, Rice earns first place with 36 percent of the vote, Schneiderman receives 27 percent, Brodsky gets 26 percent, Dinallo receives 7.7 percent, and Coffey tallies with 1.7 percent.

June 2, 2010

New York State Republicans nominate Dan Donovan.

June 3, 2010

Schneiderman's list of endorsements continues to grow, with the addition of the NY County Democrats.

June 4, 2010

City Hall News reports that the first question posed to Dan

Donovan after he officially became a candidate for attorney general boiled down to: "Do you really think you can win?" A Republican has not been elected to an open seat in New York State in 16 years.

Most Democratic candidates for attorney general skip the Working Families Party convention.

June 6, 2010

The WFP endorses three lawyers from New York City who may be changed for other candidates closer to the election. Schneiderman predicts he and Andrew Cuomo will both end up with the support of the Working Families Party come November.

Eric Phillips, representing the Rice campaign, explains their perspective.

sense early on I would say. And it obviously came to be true, but I think it was probably earlier than people would guess.

MR. SMITH: Was there anything you were sort of specifically doing tactically to try to win his endorsement?

MR. PHILLIPS: Sure. I think all the campaigns will tell you they were certainly proposing policy and talking about issues that would make for a better ticket in the general election, so to speak. And we were certainly doing that and we were hoping that that would work and I bet other campaigns were, as well.

MR. SMITH: I guess I'm interested in the other side of that. I guess the context to this is that Nick Confessore reported in *The Times* in May, and I think it had sort of become clear before then, as he put it, "Aides and allies of Mr. Cuomo have moved quietly and methodically to bolster Kathleen Rice." And there was certainly—he did a lot of things short of an endorsement to make clear that she was his candidate.

MS. ARSENAULT: Early on—from early on, our polling told us that an Andrew Cuomo endorsement would be huge for any of the primary candidates. It would be a major boost. So of course, we wanted that, probably like any other campaign did. I think we spent a lot of time—in a short primary, we spent a lot of time



working on gaining political support. And I would definitely say that around the time of the DRC, it did very much feel like we didn't have a lot of support from insiders within the Democratic party, I would say. And I did feel like—but it was all anecdotal, there wasn't anything to really point to. But it did feel very much like we were not the front-runner, we never felt like we were the front-runners. And I think we ran a campaign that always felt like we were never banking on the endorsement of Andrew Cuomo.

MR. SMITH: I mean, is there anything specific you did?

MR. ZEFF: Yeah, I mean, look, very candidly, as opposed to just candidly, Emily's right, we had this early poll and I would say, even more somewhat hyperbolically, the poll showed us that specifically, if Kathleen Rice got Cuomo's endorsement that we were done. She had so many advantages to begin with, if you recall, money not being the least. But having that would be nearly fatal to us. So, to some extent, while I mention that the message strategy was about, "We're the most progressive in the race" and framing

We viewed this as a sprint and not a marathon.

—Eric Phillips

June 12, 2010

Brodsky, Coffey, Dinallo, and Schneiderman debate in Dutchess at Tymor Park, in an event organized by the Dutchess County Democratic Committee. Rice is a no-show.

June 15, 2010

Schneiderman announces his LGBT rights agenda, stating that he is prepared to sue schools and school districts

that ignore bullying and harassment of lesbian, gay and transgender students. Like Rice, he plans to sue the federal government over the Defense of Marriage Act. He also pledges to investigate drug companies that are engaged in price-gouging of AIDS medications.

June 20, 2010

A *New York Daily News* poll question, "Which Democrat impresses you the most?" shows Schneiderman in the lead with 28 percent, followed by Coffey with 24 percent and Rice with 19 percent. Dinallo gets 9 percent, and Brodsky gets 6 percent.

June 21, 2010

The New York Daily News reveals that campaign records show Coffey and his former law firm Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossmann made huge donations to pension fund powerbrokers and received hundreds of millions in pension-related legal fees.



Eduardo Castell, of the Sean Coffey campaign, speaks about behind-the-scenes financial considerations.

that. We also thought that it was an issue that would, we hoped, create a bit of pause for the attorney general or governor elect.

MR. CHALIAN: I just want to ask one follow up to that, which is, was the goal for that then, when you chose that policy issue, to send a signal and in terms of a positive appeal to Cuomo, or was it more to—you mentioned Russell Simmons, but all the other supporters that he went out to court, that have worked hard on the Rockefeller Drug Laws over the years, to have them apply pressure to him to stay on the sidelines? Or no, this was a pure, direct appeal, like, simply to the attorney general that you were going to take up this issue?

MR. ZEFF: Okay, yeah, I should be more specific. The first thing I should mention is I don't think we ever really thought we had a serious shot at getting the attorney general's endorsement, so just to be clear about that. We were never trying to get his endorsement. It was stopping Kathleen Rice from getting it. And to some extent, we wouldn't have been too pleased if Coffey got it, either, and that became an issue later on. But certainly at the beginning, it was stopping that from happening. And it wasn't sending a message to the attorney general, of course, but it was an attempt to influence the dynamics of the race so that we were talking about an issue that we felt very positive about and we felt very comfortable with and that they would hopefully feel uncomfortable with. But that also happened to be an issue that we felt was probably important to the attorney general. But similar to that, the dynamics of that were, as this debate kept on going, every day we tried to figure out a new way to keep it going, whether it was challenging her to a debate on the issue or having letters from Eric or letters from surrogates. And you got to a point where you had African-American and Latino elected officials, essentially saying that they didn't think that Kathleen Rice was fit to be nominee of the party because of her position on this.

the race about who's the most progressive, the other kind of, correlative strategy that we had was how do we stop Andrew Cuomo from endorsing Kathleen Rice? And that really informed a ton of what we did. And so, many of the reporters in this room will probably remember asking me, "Why the heck are you guys talking about Rockefeller drug laws all the time? This is not relevant to the office." Well, after Andrew Cuomo lost the race in 2002 for governor and he was trying to kind of rehabilitate some of his relationships as many will recall, Rockefeller Drug Law Reform was one of his big issues.

I mean, you know, he worked with Russell Simmons on that and it was a big thing for him. And this was a perfect issue for us, Eric had been front and center on leading the reforms, we knew that Ms. Rice had not been, although there may be some debate about that, but from our perspective, we thought that there was certainly a gap between Eric's record and DA Rice's on

June 23, 2010

Rice takes swipes at her running-mates, making clear that Brodsky and Schneiderman are among those whom she believes fall under the scope of "insider politics." Dinallo signs New York Uprising pledge to reform Albany.

July 8, 2010

DC37 endorses Brodsky, who also has the backing of the Communication Workers of America. Schneiderman has the support of 1199/SEIU as well as 32BJ. Rice too has her share of union support, including the New York City Building and Construction Trades Council.

July 9, 2010

Public Advocate Bill de Blasio sends out a letter requesting donations to Schneiderman's campaign, and promoting Schneiderman's "diverse grassroots coalition."

July 12, 2010

At the invitation of Public Advocate Bill de Blasio, all five Democratic candidates agree to urge Gov. Paterson to sign

a law to get rid of the NYPD's stop-and-frisk database.

July 15, 2010

Candidates release their fundraising numbers. Rice leads the Democratic field, with \$2.9 million, then Schneiderman with \$2.1 million, Dinallo with \$1.7 million, Brodsky with \$1.6 million, Coffey with \$2.9 million (including \$2 million from himself) and Donovan with \$511,276.

And these were kind of signals that we were trying to send, not directly to the attorney general, but to try to effect the dynamics of the race that would be harder for him to then endorse her.

MR. SMITH: And Eddie, did you guys have a Cuomo strategy?

MR. EDUARDO CASTELL: Yeah, I think just to support what's been said so far. Andrew Cuomo endorsing a candidate, we felt, could be a definitive moment in the campaign, particularly Kathleen Rice, which was what it seemed that he was more inclined to do. And I think for many people, as Blake said, that may have, you know, sort of really, completely changed the race and put it out of reach for a couple of folks. I think for us, in our analysis, a Cuomo endorsement was important, too. We viewed, you know, the perspective, as someone else, I think, had mentioned, was the issue of matching up well with Cuomo for the general against Donovan. That was an argument we made, that you can make slightly to voters, although Democratic primary voters will tend to think less about the general, they're gonna vote for the candidate they're voting for. So there was a little bit of that discussion, but it was certainly also very tactically to have Cuomo rethink whether he wanted to endorse Kathleen. In our analysis, it became clear at one point that Cuomo would not be endorsing Schneiderman or Brodsky through his own words and his own actions. It seemed at one point

in that race, after the early sort of strength of Eric, to Dinallo to create some attention and be a viable candidate. Towards the summer, we started to see how it was going to be hard for him to break out and we thought that really, the sort of viability of a Cuomo endorsement could be, if it wasn't Kathleen, could be us as a possible second choice, but really he was only going to endorse somebody who could win.

There was absolutely no upside to who was going to be the Democratic nominee for governor of the state to take a risk before he's in a general election with a candidate and have his first, in a sense, very big political act be a gamble that he loses on. So for us, you know, while assessing all those other elements I discussed, the key was for us to seem viable. And I think that that issue of viability was very, very important throughout the race because number one, Sean was completely from the outside, had no political relationships, which was something you were stressing in your messaging, but was hard in what was clearly the second discussion. There's the public discussion always in the race and then there's the inside discussion, right? And the inside discussion became very much about viability. And being able to show that viability, whether it was cash that you had, whether it was your growing influence, the fact that he's getting around—those are things that we wanted to continuously show to the Cuomo campaign, to say, "Hey, we're viable, we're gonna have stuff at the stretch." And really, we wanted to stay out of what became the battle between, the public battle between Schneiderman and Rice. Because we didn't want, we didn't have to sort of knock down Rice because quite honestly we thought the Schneiderman folks were gonna do it because they had more to lose than us in a way, so we wanted to sort of play a much more strictly positive messaging there. And I think that was a lot of the strategy and the dynamic around the Cuomo endorsement. And I think the second piece of that—I think that's important—not to change the topic, but the Cuomo endorsement, I think, was so, so relevant and we all thought so influential because I think the most striking part of the election for me and I'm sure, I think for some of my other colleagues around the table was the disengagement of the voters in this race.

There's the public discussion always in the race and then there's the inside discussion, right? And the inside discussion became very much about viability.

There was obviously a budget. I mean, he's not a billionaire, he's not a bottomless pit.

—Eduardo Castell

July 16, 2010

The Democratic candidates for New York attorney general meet for their first televised debate, with few memorable moments. The only major disagreement is over drug law reform.

July 17, 2010

Schneiderman is involved in a parking-garage fender bender. *New York Magazine* speculates "...in a primary race with four

other Democrats, none of whom voters really know anything about, Schneiderman is now in danger of becoming 'the hit-and-run guy.'"

July 19, 2010

Schneiderman is endorsed by Sen. Antoine Thompson, D-Buffalo, as well as the Hispanic Alliance of Western New York, and the local affiliates of Citizen Action,

1199/SEIU, the United Auto Workers and former Mayor David Dinkins.

July 20, 2010

The New York Hotel and Motel Trades Council, AFL-CIO (HTC) endorses Schneiderman. More than 90 elected officials, labor unions and progressive organizations are now supporting Schneiderman. With the endorsements of HTC,

1199, and 32BJ, Schneiderman has assembled the support of the three most highly coveted field operations in New York.

Rice fails to show up for two debates, the first at CUNY, the second at Cardozo Law.

It was absolutely incredible. You had five all qualified candidates with interesting narratives, with records to speak of, whether it was in public service or outside. You had a series of debates that got going relatively early in a campaign cycle. I think the *Crain's* debate may have been the first one and I recall it was fairly early in the summer and you still had, I think it was a down ballot race always has a hard time breaking through. You had, you didn't have a contested primary for government—

DEEP POCKETS

MR. SMITH: Can I ask you a quick question about the Coffey campaign? Because I do want to immediately then return to this question of disengagement. But, I mean, Sean Coffey, there was a perception that he might reach into his pocket and outspend everybody. That didn't wind up happening. I think you guys spent ballpark, what everybody else did. Was there a sort of chicken-in-the-egg thing in there? Was there a moment when he might have gone and poured a whole lot more money into the race? Or was there always a fixed sum that he was going to spend?

MR. CASTELL: No, I think there was—

MR. SMITH: I mean, did you start with a number?

MR. CASTELL: Clearly, there was a hope of, you know, you'd spend what you'd need to spend. But there was obviously a budget. I mean, he's not a billionaire, he's not a bottomless pit. He was never going to just self-finance. There was, basically, if you were close, I think the number could always edge a little bit more because—

MR. SMITH: But there wasn't some big pool waiting in reserve?

MR. CASTELL: No, there was. I mean, he was a guy who sort of has done well for himself, but really, he made his money on that last five years of a long career. He was in public service for a lot of years. So he was seen as this bottomless pit, which he obviously was not. He's made

some money for himself and was willing to spend it, understanding that he had to spend some money to be viable, but he made a point of raising the first bunch of money that he raised, he raised in a couple of months completely outside without putting in any of his own money to show some viability, I think, to himself, as well as to his circle, and publicly.

But I think the issue that he had money and that he could finish strong became an issue that we did use, obviously, right? So he wasn't going to run out of gas and there was a truth to that without meaning that it was a bottomless pit.

INSIDE BASEBALL

MR. GYORY: Can I come back a second, because the endorsement question is, I think, important 'cause it came up with *The Times* and it came up with

The blogs are an inside baseball game that make you feel very good, and the woman to my right was magnificent in generating terrific coverage for us out of the blogs, but you don't crack through to voters unless you break through in the print press.

The majority of the primary vote from New York City is minority—black, Hispanic, Asian, biracial—if you're cut off from the minority vote in New York City, you can't win a statewide Democratic primary.

—Bruce Gyory

July 22, 2010

Donovan sends a letter to state Independence Party chairman Frank MacKay to withdraw from consideration for the party's nomination.

July 24, 2010

Following sudden press attention on the issue, Rice refers to record of not voting until her late 30s as a "youthful mistake."

July 25, 2010

All five Democratic candidates square off at the taping of their first televised debate. All are in favor of legalizing same-sex marriage; only Rice says she would not defend the existing ban against challenges. All also oppose the NYPD's controversial "stop and frisk" database. Only Brodsky is opposed to the location of the proposed Islamic Center by the

World Trade Center site.

July 28, 2010

Quinnipiac University Poll: When asked if they knew who they would vote for, with no names offered, 81 percent of Democrats said "no." Only 3 percent could name any of the five candidates while 9 percent offered names of people whose names were not on the Democratic primary

ballot. When Democrats are offered the names of the five contenders for Attorney General, 11 percent pick Rice, with no one else topping 5 percent -- and 73 percent undecided.

August 3, 2010

Schneiderman releases a policy book, referring to it as "the most sweeping and comprehensive policy proposal

Representing the Coffey campaign, Bruce Gyory discusses the importance of print media coverage.

now governor elect and attorney general Cuomo's endorsement. You have to figure out, there's no one rule of whether endorsements help or not. Endorsements did nothing for Ed Musky, but editorial endorsements were key to Ed Koch when he won in '77, but did nothing for him in '82. Endorsements did not help David Yassky beat John Liu, but endorsements were very key, editorial endorsements and union endorsements, why? What makes endorsements one year helpful and maybe even determinative, but in another year they don't count for anything? And I think it's the dynamic of this race. It was five qualified candidates, but in an undercard race, where the public didn't really have a feel for it. For example, endorsements were not as important to Andrew Cuomo running for attorney general in 2006. He was a known quantity with a known name. None of the five of us, and certainly if you included Donovan, coming into this race, were able to pierce that barrier of 20 percent, much less 50 percent—

MR. SMITH: Was anybody not surprised by how little voters paid attention to you? I mean, there's always this sense inside a campaign that it's the most important thing in the world and you're shocked when you go outside and nobody has any idea it's going on. And was anybody factoring that into their strategy from the start?

MR. GYORY: Yes, absolutely because I'm old enough, maybe Wayne and I are the only people in the room old enough to remember, but I'm old enough to remember the Beam/Lindsay/Buckley campaign in '65, which was played out every single day by articles in the print press, following the campaign and position papers, versus today where you scramble to get a blog mention—

MR. SMITH: So how does that affect your strategy, then?

MR. GYORY: Because you can't—the blogs are an inside baseball game that make you feel very good, and the woman to my right was magnificent in generating



terrific coverage for us out of the blogs, but you don't crack through to voters unless you break through in the print press. And unless you did something very bad or raised a lot of money, for instance, I'll give you an example—the real reason we announced in April that Sean Coffey was going to put two million dollars of his own money into the campaign was because *The Times* covered that, but in the context of that interview, that was the first time we got our reform agenda out. So I mean, that's not a shot at the press, I'm not criticizing, but it's just if you guys want substantive campaigns, you may need to go back to the way we ran campaigns in 1965 when it was played out in the print press and that's not the way it is now. So now, unless you take out ads on TV or hit mailboxes with direct mail, you're not going to be able to crack through, especially in the absence of an over card. So unless you have a mayoral race in New York City or a gubernatorial race, not even a U.S. Senate primary will bring you that critical math-

book any candidate for this office has ever released.”

August 5, 2010

Empire State Pride Agenda endorses Schneiderman.

Rice's camp sends out a long list of endorsers from Queens, including City Councilman James Gennaro, City Councilwoman Karen Koslowitz and City Councilman Mark Weprin.

August 13, 2010

Former City Comptroller Bill Thompson endorses Schneiderman.

August 17, 2010

The first TV ad for Rice hits the airwaves.

August 18, 2010

The Stonewall Democrats of Western New York endorse Schneiderman.

August 20, 2010

The New York Times and *New York Amsterdam News* endorse Schneiderman, citing his commitment to ethical government. Schneiderman releases his first TV ad.

August 22, 2010

The New York Daily News and *Crain's Business* endorse Dinallo, citing his first-rate legal experience.

August 26, 2010

The Citizen's Union, Reverend Al Sharpton and Manhattan Borough President Scott Stringer endorse Schneiderman.

August 30, 2010

Schneiderman receives endorsements from prominent members of the city's Haitian population.



Josh Brumberger of the Dinallo campaign for Attorney General on influential endorsements.

MR. SMITH: Okay, I'd like to keep it like this, as narrowly focused on these campaigns as we can. John? Sure, yeah.

MR. CASTELL: I think, you know, Bruce finished up the point, which was the Cuomo endorsement was so important because it would have, in a crowded field, with a disengaged electorate—the Cuomo campaign would have basically put a rocket on that candidate and endorsement, would have been a rocket on that candidate, that candidate would have become the new story because you would have done some campaigning and would have, in a sense, had somebody break out.

I think one of the key things that I think we can all agree on, it was like—how do you break out of five? And that was a disengaged electorate and a crowded, qualified field—how do you break out? That was a major question that I think we were all fighting for. I think Eric's campaign very smartly, they decided to

not try to break out to everyone. They defined him and said, "This is who we are, this is who we're going to play to." And I think that worked. I think the second piece that was very important, just from an endorsing standpoint, is the unions. I think the institutional support for Eric that didn't get a lot of play, you know, they get an endorsement here, three days later they get another endorsement through these little blurbs in the paper. It didn't matter from a press perspective. But we, I think, the same as Rice's campaign, you saw what was beginning to be was the creation of an infrastructure. I think you saw it in 2009 with the de Blasio and John Liu, which was a unified, for the most part, not completely unified, but a somewhat unified labor coalition in a disengaged electorate. Their ability to create infrastructure, particularly to bring out the troops in a Democratic primary, in particular, was exceedingly important. And you look at the 2009 mayoral race, you know, fifty thousand point difference, the question is, quite honestly, if you would have had another two million dollars in the campaign, which I was somewhat familiar with, or let's say you would have had a unified labor front, UFT 1199, hotel/motel trades, three large unions with infrastructures, maybe if they would have been involved and SEIU BJ, would that have been fifty thousand votes? And then you saw in this Democratic primary, as well, statewide primary, that the candidate who had the institutional labor support was able—and that doesn't take away anything from the campaign, I think it was a strategic decision from the campaign to piece that together, that created an incredible get-out-the-vote, turn-out-the-vote effort in a low turnout primary that I think was very, very important.

MR. SMITH: Do you think that's right? Did you sort of—I mean, there's always, people are always writing off the machine as dead and only media campaigns matter. Could you have won without this sort of labor machine?

MR. RABINOWITZ: Not in an election this close, which I think this one was gonna be. I mean, I dunno, I think that a lot of folks thought turnout was going to be low.

Quinnipac Poll: When registered Democrats were asked in an open-ended question who they would vote for in the primary, 77 percent don't know; 8 percent name someone who is not on the ballot; 4 percent name Rice; 3 percent name Schneiderman; 1 percent name Brodsky; and 1 percent name Coffey.

September 7, 2010

The *New York Observer* endorses Schneiderman. The *Riverdale Review* endorses Brodsky.

Rice snags endorsement from NYC comptroller John Liu, known to rally the Asian-American community.

September 8, 2010

WNYC's The Brian Lehrer Show hosts a live debate between

the Democratic nominees, in which the candidates appear to gang up on Schneiderman, who is gaining traction. The show posts an informal poll on the website *ItsAFreeCountry.org*, asking listeners: who won the debate? The results: Dinallo, with 41.6 percent of the vote. Coffey came in second, and Schneiderman third. Rice and Brodsky tied for last place.

September 9, 2010

As promised at WNYC, Schneiderman forwards copies of his 2009 tax returns to reporters. The most interesting items: \$65,214 in itemized deductions claimed for "un-reimbursed work expenses" and \$10,295 for "financial management."

I don't know if anybody thought it was going to be this low. I mean, it was amazingly low. And obviously, in a low turnout election, the ability to communicate with folks matters, which comes down to money and institutional support. And I think we were very smart about which portion of the electorate we wanted to reach. We knew who they were, we knew what messages resonated with them and then we spent a lot of our energy focused on reaching them. And so, the unions were helpful in two ways. One is obviously the hotel/motel trades council, 1199, 32 BJ, other unions like UAW—on election day they had a ton of folks out on the street for us, which meant we could go to poll sites where there were other races that were actually bringing people out and make sure that they knew that someone was running for attorney general and I think that helped a lot. And they also can communicate with their members, which is another huge part that is not spoken about a lot. And their decision whether or not to do that is more than just an endorsement. I mean, there are plenty of times when unions endorse but don't do anything. But if a union is sending six pieces of mail to 150,000 to 200,000 people across the state for you, that's really important.

MR. SMITH: And let's see, there's a bunch I'd like to squeeze into the last ten, fifteen minutes here.

MR. BRUMBERGER: Can I just boil it down the way I think we saw it?

The 32 BJ and 1199 coupled with The New York Times—I don't know if anyone would disagree with me at this table. The only thing that could have beaten that powerful duo was an Andrew Cuomo endorsement.

—Josh Brumberger

MR. SMITH: Yeah, sure.

MR. BRUMBERGER: The 32 BJ and 1199 coupled with *The New York Times*—I don't know if anyone would disagree with me at this table. The only thing that could have beaten that powerful duo was an Andrew Cuomo endorsement. So if you sort of—everything we've been talking about, if you sort of synthesize it a little bit, I think everyone thought that an Andrew Cuomo endorsement was the only thing powerful enough to overcome what you guys, what the Schneiderman team had put together.

MR. GYORY: I disagree. Because in reality, there were two sub-pivot points—one we touched on, one we didn't. One was the Rockefeller Drug Law. As a consequence—and no offense to the Rice campaign here, but the inability to shuck that issue and not get tripped up by it, cut her off from being able to get anywhere to the minority vote. And my sense was they probably had in the back of their head, running the way Bella Abzug used to do of having—and Marianne Crapsack—of cutting into the minority vote as the outside woman candidate, Carol Bellamy did it a little bit, too. After that, they couldn't do that. And given that the majority of the primary vote from New York City is minority—black, Hispanic, Asian, biracial—if you're cut off from the minority vote in New York City, you can't win a statewide Democratic primary. The second pivot point was at the convention. The joke was that the Rice campaign was pursuing a strategy of Snow White and the Four Dwarfs and let everybody on the ballot because they had the gender contrast. In reality, they paid a hellacious price for that because our rise upstate, getting to a full 28 percent of the vote, but for our rise upstate, Rice beats them even with 32 BJ and even with *The New York Times*. So the two interesting sub-pivot points were Rockefeller Drug Law and cutting Rice off from the minority community, and I think the decision that it was okay to—in other words, from her perspective, I would argue in retrospect and at the time, I didn't think she was wrong, so I'm not—is it hurt her a lot more not getting the designation of the convention.

September 10, 2010

Coffey calls Schneiderman a “nomination disaster for the Democratic Party” on Albany's Talk 1300-AM. Coffey also says that he is “sensing victory” and donates another \$500,000 of his own money to his campaign.

September 11, 2010

Rice runs an ad attacking Schneiderman as being a pal to the usual Albany

suspects (notably Sens. Hiram Monserrate and Pedro Espada Jr.) and presenting herself as untainted by Albany.

Sienna poll: Schneiderman 25 percent, Rice 23 percent, Coffey 13 percent, Brodsky 7 percent, Dinallo 4 percent, Don't know/no opinion 29 percent. Schneiderman has a two-to-one lead over Rice in New York City (38 to 19 percent), but Rice has a similar

35 to 18 percent lead over Schneiderman in the downstate suburbs. Upstate, Coffey has the support of 22 percent of voters and Rice has 20 percent, with the other candidates in single digits and Schneiderman finishing last.

September 12, 2010

Schneiderman releases a new web video and robocall questioning Rice's qualifications

for the job and her 2005 switch from Republican to the Democrat.

September 13, 2010

Coffey receives endorsement from the city and state firefighters unions.

To run as the front runner with the perception that you have Andrew Cuomo's endorsement and then not get the designation of the convention and not get the endorsement and then have Sean Coffey rise only in upstate, but rise upstate to a full fifty thousand votes there, 28 percent. When you lose by thirteen thousand, it is determinative.

MR. SMITH: That's a big chunk. Eric, to return to the first of those pivots, you know, the Rockefeller Drug Law thing went on and on and on, you guys, like, every day, were bleeding. Do you think you could have dealt with it differently? I mean, and did you see it coming, is the kind of a scale of an issue it was?

MR. PHILLIPS: Yeah, I mean, this is a woman who, two decades ago, was a member of the Republican party. She lives in Long Island. She's a prosecutor. The fact that we were being attacked for policies that were being delivered or communicated as though they were more moderate or more conservative was not a surprise to us. Though, I also think it allowed us, in a lot of frames, to talk about what we perceived was an advantage, which was our experience in criminal justice. So I think early on, I think it was more detrimental to us, but I think it became—we were able to somewhat, to what Bruce said—I think we somewhat were able to turn portions of that into positives on the experience front.

MR. SMITH: And then another question on your attacks on Schneiderman, which, this is something that surprised me watching the race. This attack on him as an Albany insider—why didn't that work better?

MR. PHILLIPS: That's a good question. I don't know. I mean, I think it did work, to some extent.

MR. SMITH: Okay, and I was interested in what you—

MR. PHILLIPS: To some extent, it did work and I think also, to Bruce's point, actually, and this was something I suspected after the race, that if Coffey hadn't done as well upstate that we may be looking at a different situation.

If you reapportion Coffey's votes along the same lines that in the race shows he got in each community, we

actually still would have lost by I think, about a point. It would have been a lot closer, obviously, but I don't think, technically, that he—

MR. SMITH: So no job in the Schneiderman administration for him.

MR. ZEFF: Just to get back to Josh's point and Bruce's point, I think they're both accurate, but what they turn on is who's in the race, and I think one of the surprising factors, at least to me, personally, was that all five stayed in. So that with all five in, Josh's point is exactly right. It really goes back to whether in the spring, certainly, the expectation, I think widely held was that someone or someone's—

MR. SMITH: And a Cuomo endorsement, I think, luckily, what you guys were suggesting might have even knocked you guys out, right?

MR. ZEFF: Yeah. I mean, we—I'm gonna be very candid again. We definitely had to think about it. You know, there was a deadline. I don't remember what day it was, it was probably sometime in June, right? Where we had to really, you know, there was a deadline by which if Eric Schneiderman stayed in the race, he would lose his senate seat. So there was kind of a D-Day that came up and we really had to figure this out. And it was not a slam dunk. We had to think about it. At that point in the race, I mean, heck, in July, there were polls coming out publicly that said that Rice was up by twenty five points, so in June, I suspect, it was probably similar. And there was this looming threat that the incoming attorney general might endorse her. Our fundraising was not going great at that point. So we had a decision to make.

MR. SMITH: And if Andrew had maybe endorsed her before that moment it would have changed the rest? Looking back, it's interesting.

MR. ZEFF: It certainly would have changed the race, for sure.

MR. SMITH: I guess I'd like to occupy the last few minutes of it, if you guys can try to keep it brief, I'd be interested in your asking if you have questions for

September 14, 2010

Donovan leaks word of his endorsement by former Mayor Koch, a Democrat. Koch announces it himself the next day.

The primary votes are tallied: Schneiderman 34 percent; Rice 31 percent; Dinallo 8 percent; Coffey 17 percent; and Brodsky 10 percent.

September 15, 2010

Following the primary results, Schneiderman invites Donovan to debate the role of the attorney general in regulating Wall Street.

September 19, 2010

New York Magazine runs an article on Donovan, portraying him as a business-friendly guy, backed by business interests.

September 28, 2010

Planned Parenthood Advocates of NY endorses Schneiderman.

September 29, 2010

The Village Voice links Donovan to a number of people involved in organized crime through his previous job as chief of staff to borough president Guy Molinari.

October 4, 2010

Former four-term Attorney General Robert Abrams endorses Schneiderman.

October 6, 2010

Schneiderman launches his first general election ad. He criticizes Donovan for taking Wall Street money.

each other. You know, if—I mean, I’d just like to give each campaign an opportunity to ask one question of another campaign. I guess I’ll start with the Dinallo folks.

If there’s anything—don’t feel obliged, but if there’s anything that you wound up puzzled by.

MR. BRUMBERGER: I’ll ask the Schneiderman team a question. If you had to pick one opponent that you were most worried about getting *The New York Times*’ endorsement other than yourselves, who would that opponent have been?

MR. ZEFF: I think you’ll be happy to hear this answer. We were getting indications that Dinallo was a very serious threat for them.

MR. SMITH: Do you guys regret staking so much on *The Times*? Campaigns are sort of obsessed with it here.

MR. BRUMBERGER: Our only choice. It turned out, both Andrew Cuomo and Eric Dinallo were Italian-Americans, we had to forgo that endorsement. It looked like it was our only choice.

MR. SMITH: And I mean, but do you worry that the perception that you’re staking everything on it, when you come to the editorial board and you’re saying, “Save us”—I mean, isn’t that—

MR KENNY: No, because of what we did before, including raising a substantial amount of money, doing well at the DRC, managing to get on the ballot at the convention, all in an effort to show his political viability. Obviously, his government service and his experience in the attorney general’s office made it clear that he could be an exceptional attorney general and was well prepared to do so, but political viability was the question. And our efforts really had to be for the twelve months before *The Times*, to build toward that. And also, it does go to who the candidate is and who’s going to be naturally inclined to support him. And

it went to a key slice of what we hoped would be our base.

MR. SMITH: That makes sense. Anybody else got a question for another campaign? Sure, John.

MR. LIPSHUTZ: Just a brief question. I think the Coffey folks addressed this a little bit earlier, but just the general thought about your media buy and your strategy behind kind of going up early limited on cable and doing it the way that you guys did. We just thought it was very interesting, the general philosophy behind that.

MS. TAMMY SUN: I think we had decided, or what you may be talking about is in the early, around the DRC, we made a significant buy upstate and I think that was to address the fact that one of our biggest early challenges and a challenge that I think existed through the campaign was Sean’s name recognition.



John Kenny on Dinallo campaign finances.

October 7, 2010

The state Democratic Party claims Republican Donovan improperly accepted more than \$75,000 in violation of the contribution limits against accepting campaign donations when one does not have a primary challenger. A Donovan spokesperson says any contributions above the limit would be returned.

October 12, 2010

The company that owns the New York Yankees donates \$25,000 to Donovan.

October 20, 2010

Donovan pulls all TV ads, but denies claims that the decision has to do with budgeting.

Siena Poll: Schneiderman has a small 44 to 37 percent lead over Donovan.

October 23, 2010

The Central and Northern New York Building and Construction Trades Council endorses Schniederman. The executive board of the New York Building and Construction Trades Council endorses Donovan.

October 24, 2010

The New York Daily News endorses Donovan.

October 25, 2010

Newsday endorses Donovan.

October 26, 2010

The Staten Island Advance endorses Donovan.

And so, in addition to the political and sort of making sure that some of the political doors opened for us and making sure that the press were paying attention, we felt that we had to put in money early on and do some significant buys. And in terms of staying out of the—can you talk a little about why we didn't go up as early?

MR. LIPSHUTZ: Well, I think we got caught. If we had to do over again, we would have made a much earlier buy and just gone TV early. And the other thing I think is, in credit to Eric Dinallo's campaign, they got *The Daily News* and *Crain's*, as well. And I think funny enough, if either Dinallo or Coffey had dropped out of the race and there was the one outsider, I think it would have been a very different mix. And my own sense is, and I don't know if—I guess I sense both Sean and Eric Dinallo came much closer to getting the *Times* endorsement than most people realize and the way it turned out, they were more comfortable on substantive positions, which Schneiderman and the Schneiderman campaign did a very good job of making a late run to get that endorsement. But again, it wasn't that endorsement as a stand-alone, it was that endorsement, in other words, **the** *Times* endorsement, plus *El Diario*, plus *The Amsterdam News* plus *The Labor*, was more than one plus one equals two, it equaled three or four. It was the combination factor, I think. Would you agree?

MR. SMITH: So I guess, what voodoo did you work on *The Times*? And do you see that endorsement in the same way?

MR. ZEFF: One thing I want to address that Bruce said that I think is really important—sorry, I keep forgetting to go into the microphone.

MR. SMITH: You don't have to go into the microphone, just be near it.

MR. ZEFF: One of the things that we took very seriously were these other endorsements, like *El Diario* and *Amsterdam News*. We had the same ferocity and intensity and frankly, respect for these papers. And not just the ones I just mentioned, that we did for others that might have higher circulations. And it was

certainly a big part of the strategy. And we felt that if we got these other papers—*Gay City News* is another one—that would be very important for the coalition we were trying to build. In terms of *The Times*, we treated it extremely seriously. We had many mock—obviously, people know about mock debates. We had mock-ed board sessions and many of them. I think I—

MR. SMITH: Everybody plays different characters at the editorial board?

MR. ZEFF: Yeah, I think I usually played a woman in these sessions.

MR. LIPSHUTZ: You had the key role then.

MR. SMITH: Is everyone—is that now a standard feature of a New York campaign? Did everybody do mock editorial board sessions? Yeah?

MR. ZEFF: Yeah, it was not mock like a mock debate, but it was projecting questions, but we didn't go—

MR. SMITH: No wigs.

MR. ZEFF: We role played.

MR. SMITH: Obviously that works.

MS. ARSENAULT: And if I could just add onto what Blake said. We treated it with almost the same seriousness as we did call time. In a campaign, the candidate call time is extremely important and it's a sacred time. We set aside hours of the day for mock debate that was sacred, and we did that in preparation for trying to win *The New York Times*.

I sense both Sean [Coffey] and Eric Dinallo came much closer to getting the Times endorsement than most people realize.

—Jon Lipshutz

October 28, 2010

Donovan calls a press conference to accuse Schneiderman of benefiting from a legal tax loophole which allowed him to deduct tens of thousands of dollars last year in work expenses for days when the senate was not in session. The Schneiderman campaign denies wrongdoing.

November 2, 2010

Schneiderman is declared the winner of the election, leading Donovan 56 percent to 43 percent with 88 percent of the precincts reporting, according to the Associated Press.

One of our biggest early challenges and a challenge that I think existed through the campaign was Sean's name recognition.

—Tammy Sun

MR. PHILIPS: And I think, too, just to add thing, we suspected that Eric, actually, Dinallo, was gonna get the *Times* endorsement.

And I think when that didn't happen, not only does it mean a great deal, obviously, in a Democratic primary, but I think it allowed, it gave a lot of political cover to, I think, a lot of Eric Schneiderman's supporters and electeds and unions that were with him to spend more money on his behalf, to go out and work a little harder, to do all those kind of things. And I think adding to that was how—if people remember—how early it came. It was a pretty early endorsement. And some people in our camp thought that that might not end up helping as much, but it turned out that it helped more that it was that early 'cause it really allowed you to coalesce a political support and institutional support that might not have existed if it had been just ten days before the race or anything. And you also, I mean, the other benefit of it being early—I mean, Emily can talk about the fundraising help it provides and the political help it provides. But you can communicate it, right? I mean, most people who know about The New York *Times* endorsement don't know about it because they read it in *The New York Times*, they know about it because you send it to their mailbox, you tell them in a million automated phone calls, you put it on your TV ads. I think every single one of our TV ads was able to have the *Times* endorsement in it because of when it came, which was, you know, really, really helpful.

MR. SMITH: Okay, well, I think we're out of time. Thank you all so much for doing this and for your candor.

[Applause]

MR. CHALIAN: Great job, thank you. This is not an official break. So we're going to quickly move to the general election. You guys stay put, obviously. And we'll bring on the Donovan campaign. Thank you guys very much.

ATTORNEY GENERAL, GENERAL ELECTION

THE TOP OF THE TICKET

MR. CHALIAN: We're going to head right into the general here because everyone will get a break before we go into the gubernatorial contest. Great. Again, guys, when you speak, speak into the microphone and say who you are because only we can see your names. So thank you for that. I'm going to begin with you guys for a couple very quick questions that I want to get out of the way quickly and I'm sure we will revisit some of these topics—and any of you can take this. But the first question I have here is—if Rick Lazio was at the top of ticket instead of Carl Paladino, would there be an Attorney General elect Donovan today?

MR. BRADLEY TUSK: No, there would be not. I don't believe so, no. I think that you might have had a closer election. But it would be hard to see how, given all the other factors—I think we could have done better, but no.

MR. CHALIAN: How many points, do you think, Carl Paladino was a drag for you guys in that way?

MR. TUSK: I didn't analyze it. But maybe a couple. I think Harry Wilson might be the controller, but I think that we probably still—I think it's a little closer.

MR. CHALIAN: Agreement on all frontiers in the campaign? Yes? Excellent. Blake, you said something interesting and you said it today and you said it last



Tammy Sun discusses the Coffey campaign.



Virginia Lam and Bradley Tusk talk about their work on the Donovan campaign.

night, which I know is off the record, so I won't quote you any further than you said something, I know. But you talked about occupying the progressive lane and in a way it almost surprised you that none of your other counterparts from the primary season sought to occupy that space quite as much as you guys did. Eric mentioned this in the primary discussion—take us through how you guys had to then do the pivot to the general.

They were talking about how they thought they had the candidate who would have the least tough of a time making that pivot after trying to occupy that liberal space. Take us through what you needed to do as soon as the primary was over to pivot to a general electorate.

MR. ZEFF: Well, the first thing I would say is we were woefully unprepared for the general election, we were not confident. I mean, we were cautiously optimistic that we would win the primary, but it sure was not a *fait accompli* at all, we had not really spent much time on Dan Donovan. So we found out, I think, about one o'clock in the morning on Tuesday night, Wednesday morning that we won and all of a sudden, it's like, "Okay, let's have a meeting now about Dan Donovan." And we knew that Donovan was going to be endorsed by Koch the next morning. We wanted to have a hit right out of the box.

MR. CHALIAN: Wait, literally, you did not have, like, a research file on Dan Donovan done?

MR. ZEFF: No, because you've got to get to the general election first, at least that was our thinking. And you have very limited resources, we didn't, you're going to spend all your money to get there. We had a little bit of research that had been done in secret about two or three days out and it was not a comprehensive book. And on Tuesday, when there was not much else that we could do because the voting was happening, I would kind of like, go on Google and look up Dan Donovan. And I noticed that he had said, "I don't want to be the Sheriff of Wall Street," in an interview with Reuters.

And we hadn't really tested it, but we needed a hit to do the first day, so the idea was why don't we invite him to a debate on our differing approaches to Wall Street? And so, that sorta just began that message theme and as we did a little bit of research and did a little poll testing, A: there wasn't a whole lot on Dan Donovan that was terrible. He was a very appealing candidate and didn't have a whole lot of skeletons in his closet, so this wasn't going to be a very opposition-driven campaign. There was one thing with this interstate thing which may come up, but aside from that, it turned out that Wall Street was going to be a good differentiator for us.

The other obvious thing is the abortion issue. And what was good about the Wall Street and abortion issues was that they were very viable general election issues, but they were still progressive issues.

So Eric didn't have to change who he was. Eric wasn't going from being very progressive to suddenly being a moderate conservative or something like that. We were just talking very much about two issues that he sincerely felt, but which happened, we thought, to have resonance in a general election campaign. But it happened a little bit organically, and the Wall Street thing was—just we needed a hit that day and it kind of worked out.

A RUN WITHOUT A PRIMARY

MR. CHALIAN: You guys had the luxury of not having a primary, right? And so, we just heard everything that they had gone through in that five-month period. Take us through what you were doing during that period to prepare for the general. I believe that you guys have said that you were probably most concerned, as they all were, about the Rice candidacy. But what were you doing to prepare so that there was an instant go when their primary was over? And was there something, now looking back with the hindsight of the campaign behind us, what did you not do that you should have been doing in that time?

MR. TUSK: Well, first off, I'm not even sure that I would say that not having a primary was a luxury, particularly as it pertains to raising money. Because at the end of the day, when you're raising money, you're raising money against someone as well as for your candidate. So that sort of indecision—I mean, we got in the race late. And then the primary was late, so it made it sort of difficult to frame the race as it relates to raising money, so that would be just sort of one little comment.

MS. VIRGINIA LAM: You know, Dan had announced in mid-May, and so he got in very, very late—six months to almost a year after some of the other candidates. So for us, the real challenge was increasing his name recognition. He was the DA of Staten Island, which is the southernmost county in all of New York state, it just didn't resonate upstate. So we spent most of the summer traveling and doing a lot of earned media. But again, there were five people running on the other side, no one was paying attention to the race, if they were paying attention to the race, they were paying attention to a competitive race, not ours, and so, the big challenge was really just trying to get Dan out there, trying to do as much earned media as possible and coupling that with raising money, and it was incredibly challenging up until September 15th.

MR. CHALIAN: And looking back, you see no squandered opportunity there, something you didn't do that you wanted to do that didn't get done in that period?

MR. TUSK: Sure, we didn't raise enough money. I mean, look, the nice thing about the other side was they had an incredibly tough primary, they ran a brilliant campaign—they won. Maybe they didn't have a lot of time to prepare, but the burden shifted completely to us. You have a close two-to-one registration disadvantage, you have an infrastructure that they could draw and that the other side doesn't have, so it was incumbent upon us—if no one knew anything about Dan Donovan or Eric Schneiderman, they win by the margin they win. So it was incumbent upon us to overcome that, and they had a couple of good issues, not a ton. We knew that—that's why Dan made sense as a potential candidate. But we had to overcome all of the infrastructure, sort of institutional disadvantages, and the way to do that was money. So did we have the right message? Yeah. The right endorsements? Yes. The right approach? Sure. But you needed a lot of it to get there and we didn't have nearly enough. So yeah, we failed in that we didn't come close to raising enough money.

Because at the end of the day, when you're raising money, you're raising money against someone as well as for your candidate.

Bloomberg and Koch, in a lot of ways, represented a permission structure for Independents and Democrats to cross party lines and vote for a Republican.

— Bradley Tusk

THE BLOOMBERG FACTOR

MR. CHALIAN: We talked a lot about the *Times* endorsement and the Cuomo endorsement in the context of the primary, how did you guys assess the Bloomberg backing of your opponent and the impact that that would have on the race?

MS. ARSENAULT: We were very worried about going up against Dan Donovan. He was a very formidable candidate and we assumed that he—we knew that he was getting Mayor Koch, we knew that he had the support of Bloomberg and we thought that that translated into lots of money, and so we always, we always were running and very aware that we were probably going to be outspent, that's what we thought early on and I think that was the biggest fear that we had on day one of the general and I think that's why we went right back into—okay, we're not the frontrunner, we're behind, we have to catch up. And we worked really, really hard because we thought for sure we were going to be outspent.

MR. CHALIAN: So the Bloomberg endorsement and the Bloomberg backing of Donovan, purely, you saw it as a financial thing. It wasn't bringing votes, necessarily, in a significant way, other than what votes money can buy.

MS. ARSENAULT: I think, first—yes, possibly. But first and foremost for us was the financial issue. We knew that in a statewide general election you have to be able to spend a lot of money on television you have to talk to voters state-wide. And I really thought—I think a lot of people in our campaign thought that the Bloomberg endorsement meant money.

MR. CHALIAN: Is that what you thought it meant?

MR. TUSK: I think we thought it meant a few things. No, I mean I have a sense of what a Bloomberg endorsement does and doesn't do.

MR. CHALIAN: I figured you might.

MR. TUSK: No, I think to me, Bloomberg and Koch, in a lot of ways, represented a permission structure for Independents and Democrats to cross party lines and vote for a Republican. I mean, there aren't nearly enough Republican voters to win a statewide election, so you needed to tell Democrats in Nassau, Suffolk, Rockland, Westchester, parts of the city, "Hey, it's okay to cross party lines here." For example, the ad we did with Bloomberg and Koch, I think provided that permission to a lot of people and clearly had some impact, but if we were able to run it more, it probably would have resulted in more votes. So I think it could have, but it has to mean more resources to do that, and that we didn't have.

MR. CHALIAN: Is there anything—obviously your relationship with the Bloomberg operation, you don't

get much closer. But is there anything that you asked the Bloomberg political operation to do that they didn't do?

MR. TUSK: No.

MR. CHALIAN: And so, there was no more that you wanted from them, from what Mike Bloomberg provided?

MR. TUSK: I think there's just a general misconception out there that a Mike endorsement automatically means it's some secret ten-million-dollar check comes rolling in. Somebody wrote a good story about this a couple months ago, I forgot who it was. But sorry, to the reporter—

MR. SMITH: I think it was Friedlander.

MR. TUSK: Sorry, David wrote a good story about it. The mayor does events, he'll write a check, he'll max out. But he's not a guy that gets on the phone and raises money. He might do it for a cause that he cares about, but it doesn't really matter if it's Dan Donovan or any candidate anywhere.

It's just not what he does. Might there come a race sometime where he decides, "I'm gonna throw myself into fundraising." It's possible. But that wasn't and was never gonna be ours.

INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS

MR. CHALIAN: Another topic that had come up in the primary discussion that I think could have potentially had more weight in the general election context, is the notion of the insider, Albany, in this year of the outsider. Can you guys take me through your assessment of when it looked like that was not having as much traction as you thought that it might? And the adjustment that you had to make inside the campaign or no—it was getting as much traction as you thought it would, and it didn't surprise you at the level at which that was sort of maxing out as an issue that could move voters.

MR. MARCUS REESE: We thought it was getting traction. Our polling was great, you know, so we obviously kept hammering. I mean, everybody was running on that, whether you're in Albany or not, that and the economy were underlying themes of everyone's race. So you know, we kept hammering as best we could. Back to Bradley's point, obviously to hammer something home you need resources, and at the end of the day, it doesn't matter how poignant your message may be, you still have to get it out to people. So that was always the sort of obstacle that we had to overcome.

RUNNING ON EMPTY

MR. CHALIAN: And since we're going to obviously mention money a lot and yes, it is the sort of mother's milk of politics, as we know—what was the problem with the fundraising? I remember, towards the end of the campaign, there was that big Christie fundraiser that was reportedly going to raise a couple million dollars and raised far south of that. What happened? Why was that the case?

MR. TUSK: It's a good question. I think there's a few factors.

One is you've got a guy that's never raised money before, so every call to a donor was, "Hi, I'm Donovan, can I have ten thousand dollars?" Or whatever it is. Those are hard to do. So there's no history of doing it. All of the reasons that make Dan a great person, I bet everyone in this room who's ever met him have said he's a great guy, I bet there's no one that wouldn't say that. And I think what would have made him a really good AG made him a pretty bad fundraiser. He's not the kind of guy who will aggressively—I've worked for some pretty aggressive fundraisers, and that's a certain quality that he just doesn't have. And then you're running a noncompetitive primary. And also, when everyone thought it was going to be Rice, we heard a lot was Rice, Donovan, sort of same thing—one's a Democrat, one's a Republican—it's effectively the same person. So that limited it quite a bit. That and people just weren't that interested in a down-ballot AG race. But on the flip side, the Schneiderman campaign did just a great job raising money and that's, you know, it could have been—if they had raised a lot less, then you wouldn't have had this sort of, lopsided equation. But they did a great job with it.

MR. ZEFF: Can I say something on that?

MR. CHALIAN: Please.

MR. ZEFF: Thank you, first of all, although I have nothing to do with the fundraising on behalf of the fundraising team. This issue of money, and I hope it doesn't sound like an excuse from their side because I think it's actually very legitimate and we were, just to give you a sense, we were very worried, Emily said this before. You have to remember Eric was getting outraised constantly in the primary. Kathleen Rice was putting up huge numbers, we were constantly trying to have to spin these numbers as not pathetic, "Schneiderman comes in second place and cash on hand," or "For this pe-

We locked him in a room all day and said, "You have to make these calls." And that's really a major strategic decision for us.

— Blake Zeff

To hammer something home you need resources, and at the end of the day, it doesn't matter how poignant your message may be, you still have to get it out to people.

Donors are gonna throw their money behind the people they think are gonna win.

—*Marcus Reese*

riod”—we were constantly trying to parse the number to come up with some way to release it in a way that would not be totally embarrassing. So we always had that kind of mindset. And so we did think, like apparently everyone else, that the Bloomberg support meant that they were gonna really out-raise us. So we were very, very worried. And we made a very conscious effort to basically devote a huge chunk of the candidate's time to fundraising at the expense of press conferences, at the expense of a certain amount of campaigning and this, to some extent, is a condemnation of the American political system right now that he had to do this.

But it was very much a strategic—I mean, Schneiderman also had not raised a ton of money in his life before this. He was an Upper West Side state senator, pretty safe seat. He had one competitive race when they tried to redistrict him out in 2002, but beyond that, he wasn't used to calling up these guys and, you know, he's a progressive Upper West Side state senator calling these businessmen for money. It wasn't something he was used to. So we locked him in a room all day and said, “You have to make these calls.” And that's really a major strategic decision for us.

MR. CHALIAN: If the money was at parity, you would not have won the election?

MR. ZEFF: I don't know, I mean it's like, who knows? I like to think that we ran a skillful race and I think, you know, it's a total hypothetical. But I am saying it's hard. Every candidate has vulnerabilities. Obviously, our guy had vulnerabilities. If they were able to put more money behind it, who knows what kind of impact it could have had? But I'd like to end that statement by saying Eric Schneiderman was a wonderful candidate and he would have won no matter what.

MR. CHALIAN: Do you want to take a crack at the hypothetical? If the money was at parity?

MR. REESE: I do want to add one quick thing. Donors are smart and they know, you know, we were an underdog the entire time, they recognized that. Donors

are gonna throw their money behind the people they think are gonna win. And so, at the end of the day, if the narrative is that you guys are the underdog, we're afraid that you guys may not win. Obviously, that's going to hamstring fundraising. So I think it's important to definitely put that on the table.

MS. LAM: And also, there was a bit of fundraising fatigue, as well. By the time Dan got into the race and by the time we were going around to start raising money, people were like, “Hey, you're number six in line.” And so that was incredibly difficult as well.

AQUEDUCT!

MR. CHALIAN: Sorry, did you want to add something? Oh, at one point in the race, did Eric appear most vulnerable to you?

MS. LAM: Aqueduct.

MR. CHALIAN: And for how long of a period of time has that story sort of consumed the oxygen?

MR. TUSK: See, I'm not sure I actually I agree with Virginia on that. I think among reporters that was the case, I think among editorial boards that was the case, I think the issue was just way too complicated for real people to understand it. And look, we did, actually, I think, a pretty decent job tying him to it, but that was more her skill than I think the reality of the report, quite frankly. I mean, he wasn't really in there, he had nothing to do with it.

MS. LAM: From the earned media perspective—



Marcus Reese, of the Donovan campaign, talks about fundraising.



Emily Arsenault, a representative of the Schneiderman campaign talks about election day.

MS. ARSENAULT: We can laugh now.

MS. LAM: From the earned media perspective and also, at that point, we were going into our final round of editorial boards, I think that actually was very important for us, in terms of going after the big ed boards that we wanted to have under our belt—*The Daily News*, *Newsday*, and so that was key for us.

MR. ZEFF: Sorry, can I just say one thing to that? We had to do a very aggressive editorial board, almost like, damage control operation, when this came out. Obviously, Eric wasn't even in it. But—

MR. CHALIAN: I believe you guys tried to point that out at the time.

MR. ZEFF: Eric was not in it. Eric returned any money from anyone who was associated with it right away. Eric voted against the bill that made that process in the first place, and Eric issued a reform proposal immediately afterwards, that's something that we said. But we really did have a lot of work to do at the editorial boards when that came out because there was a lot of hysteria going on and anti-Albany craze and no one was really reading the report and there was like eight days before the election. So I don't know if I agree that's when he was his most vulnerable, but it certainly created difficulty for us.

MR. CHALIAN: And when do you think the Donovan campaign was at its greatest strength? Was there a moment in the campaign that you—

MR. ZEFF: I mean, I'll say this, I'll pass it onto my colleagues after this, but I mean, when it started, we

were very worried. I mean, we took our opponent very, very seriously. Right out the bat, they had Ed Koch. They did a couple of smart press conferences. I think the first weekend, they did something on transparency or unveiled some policy proposal that had to do with Albany corruption, so we took them very seriously.

And frankly, for the first week, we were so tired from the primary, and a little psyched out, that it was a mindset of, "Let's just get through this first week. We'll rest on the weekend and figure out what we're going to do." But we definitely had great respect for what they were doing. And by the way, the final tally is eleven points, so everyone can act now like it was this like big blowout, it felt very, it was a very hotly-contested race. The press treated it as such. We were never coasting, we were never drinking margaritas with our feet up on the desk for a single day, just to be clear about that.

MS. ARSENAULT: Yeah, I think the Donovan campaign was really strong out of the gate and I think they did a great job of starting the general campaign in a really strong way. And I think the election was really close in the public polls all the way up through to the end. In fact, the night before, we did not think that we necessarily were going to win. We really felt very worried. I think, just to add, this is not exactly to your question, but just to add, why the margin of victory was big is that we focused very heavily on field in the last couple of days and we did a serious drop off operation thanks to some really, really smart people who helped us from the coordinating campaign, including Josh Gold, who did a lot of work to help us. And we really focused on poll sites where we knew we would be strong, but the people don't vote down the ballot, they stop at governor. And we knew if we could focus a really heavy visibility operation around key poll sites, which Mike should talk a little bit about, too, that we could up our points, our point advantage. And we actually reduced it from 2006 by fifty percent, so it was a big part of our—

MR. CHALIAN: Drop off voters?

MS. ARSENAULT: Yes.

MR. CHALIAN: Do you want to speak to that, Mike?

MR. RABINOWITZ: I don't have—this is Mike—I don't have that much to add other than I think it's a real testament to the coordinated campaign that they

We set aside hours of the day for mock debate that was sacred.

—Emily Arsenault

There was a bit of fundraising fatigue, as well. By the time Dan got into the race and by the time we were going around to start raising money, people were like, “Hey, you’re number six in line.”

—Virginia Lam

took drop off really seriously and they targeted the top four hundred poll sites in the city that had significant drop off, which freed us up to focus on persuasion of people in the suburbs or other voters that we saw in our polling, and were voting for Cuomo, but not necessarily for us, and we were able to, in the final week or so, really touch them and connect Cuomo and Schneiderman pretty significantly.

And if we had had to spend resources on focusing on drop off in the city, you know, it would have been a tough decision, I think.

THE PROGRESSIVE LANE

MR. CHALIAN: I want to get back—I think it was Blake that had mentioned the abortion issue. And I want to get back to this idea. I asked them, sort of, about Schneiderman’s pivot from running as the progressive and the liberal in the primary to the general. Did you guys see that as, him entering, having run as the most liberal candidate in the primary, did you see that as a real opportunity for you guys to exploit? And how did you go about trying to do that?

MR. TUSK: Yeah, I mean, absolutely we did. We were rooting for them in the primary too, because there was at least a clear narrative that you could—and a distinction between Dan Donovan and Eric Schneiderman, but Dan Donovan, Kathleen Rice, really tough to make that distinction at all, so at least with the right resources, a win against these guys was feasible, right? Didn’t happen, didn’t even come that close, but it was feasible. Under Rice, we didn’t even have a really viable game plan at all. So yeah, I don’t know if you saw the first ad that we did, but basically, I think it was called too radical and that was the whole point. And I think if you looked at numbers upstate, they moved considerably after that ad started running. Again, they took it off the air because they ran out of money. Yeah, the contrast was good. I don’t know that the abortion issue was big. I think the Wall Street issue worked really well. I still think that this year, in this climate, that was less of a concern. Look, it would have been better if Dan was pro-choice. I think that there were at least certain editorial boards where we weren’t in play because of that, so it would have helped the margins a bit, but I think of the two issues they attacked on, Wall Street was more careful. But again, it’s less so much

that it was this issue that was devastating or that issue, it’s just—we had to sort of overcome the bar by a significant amount. And the things that we needed to do to do that, I think we had all the right pieces, but there wasn’t nearly enough volume of any of them to work.

So you know, in some ways it wasn’t any one of these issues in and of itself was devastating because that’s beyond the point. I mean, that’s just a question of defense, we didn’t play enough offense.

MR. SMITH: Did you make an effort to sort of take advantage of what had been a rift in the primary between Cuomo and Schneiderman?

MR. TUSK: I mean, look, at the end of the day, Andrew Cuomo’s a Democrat. Some reporter once called and said, “Oh, do you think he’ll endorse you?” No, why would he do that? And it’s not like Dan and Cuomo had a close relationship, they know each other, everyone kind of knows each other. But no, not really. I think that neutrality would have been great, but I don’t think it really—I think where it mattered was, had Dan been on the IP line, then you could have tried to do something. There was a Cuomo/Donovan ticket somewhere and it was really smart of them to go grab it. Once Dan was in a position where he had to investigate McKay[?], we were sort of out of the running for that. And that’s okay. That sort of reflects Dan being a good, honorable guy and that’s who he is, I have no issue with that. But that would have been the only opportunity to try to re-link the two.

MR. ZEFF: Can I say something to the abortion issue?

MR. CHALIAN: Yes.

MR. ZEFF: I think that there were a couple of less obvious ways that it was useful. For one thing, I think it really gins up a lot of Democratic donors if you have a generic Democrat, running against a generic Republican who’s against choice. So that was one major way. Another way is we were surprisingly competitive in the suburbs. I think in the end, it was like a two-point margin that we lost by, or something like that. I think Eric’s record and some of what he had been saying, could have been a little bit vulnerable in the suburbs, and I think abortion helped us a little bit there.

THE ENDORSEMENT

MR. CHALIAN: And can you speak to the relationship with Andrew in the general? Obviously, you talked much about how you wanted to make sure he didn’t endorse others. But was there a—the strategy to associate and embrace, obviously, this guy who looked like he was going to be coasting to victory?

MR. ZEFF: Yeah, you know, look, we clearly won in the endorsement. We thought it would be very useful. We knew in the primary, being on the other end of this,

that if Kathleen got it, we would have probably not won.

So we knew the power of it. We wanted it. And more than that, it would have been really bad if we hadn't gotten it. And so, I saw some people from the DiNapoli world today, and they can probably attest to this a little bit, the absence of it, we were starting to get questions about that, because I think it took a week to nine or ten days before he actually went ahead and did it. So that would have been really bad. But no, it was great, I mean, having his support, his numbers were obviously very, very high, and they didn't do a whole lot of campaigning. They did one event announcing the endorsement, and then the very last day, I think Monday before election day, they kind of did a barn storm across the state.

MR. CHALIAN: Did you guys ask for more?

MR. ZEFF: I think we asked for that—oh no, actually, I think they offered the barn-storming thing. I mean, look, the guy's running his own race and yes, he ended up winning by twenty-five points or whatever it was, but for a long time, that felt like a competitive race and certainly the press was treating it as such. So there weren't a whole lot of things we could ask them to do when they were getting pelted every day.

MS. ARSENAULT: We didn't actually ask for them to do much more than that because frankly, having his endorsement, we could put it on all of our literature, we could use it in all of our television. That was probably more helpful than anything they could have done together.

MR. CHALIAN: And was getting his endorsement as no-brainerish as Bradley suggested to the reporter that called him that it would be?

MS. ARSENAULT: No, we were worried. We had a lot of political work to do. We had to—I mean, look, he was very helpful to us in the general and I think there was a time where we weren't sure if he was going to endorse Donovan over us, but yeah, I think in the end it made more sense, I guess.

MR. ZEFF: We were all worriers, in case you can't tell. We worried about everything. We never felt confident that we were going to win, we always ran as underdogs, we always assumed someone was going to have something against us. I remember, I think it was Rogers, Roger Stone was on "Dicker" at some point, or was always on Dicker's show and was always throwing out these vague things about, "I know something about somebody." And that's all he would say. We'd be like, "Oh my God, it's us. And he's going to unveil it tomorrow." I mean, that was the mindset that we had and I think it helped us, actually.

MR. CHALIAN: As Ben did, I want to give you guys the opportunity to ask each other questions about the campaign that we haven't covered if you want to ask specific—if you have a question for your opponents.

*We knew the power of it. We wanted it.
And more than that, it would have been
really bad if we hadn't gotten it.*

—Blake Zeff

Otherwise, I'm going to read our audience questions in a moment.

MS. ARSENAULT: I just have one question. I was surprised that you went dark for a little while on television, I think it happened maybe two weeks out. And I was wondering if it was strategic or if was just because of the lack of resources at the time.

MS. LAM: It was strategic because of our resources.

MR. REESE: What do you mean by "going dark?"

MR. ZEFF: One note on that, actually, that I think is kind of interesting. They, to Bradley's credit, I think it was Bradley, I thought they had some very effective ads, so we were determined to try to limit the amount that those ads aired. And so we noticed in one of the campaign filing reports that they had gotten, I think, something like seventy-five thousand dollars in maxed-out contributions that were over the limit, and it was our obsession for a week to make sure they could not spend seventy-five thousand dollars on the true radical ad. And so, as a result, every day we had election lawyers and good government groups and us and everyone calling them to return that money, and I think they actually did, but that was because we were determined to try to limit the amount that those good ads got out.

MR. CHALIAN: Wayne Barret, if you can make your way to a microphone, he's got a question or two for you guys and then we'll try to get to some audience questions before we wrap it up.

MR. WAYNE BARRETT (VILLAGE VOICE): I'm gonna cheat a little because this relates a little bit to the primary campaign, but I don't think we should miss an opportunity to get a demonstration of that role-playing with the *New York Times* editorial board, do you? This is a man who psychoanalyzed the *New York Times* editorial board, and I think we need a little demonstration of what makes those people make the decision that they make. And I'd like to include Bradley in this because I think he was just referring to the *New York Times* editorial board when he said that because we weren't running a pro-choice candidate, some editorial boards were beyond our reach.

Which would mean that *The New York Times* decides who should be the Attorney General of the state of New York solely on the basis of their position on abortion—if I interpret, that's the threshold, at least, that to become Attorney General of the state of New York you have to be right on that question. So I would like both people to address the issue of the *Times* editorial board

and we ought to see, maybe we can set up a quick stage or something for Bradley. And then lastly, I've asked Bradley if you would address this Reuters story—the interview that Donovan gave, I found it very troubling. It was in September sometime. It's not just that he said he wasn't going to be the Sheriff of Wall Street, he basically said, "They're too important for our economy for us to look at them—the folks on Wall Street—the same way we look at other folks." And I just wonder, was that a mistake? A stumble? Or was this conscious policy and was this a conscious decision that was made and was it connected to fundraising?

MS. LAM: I can address that issue. I was actually in that Reuters editorial board and Dan was asked the question, you know, Elliot Spitzer had run saying that he was going to be Sheriff of Wall Street. Andrew had said he was going to the Sheriff of State Street, what do you want to be the Sheriff of? And the response was, "You know, I don't need a title to do my job. I don't need to be the Sheriff of Wall Street." And of course, that became the headline in the piece that ran on the wire and Dan's point had always been that Wall Street, the financial services industry is an important economic engine for our state. And that we should regulate and we should go after those that do illegal practices.

That we should aggressively regulate Wall Street, but not to the point where we drive them out of our state. And that got misappropriated in that interview, and so that was a great opening for the Schneiderman campaign to then go after us because of that quote, "I don't want to be the Sheriff of Wall Street."

MR. REESE: And as you can tell, the New York political media was totally in the tank for us. It was very obvious by that question.

MR. TUSK: And obviously, it wasn't a great statement to make because they used it effectively against us. You know, with that said, one of the things I think I liked about Dan when I agreed to help him and other people did too, he's a guy who really would not have used the AG's office as a stepping stone to anything else—would not have sought to use the power of the office to get headlines. And look, Spitzer did do that. I don't think anyone here would disagree with that. And that's not Dan, and we like that about him. And I think he was trying to express the way that he sees the world, and it's a good vision for the world, but with that said, yeah, that was definitely a poorly articulated line that was effectively used against us, for sure.

MR. SMITH: And did it help with your fundraising? Did you try? Did you send that around?

MS. LAM: Well, people would ask about our Wall Street money and I kept saying, "What Wall Street money?"

MR. CHALIAN: And to Wayne's other question, not re-enacting your editorial board rehearsal, but to Wayne's other question about *The Times*.

MR. ZEFF: Well, we certainly never heard anything about a litmus test on choice, so I don't know—I think that might be something that he was asking Bradley about. But in terms of the other thing, we weren't psychoanalyzing anyone on the board, it was just sort of trying to simulate the experience for the candidate because people can be nervous to go into the room and generally, you're not with staff. It's a little bit of a different experience, so you try to, you know, try to get them prepped. It was really the same thing you kinda do for mock debates, where you kind of simulate the experience.

You have, the candidate standing up and then you have someone pretending to be the opponent standing up and you ask questions and you do the time limits, and it was really not so much more than that.

MS. LAM: Absolutely. Every campaign does that for debates, for editorial boards. You know who you're going to be sitting with, you know what their backgrounds are, you research what they've written before, how they've editorialized in the past, and you prepare your candidate. That's the smart—that's what every campaign should be doing before they put their candidate in a room.

MR. CHALIAN: And Bradley, do you want to speak about clarifying your earlier remark about the issue of choice?

MR. TUSK: Nothing to clarify. I think that if you went back through the history of every *Times* endorsement,



Blake Zeff talks about the concerns of the Schneiderman campaign.

you might find a couple of pro-life Republicans on there, but not a lot. So I don't think we ever thought Dan had a real shot at the *Times* endorsement. And I think the fact that he was a pro-life Republican guaranteed that. You know, our goal for *The Times* was to try to make the general election endorsement as tepid as possible, and we were actually not that unhappy with it. We thought that it was overall pretty good. And look, we got *The Post*, we got *The News*, we got *Newsday*, we got *The Buffalo News*, a bunch of others, so we felt pretty great about the editorial work performance overall, but yeah, I think from day one, we never thought *The Times* was in play. And I think that one of the reasons that Harry Wilson got it was that it was more acceptable to them was because he was a pro-choice Republican.

UNEXPECTED TWISTS

MR. CHALIAN: I have one question here submitted from a card in the audience. I'll ask you to keep your answers brief because after this I have one final question for each of you that we'll do really quickly, and I only have a couple of mine. Was there any major—this is from Jeff from the Milano School here—was there a major unforeseen event or circumstance that arose during the campaign and if so, what was it? How did it alter the original campaign plan and/or strategy? Was there any major event that altered the course? Anything?

MR. TUSK: Yeah, I think for us, two things. And I look at the campaign plan that I wrote in January and it required two things that we didn't have. One was a million dollars a week from September 15th till election day to kill the opponent and two was the Independence Party line. The IP line went away the minute that *The Post* ran a story saying that McKay was accused of many crimes on Staten Island.

It turns out he was fine, but it was Dan's obligation to investigate. And we've talked a lot about money, and that wasn't there. So two of the tenets—if there were five tenets of the path to victory, two didn't exist. So one was an event, one was just sort of a consistent failure.

MR. CHALIAN: You guys—anything? Any unforeseen—

MS. ARSENAULT: The independence party line was really a big—a very helpful addition in our race. I mean, we didn't include it in our original path to victory and then we started to go for it and then when we actually got it, I think it was very—being on the Working Families Party line, the Independence line and the Democratic line is hugely helpful.

MR. CHALIAN: I'll close this way, which is a little future-oriented instead of looking back for a moment. To you guys first—obviously you know Eric's political skills well now. You've gotten to know him really well throughout this campaign. We've seen the path of this office, of Spitzer and Cuomo—does Eric Schneiderman now wake up every day and look in the mirror and see

himself as the future governor of New York, do you think?

MR. ZEFF: This was something that came up quite a bit during the campaign. And Eric had said in the primary, he was asked in a debate, he said, "No, I don't want to be governor." And then Dan Donovan kept saying, "For me, AG doesn't mean aspiring governor. For him it does." But he kept saying it didn't and that remains so.

MR. CHALIAN: And does Dan Donovan leave this race in a better position for a political career than when he started it?

MR. TUSK: No, because there's really no office for Dan to run for other than Attorney General. I can't—maybe he runs again in four years, but I don't see it. But I mean, fundamentally, one of the things that I think we learned from this race is after some extraordinary circumstances, in 2010 or '12 whoever it's gonna be, for a non-Democrat to win state-wide office is virtually impossible. So I think that, you know, I think *The Wall Street Journal* wrote an editorial on election day, something like that, about Donovan and Wilson saying, "Wow, two Republicans in New York may have a chance."

And the answer was—they didn't. So it's hard to see someone who maybe transcends party politics points, like Rudy Giuliani, or someone with an unlimited amount of money, absent one of those two factors, why a really qualified Republican would choose to run state-wide because it's hard to see how they could win.

MR. ZEFF: Can I say something to that?

MR. CHALIAN: Yes, please.

MR. ZEFF: This is—I like to think part of this is due to our good work, but also, part of it is probably some sort of larger systemic issue that Donovan folks would agree with. Eric ended basically tying in upstate and when you think about that, this was a guy who ran pretty hard to the left in the primary, and then had about six weeks after that where he didn't really moderate himself, he just kind of focused on specific issues that I think had a little bit broader appeal and we tied in upstate New York and I think some of that was due to the amazing political and field work of my colleagues here and others. But beyond that, it's something, when you really think about who this candidate was and how he performed in upstate New York, I think that supports some of what Bradley's saying.

MR. CHALIAN: Great, thank you all very much. I appreciate it. Is there anything we didn't cover, I should say, before we go, that you guys want to make sure you get on the record? No? Excellent. That does it for this Attorney General panel. We're going to take a fifteen-minute break I believe, yes? Fifteen? Ten, fifteen-minute break and we'll come back for the governor's race.

ROUNDTABLE II: THE RACE FOR GOVERNOR

WHO'S WHO

Moderators

David Chalian
Ben Smith

Campaign Representatives

Andrew Cuomo 2010

Phil Singer

Lazio 2010

Kevin Fullington
Barney Keller

Levy for NY

Michael Dawidziak
Paladino for the People
Michael Caputo
John Haggerty

Commentators

Errol Louis, Host of NY1's "Inside City Hall"
Jon Mollenkopf, Director, CUNY's Center for Urban Research
Lee Miringoff, Director, Marist Institute for Public Opinion

GOVERNOR, PRIMARY ELECTION: CUOMO'S NON-PRIMARY

MR. CHALIAN: Thank you all. Reconvening here, we're going to start with the primary season in the gubernatorial race. We'll do that for a bit and then we'll hand over to Ben, who will wrap up with the general election between Cuomo and Paladino. I'm going to begin with Phil Singer who's representing the Cuomo campaign here because it was a non-primary primary season for you. But Phil, I'd like you, if you could, to address two points—the first is sort of the waiting game on Paterson and what—how you guys had to deal with that and literally build a strategy around the waiting game on Paterson, whether or not he was going to run. I won't double-question you, I'll start there. And everyone, please speak into the microphone so that—this is obviously going to be recorded and on the record. And if you were not here when I started this morning, I will give you the same guidance that I gave to our AG panelists, which is please be as candid as possible. This is not the opportunity to settle scores and do your sort of therapy about the campaign, as much as it is to really provide a valuable historical record for those that follow you running statewide campaigns in New York to have this document at the end of all of this and look through what this campaign season was all about in 2010. So as much as we can get close to reality on the record, that would be helpful. So Phil, with that admonishment, take us through your—

MR. PHIL SINGER: So with regards to the primary, I think there was a certain presumption that a decision had been made when Andrew first got into office that he was running for governor and it was just a question of how and when he would advance a formal campaign. The reality was the exact opposite. A decision was not made until much later in the process. You know, he was very focused on his work at AG, there was a lot going on and around the time that Governor Paterson made his decision not to run and, for Andrew, it was not a foregone conclusion that he was going to challenge Governor Paterson. And so this idea that a decision was made in February or March I think has become somewhat mythologized. The reality is that he was focused on what he was doing, he was obviously watching the political tea leaves in the state to see how things were going to transpire and sitting back. It was one of those unique circumstances in politics where the best political strategy was just to focus on your job and not get pulled into the daily coverage of whether or not the governor was going to run for reelection, whether or not he was going to challenge him, you know? And just avoid getting into that daily nitpicking. And so as a strategy, it worked out very well. All he had to do was focus on his job, keep making his cases and basically doing what he was elected to do, and in the end, obviously a lot of decisions were made. The governor decided not to run and then he still had a huge amount of work on his plate to clear before he got into any kind of...

MR. CHALIAN: I want to back up though, before Governor Patterson's decision.

MR. SINGER: Sure.

MR. CHALIAN: So strategy for Andrew Cuomo is to stick to your job, but obviously you were already on board advising him, right? In some capacity, there were people around whose job it would be to put the apparatus of a campaign together and think through, "How do we get from here to the governor's mansion," even before David Paterson made his decision—

MR. SINGER: To be clear, he was going to be on the ballot in 2010 whether it was as AG or whether it was as governor was the undecided X factor. So I was there to help with whatever that effort was going to end up being, A. And B, you'll recall there were a lot of incoming stories—newspaper inquiries, blog posts etc.—speculating about all of this and obviously the AG's office had a full plate. They needed somebody on the political side that could help navigate that traffic.

MR. CHALIAN: And so you said it was not a foregone conclusion that Andrew Cuomo would challenge the governor in a primary, but more likely than not that he would have. Then how would you—in other words, was there a plan somewhere down—a plan for a primary against Paterson and obviously all the history



David Chailian, political editor of PBS NewsHour, moderates the discussion of the Governor's race primary.

MR. SINGER: Well, this is the first wave. But it wasn't something that, you know, occupied each day.

Like I said, the best strategy that was in place, that we were pursuing at the time, was just to say, "Look, do your job and everything else will fall out the way it should."

MR. CHALIAN: Were there any complications or obstacles because of that down the road? So that you said it was a compressed schedule because of the late decision? Was there something that you encountered on the road that you could say, "Well, this is because we had to wait so long on the governor", or on—

MR. SINGER: Well, I mean, it was a late decision on one hand. On the other hand, the governor made his decision not to run, when was it? I think February or March?

MR. CHALIAN: February, I believe.

MR. SINGER: And so when he decided not to run, there was, nobody else was coming around to, again, force a decision to enter the race in February at that time. So people were sitting back, I think the general political world was assuming that Andrew was going to run and so, if there was any pressure, it was coming from press who was calling and saying, "When is the announcement? When is the announcement?" To which our response was, "Look, our focus is on being AG, doing our job as AG and when there's an announcement to be made, we'll make it." And so that bought us three or four months until May, at which point we decided to enter the race formally and engage. And look, during that time, to be fair, we did acknowledge that this was something that we were considering.

from 2002 playing into that from Andrew Cuomo and that plan just ended up on the shelf and you didn't see it? Or how were you preparing for a potential primary with the governor?

MR. SINGER: I don't think it was a question. If you're going to do a primary, you have to decide you're going to do the primary first. And so there was a lot of gaming out of scenarios and some discussion, but ultimately, that's not a very difficult or a significant step to take in terms of challenging an incumbent in your own party and a decision point was never forced onto Andrew. So in some respects, this will be something that gets debated and discussed by the people looking back on this race. It wasn't an issue that —

MR. CHALIAN: That's what we're doing here, by the way.

MR. CHALIAN: And preparing for.

CAMPAIGN TIMELINE: GOVERNOR'S RACE

HOW THE RACES WERE PORTRAYED IN THE NEW YORK PRESS

May 31, 2009

Calling the Democratic Party "a party of primaries," Attorney General Andrew Cuomo insists he will not challenge Governor David Paterson in the gubernatorial race. According to a *New York Daily News* article, at the same meeting, Paterson delivered what a campaign aide called an "unofficial kickoff" delivering what sounded like a stump speech.

September 20, 2009

Just before a presidential visit to New York, word leaks that the White House has encouraged Paterson not to run for a full term. The governor's approval rating in a recent poll was 20 percent.

September 22, 2009

Rick Lazio announces in Times Square that he will announce his candidacy—but not at

that moment. Lazio says he'll announce in Albany, on the following Tuesday.

October 21, 2009

Quinnipiac University Poll: Blacks back Cuomo over Paterson 2-1; Paterson's approval inches up. The poll shows Rudy Giuliani leading Paterson 54-32 percent, Cuomo ahead of Giuliani 50-40 percent and ahead of Lazio 61-

22 percent; and Paterson in a tie with Lazio 38-38 percent. In the Cuomo-Giuliani matchup, white voters back Giuliani 47-42 percent. Black voters back Cuomo 78-14 percent.

MR. SINGER: Andrew, I believe, the week after the governor made his announcement said that he would make an announcement about his political future down the road.

MR. CHALIAN: You mentioned blogs, newspaper stories swirling around as speculation. I don't recall ever seeing something like what happened in January, February or surrounding what *The Times* had or did not have. And obviously, that created a huge dynamic in this non-primary primary season that you experienced. And what was your plan? I don't—I have your answer that Andrew stuck to his job, I have that.

I'm looking for something else. What was your—

MR. SINGER: You may not get it.

MR. CHALIAN: What was your plan to deal with the coming *Times* story because obviously, the *Times* story was going to have the most direct impact on your guys' strategy going forward?

MR. SINGER: Well, I'm not sure that anybody knew what *The Times* had. I mean, there were a lot of rumors swirling around, and I think at some point, everybody just assumed that it was more rumor than reality because it did take a while for that story to—you know, the amount of time between the rumors originating and the time that the story actually broke, did drag on for quite a bit. There were a number of snow storms during that period, I recall. And so, since nobody knew what was in the story, you couldn't really game

out a plan for how to react to the story and ultimately, it wasn't really a factor for us because, like I said, the best politics for Andrew at the time was just to focus on doing what he was doing and to get involved and into the nitty gritty details of the political implications etc. wasn't to his advantage. And I'd just like to make a general point off of that which is that in general, politicians are at their best when they're focusing not on the day to day politics. Hillary Clinton's numbers were always at her best when she's focusing on being senator, focusing on being Secretary of State, not when she's focusing on—

MR. CHALIAN: You sound like you have experience on that.

MR. SINGER: The minutiae of being a candidate. And I think the same was true for Andrew or any other politician. When you are allowed to do the job that you were elected to do, you accrue significant good will and political benefit and that was his strategy. He recognized that, and one final point—successful political figures are those who recognize what the macro strategy needs to be, "Stick to it and don't deviate." And Andrew I think more than most of the candidates I've had experience with, recognized that macro, he realized that what his best macro strategy was, stuck with it and didn't deviate from it.

You know, for the most part, throughout the entire process.

MR. CHALIAN: And one other question that I have for you in this period of time is that obviously, Andrew did a lot of rehabilitations with his relationships post his 2002 gubernatorial run in advance of his 2006 AG run around the state and what have you. But clearly, the prospect of a potential primary with Governor Paterson raised a lot of those questions again about those relationships and buildings especially in the African American community and other communities within the Democratic base. When you started coming on board with him, what kind of work was being done? Or did you already arrive and you had a fully rehabilitated candidate with the Democratic base?

And I think the same was true for Andrew or any other politician. When you are allowed to do the job that you were elected to do, you accrue significant good will and political benefit and that was his strategy.

—Phil Singer

November 19, 2009

Marist Poll: Reports today confirm that Giuliani will not run for governor, but the Marist Poll finds that he would make a formidable candidate for Senate against Kirsten Gillibrand.

December 15, 2009

Quinnipiac University Poll: Paterson continues his climb out of the basement, as voters disapprove 49-40 percent of

the job he is doing, his best overall rating since February 17. Cuomo still leads Paterson 60-23 percent among Democrats in a primary contest for the 2010 governor's race. In a possible race against Lazio, Cuomo tops Lazio 62-22 percent; and Paterson leads Lazio 41-37 percent.

January 4, 2010

The New York Times reports on the enormous challenge faced by Lazio's campaign as he tries to prove he can make a comeback against a Democratic challenger who many consider to be unbeatable.

January 14, 2010

Cuomo's campaign reports more than \$16 million in his campaign account. Paterson

reports \$3 million. Danny Hakim of the New York Times writes that the disparity "underscores a growing sense of inevitability surrounding Mr. Cuomo."

MR. SINGER: I think he was pretty popular when I got there.

MR. CHALIAN: Clearly his numbers were.

MR. SINGER: Yeah.

MR. CHALIAN: Those relationships. In other words, by the time you got there, weighing the primary in this primary season, he had already done, sort of rebuilt—and I'm not talking about his numbers, I'm talking about his relationships.

MR. SINGER: Sure.

MR. CHALIAN: Inside the apparatus of the Democratic Party.

MR. SINGER: I think a lot of the relationships, you know, were rebuilt—if they needed to be rebuilt—a lot of them were new relationships, you know, through his 2006 campaign. So, he had a deal with the primary contest in that race. He navigated those hoops, he got elected in '06 and embarked on a successful AG run, AG tenure. And so a lot of that's, a lot of that work or what you call repair work, I think was done in conjunction with his office and his performance in his office.

MR. CHALIAN: What would you call it? I called it "repair work." What would you call it?

MR. SINGER: I think you develop relationships and you allow them to evolve as you grow in office.

MR. CHALIAN: But you felt that any sort of overhanging baggage from 2002 was long gone.

MR. SINGER: I think most baggage—a lot of the baggage that came out of '02 was specific to '02 and, as he explored other opportunities between '02 and his current state of play now, he rekindled relationships that might have lost some of their fire. And he began and initiated other relationships that allowed him to grow in office.

We never intended on running as Republican. When Steve and I first started talking about the run for governor almost two years ago, the idea was a Democratic primary and the idea was if Paterson stayed in and Cuomo challenged, a fiscally conservative Democrat from the suburbs might have a chance against two liberal city Democrats splitting the vote, so that was the original idea.

—Michael Dawidziak

EARLY IN THE PRIMARY

MR. CHALIAN: I'm going to move on to the Republicans, thank you. I guess I'm going to begin with the Lazio campaign because I think you guys were first really early, really into the race. I think he announced his intention in September '09. And I—let me try to head off at the path. I am sure there will be a lot of talk of Ed Cox and his chairmanship of the NY Republican party here, and I have no doubt that that will dominate much of this conversation, but it shouldn't let you guys off the hook, if you will, for this question. I mean, you got into this race or Lazio got into the race—I don't even know if Ed Cox was chair of the party yet or he was not chair of the party yet. So before we get into Ed Cox, what is it with that early entrance into the race that Rick Lazio failed to do—to sort of lock down a nomination process? Clearly getting in early was an attempt to do that, but that did not happen long before we got into Ed Cox and his negotiations with Steve Levy or others.

January 16, 2010

A Marist Poll finds that while Paterson's favorability continues to rise, New Yorkers still overwhelmingly want someone else for governor. Paterson's favorability has risen to 38 percent, but 60 percent say they would prefer someone else as governor.

January 23, 2010

The *New York Daily News* quotes "a source close to Cuomo" as saying that Cuomo will run for governor in March. Cuomo himself is only saying that he is "focused on being attorney general."

January 24, 2010

Gov. Paterson's campaign begins its offensive against the predicted-if-not-yet-official op-

ponent Cuomo in the first direct mention from Paterson's camp of Cuomo as an opponent.

To avoid charges that he is trying to thwart the ambitions of a prominent African-American in a governor's race, Cuomo has been meeting with black civic and religious leaders, including the Rev. Floyd Flake, Senate leader John Sampson, Buffalo Mayor Byron Brown and Assemblyman Hakeem Jeffries.

The *New York Times* reports that Cuomo hired Juanita Scarlett, a "well-connected black political hand" to work on intergovernmental relations in the attorney general's office.

January 28, 2010

The *New York Times* reports that one in every five dollars over the past six months donated to Cuomo's campaign has come from the real estate industry.

MR. KEVIN FULLINGTON: So just like the attorney general's candidates, our sole goal was to get the *New York Times* endorsement, and we didn't, so we were very upset about that. But so at the timeline is Rick Lazio announced his candidacy for governor in September '09. He opened up his campaign account in May '09, but he really started running and going to events, and the first event we went to was in January '09, the Staten Island State of the Borough address. So you're right, he started early. And our strategy was—be the alternative.

And whether it be David Paterson or Andrew Cuomo, be the viable alternative when it gets to that point a year and a half later. And we believed that there was a very good chance that David Paterson was going to run no matter what and that if he did, it would have been very difficult for Andrew Cuomo to run. And it served the Lazio campaign well that it was the common political perception that Andrew Cuomo was going to run no matter what, because that meant that we could go around and do our best job to sew up the nomination, because no other people thought they could beat Andrew Cuomo, so it served us well. So our goal starting that early, was to get out there and lock out the county chairman support so that we could be the presumptive guy by the time that all the dust cleared, and it was either David Paterson was the candidate or Andrew Cuomo as the candidate from a bruised primary, or in the worst case scenario, Andrew Cuomo is the candidate and we'd have to run against him as the Albany insider.

MR. CHALIAN: And did you see a fully formed field on your side?

MR. FULLINGTON: No, no, no.

MR. CHALIAN: So when you say you wanted to get those county chairmen and sew up the—

MR. FULLINGTON: Right.

MR. CHALIAN: How did you perceive the field that you would be dealing with early on?

MR. FULLINGTON: Well, the talk of the time was Rudy Guiliani, and we felt very comfortable from private conversations with him and his folks and from just looking at the lay of the land and where he was in his life that he probably wasn't going to do it. Mike Bloomberg's name was floating out there. Having worked for Mike Bloomberg for a couple of years, I think it's safe to say he'd rather stab himself in the heart than move to Albany. And so aside from that, we knew that Chris Collins, the Erie county executive was a possibility. So we were moving to foreclose that to get as much county chair support and I think we did a pretty decent job of that, cause we got a lot of county chair support. But where it faded and where we failed—and it's kind of the running theme you've heard today—is in raising money. And so what was good for us politically, the thought that Andrew Cuomo was going to run and win because we could then lock up all the Republican support, was bad for us financially because everybody thought Andrew Cuomo was going to run and win.

And no one thought we could raise money. So when Rick opened up his account in May, the next filing was July 15th and we had reported something about a half million dollars raised and people were underwhelmed by that, and then the next filing was in January and we had by then reported one point two million raised or something like that. And that, coupled with our state chairman working against us at every turn, made it very difficult to build the political momentum and the financial momentum to do what was our goal, which was to make Rick the absolute presumptive guy and then cruise through without having a bloody primary and then face the other side when hoping that they did. So it really was raising money, and so then the issue is, why can't you raise money, right? So it's the whole chicken-and-the-egg. You're not viable because you don't have money, but you don't have money because you're not viable, because the polls show you can't win and so the media won't cover you. And it's an endless cycle that is so difficult for candidates to break out of.

MR. CHALIAN: And your first signal about the chair of the party going to work against you came when and,

January 31, 2010

Upstate Democratic leaders from 17 counties fail to reach agreement on whether Paterson should attempt to run for governor again or be replaced by Cuomo.

New York Magazine publishes a mostly sympathetic article about Paterson, citing his main obstacle in the race as being not Cuomo, but Paterson's "own essential, if appealing,

weirdness."

February 1, 2010

Paterson has \$620,000 in available cash to spend on a primary, as opposed to Cuomo's \$12 million.

February 2, 2010

The Village Voice explores the reinvention of Andrew Cuomo, reflecting on his history as the twenty-something-year-old

"Prince of Darkness" and his disastrous experience in 2002 when he trash-talked George Pataki, in light of his current tightly-scripted campaign.

February 3, 2010

Quinnipiac poll: Cuomo's possible challenge of Paterson will not be racially divisive, voters say 80-14 percent, and black voters say 73-22 percent. Cuomo leads Paterson 55-23

percent among Democrats.

February 5, 2010

John Koblin, a reporter for the *New York Observer*, tweets: "anyone hearing about NYT bombshell on Paterson? Heard big, damaging [sic] story comin. been working for weeks, but still not published yet."

and how did you guys put together a strategy to deal with it? And what was that strategy?

MR. FULLINGTON: So it came very shortly after he was elected when he started bringing Chris Collins, the Erie county executive around. And so our strategy was, at first, let's play as nice as we can with the chairman. You know, we'll do what he wants. We'll talk to his staff, we'll work with him. But in the meantime, we'll do everything we can to crush his favorite candidates and show to the party members that their leader is taking them down a primrose path, that the candidate he's pushing is really bad for all these reasons.

And so it was very early on, I guess it would have been November, December of '09. I think he was elected September of '09, so by October or November, we knew that he was advancing another candidate. And so we moved as quickly as we could to suppress that while trying to have a good relationship with him, so that

while Chris Collins—because of a number of stories that came out—dropped out—well, Rudy Giuliani endorsed us at the end of December, then Chris Collins dropped out first week of January. Next thing, we're standing with Ed Cox and we thought it worked. Ed Cox is saying Rick Lazio's our guy, he's my man no matter what. Meanwhile, he's stabbing us in the back to everybody else. So we knew very early on.

LEVY SWITCHES PARTIES

MR. CHALIAN: I'm gonna bring in the Levy campaign here for a moment. Just take us through your first approach to switch parties and Levy's process from first approach and thought to actually deciding to switch parties. Take us through that period there and how you guys got through that conclusion.

MR. MICHAEL DAWIDZIAK: Well, probably I should have gotten involved with the conversation earlier when we were talking about the democratic primary because that's actually how we started.

MR. CHALIAN: Right.

MR. DAWIDZIAK: We never intended on running as Republican. When Steve and I first started talking about the run for governor almost two years ago, the idea was a Democratic primary and the idea was if Paterson stayed in and Cuomo challenged, a fiscally conservative Democrat from the suburbs might have a chance against two liberal city Democrats splitting the vote, so that was the original idea. The original idea was never to run as Republican. And basically, we had the same waiting game on, we waited on Paterson to see whether he would stay in. We were praying and hoping he would. And waited, seeing whether Andrew was going to get in, and we were hoping he wouldn't.

But the bottom line is the opposite dynamics happened and then I'm probably going to get this date a little wrong, but somewhere around November, December, Republican party leaders and conservative party

Kevin Fullington of the Lazio campaign discusses the Republican primary.



February 8, 2010

Harlem lobbyist and political strategist Bill Lynch tells the *Wall Street Journal* that Paterson will officially announce his campaign for governor next week. "He's running," says Lynch.

February 9, 2010

New York Daily News: "A chaotic Capitol plunged to new lows Monday as Gov. Paterson was

forced to swat down 'callous and sleazy' speculation he's quitting amid personal and political scandal."

February 11, 2010

On CNN's Larry King Live, Paterson tells King that the recent rumors attacking Paterson are "a carry over" from Spitzer's abrupt departure and scandal.

February 13, 2010

The *New York Times* opinion section runs an editorial by Clark Hoyt on the responsibility of the Times to either address the rumors about Paterson stirred up by Koblin's tweet, or to not address them as a policy decision.

February 16, 2010

The *New York Times* profiles Paterson aide David W. Johnson, a former intern who rose to be Paterson's driver, serving as a kind of protector and scheduler, and is now one of the most senior people in the governor's administration. The article calls attention to Johnson's arrests on felony drug charges as a teenager and for misdemeanor assault in the 1990s.

[Initial finances], coupled with our state chairman working against us at every turn, made it very difficult to build political and the financial momentum to do what was our goal, which was to make Rick the absolute presumptive guy and then cruise through without having a bloody primary.

—Kevin Fullington

leaders started coming to us and meeting with us and saying, “Your politics are much more at home in the Republican party. Why don’t you consider switching to the Republican party?” And anybody who’s ever been involved with a candidate that’s switched parties, it’s a momentous decision. It’s not something that’s done easily and it wasn’t an easy decision for Steve to make, and I would say it wasn’t really until we forestalled any chance of running a Democratic primary that the decision was made to then really possibly make the move. But even then, it wasn’t until the Republican party demonstrated a certain amount of support in their committee for Steve that he made the decision to change parties. And he’s been criticized for dawdling too long in making that change because it left him basically very vulnerable because we couldn’t—the threat of a primary was never there for us because there’s a year waiting period from when you change parties to the ability to run a primary on your own. And we kept saying that. We kept saying that to the party leaders. We’re saying, “We’re only at this dance by invitation. You know, we can’t play in the sandbox by our own invitation. We’re only here by your invitation. And anytime you tell us to get lost, we take our ball and go home.” You know, but I think that was a tough choice for them to make at that point because the one problem we didn’t have was raising money. We didn’t have to worry about raising money, we had it.

MR. CHALIAN: Right.

MR. DAWIDZIAK: We started with five million dollars and we were very, very confident about our ability to raise money from our existing donor base. So the one problem we didn’t have was raising money, so I think they were very slow to saying no to that, that pile of money, in the end result.

MR. CHALIAN: And before I get to the Paladino folks, how real of a threat did you see the Levy candidacy as once the party switch was in place?

MR. KELLER: Well, I remember that we didn’t think that Levy would switch parties. I mean, we thought it was insane for someone to switch parties, especially once—I remember talking to Kevin about it and he was telling me what you needed to do at the convention to get the Wilson Pakula to get on the ballot and I said, “There’s no way an ex-Democrat who, just by Googling Steve Levy and Barack Obama, you get a bunch of hits about, is going to win, is going to get over 50 percent at the Republican convention.” It’s just not going to happen, so we thought we were pretty much done after Chris Collins dropped out. I think that initially, it was a little shocking, but I think the mistake that—Mike may not want to say this, too—but I think the mistake that both Mike and the Levy campaign and our campaign made was trusting Ed, the party chairman too much. Ed, I thought, based on the stuff that I was hearing when I was talking to the media, was telling everybody that he had all the county chairs locked down and he kept talking about the—my favorite was these “vice chairs,” you know, he would talk about these all the time. And if you know how the Republican party convention works, being the vice chair is almost as important as being Ed Cox. It’s not important at all for what actually happens on the convention floor. So once we realized, once everything sort of settled down, we figured out who was switching and we put in a strategy to win the convention and get over 50 percent, we felt very, very confident going into the convention that we would deny Levy a spot on the ballot.

February 18, 2010

The *New York Times* refers to Paterson as “increasingly reliant on people whom he feels comfortable with but who lack deep experience in government, including his former driver, David W. Johnson.”

February 20, 2010

Paterson announces his candidacy at Hofstra University without any recognizable

Democratic leaders present. His tour makes two more stops this weekend, none of which are attended by many of the top Democratic leaders. According to the *Daily News*, even Rep. Charles Rangel stated “Nobody asked me to go. I’m surprised they’ve got something going on.”

February 21, 2010

The *New York Post* reports Paterson’s top personal aide, David Johnson, took a trip to Dallas to watch a football game courtesy of affordable-housing builder and wealthy NYC developer Jonathan Coren.

One day after announcing, Paterson arrives in DC for two days of meetings with the country’s governors and President Obama, the first

extended contact between Paterson and Obama since word leaked out in September that the President had asked Paterson not to run for another term.

MR. FULLINGTON: But directly to your point, once he got in, we took it incredibly seriously and it affected our ability to raise money and prepare ourselves for what ended up being a primary or a general, because from the months of March through June, a pivotal time before the summer comes and it's hard to raise money, we spent just about every minute—this is an exaggeration—but every minute communicating almost solely with the political insiders.

So everything we did every day was to make Steve Levy look to the county chairman, to the delegates, to the media, like he could not win. Like he was not going to get to the threshold, like you're joining, you're signing onto a sinking ship, you're making a huge mistake and he could never win anyway. So it was—we took it incredibly seriously once he got, and it occupied almost everything we did.

PALADINO ENTERS

MR. CHALIAN: Which brings me to you guys. You see this landscape taking shape inside the Republican Party and when Carl took a look at that, what was his calculus as sort of seeing a path to victory with what was going on between the chair of the party and the Levy folks and the Lazio folks?

MR. MICHAEL CAPUTO: I'm Michael Caputo with the Paladino campaign. Carl was a big supporter of our county executive Chris Collins. He really wanted him to run for governor. When Chris Collins tripped over himself making some unfortunate comments, he called up Chris and told him to stay in. Just stand up, don't fall down. Whatever it takes, you got to stay in. And Chris decided otherwise. Subsequent to that decision, Carl had a meeting with Rick. Rick came to Buffalo to sit with I think not just Carl, but many different people during the day, and Carl sat there with members of—his son and others, close advisors—and I think Rick was interested in, you might have to tell me, but I don't think Rick had any inkling that Carl was really seriously considering running. I think he was raising money and Carl is a winning donor. And after that meeting, Carl felt kind of rather nonplussed about it.

And within days, a couple of Tea Party leaders from western New York came to him and gave him the idea of running for governor himself, which he immediately told them was the most crazy thing he ever heard of in his life. And of course, we all know the end of that story. But I think it's important to note that Carl came in, he thought that Rick Lazio was not going to win against Cuomo. In fact, there was a lot of talk about Rick being a put-up to lay down for Andrew Cuomo because of the fact that Alfonse D'Amato was involved on both sides. You know, we all have conspiracy theories and he thought that there was running room, certainly to Rick's right, and he thought, he looked around, Carl made telephone calls to other business leaders and encouraged them to run. And at the end of the day, he just saw nobody else that would stand up and do it. I believe at the time that everyone believed that Andrew Cuomo was a metaphysical certitude as governor and Carl decided that by hook or by crook, he wasn't going to let him just waltz into office.

MR. CHALIAN: Do you guys remember a day where you took the Paladino campaign seriously, as a serious threat to the nomination?

MR. FULLINGTON: Sure, well, first off, I was in that meeting with Rick and Carl and it's just funny how the different perspectives, I'm not sure which one is entirely right, but we had the meeting and after the meeting, Carl was like, "This is great, Rick. I'm with you. Call me tomorrow, we're setting up a fundraiser." And so it's funny how later it became how he was unimpressed. So I guess—

MR. CAPUTO: I think he slept on it.

Not the pornography but the perceived racism. We found that to be a bullet to the head and it was.

—Michael Caputo

February 23, 2010

Siena poll: Just 35 percent of New York voters view Paterson favorably, and 64 percent of registered voters, including 58 percent of Democrats, would prefer someone else for governor. Only 19 percent would vote for Paterson. Paterson trails Cuomo by 42 points and Lazio by 7 points.

February 24, 2010

The New York Times breaks the story in the evening: Paterson is suspending top aide David Johnson without pay and requesting that the Attorney General investigate his administration's handling of charges brought against Johnson for assaulting a woman last fall.

February 25, 2010

Lawrence B. Saftler, the lawyer for the woman charging Johnson with assault, disputes Paterson's claim that the complainant initiated a telephone conversation with Paterson the day before she was due back in court.

Paterson's top criminal justice adviser, Denise E. O'Donnell, resigns, saying the recent developments are "unacceptable."

No prominent Democrat calls for Paterson's resignation, but according to the Times, "those calling on Mr. Paterson to suspend his campaign included senior Democratic members of New York's Congressional delegation, Albany lawmakers and black Democratic officials, including some from Harlem, generally considered Mr. Paterson's political home base."

Michael Caputo of the Paladino campaign talks about Paladino's decision to run.

MR. FULLINGTON: So we, to be frank, didn't take the Paladino campaign seriously at all through the convention for a number of reasons, including the coverage that they had gotten. You know, the *New York Post* editorialized, calling him the Bigot of Buffalo, and that was before the convention.

The *Daily News* editorialized, saying he was the worst statewide candidate in the history of New York, and that was before the convention also. So our kind of perspective was he wasn't going to be able to get any oxygen, and the public polling was showing good things for Rick. They were showing him up twenty points, up thirty points, but then it did close to twelve and we got worried a little bit then. But then two, three weeks passed and another poll came out and it was still twelve. So we felt it had stabilized. Now, I had left the campaign in August, a month before the primary, so I can't speak specifically to it, but my sense is that there was a little bit of worry, but when the poll came out the Saturday before the election selling it at a one point difference—and Barney can speak to it—I think the whole campaign was pretty surprised.

MR. KELLER: So the answer basically is that we had no worry about the Paladino campaign. I think about three weeks out—Kevin might not have been there at this point, I may be botching the timeline—but we did a poll that showed us up something like twenty points but under fifty, and at that point, we were given sort of—they told us that if we wanted to tell members of the press or start telling people, we weren't even allowed to tell people, acknowledge his name. It was sort of the decision up until that point—

MR. CHALIAN: A decision made by the candidate?

MR. KELLER: No, by just the general team. We wanted to acknowledge that he exists and when people who tried to cover Rick would ask him about Carl the last two months up until the campaign and getting him to even say Paladino was very, very difficult by design because we were running sort of the classic front



runner campaign in the primary. So then that—I remember with the Sienna poll coming out on that Saturday, and someone just—you know, it was really a disaster zone, and it was about four days to go.

So there's really nothing we can do at that point. And I think it's interesting too, because looking around the country, a lot of sort of establishment type—I don't want to fall into the old establishment Tea Party—

MR. CHALIAN: Right.

MR. KELLER: You know, dynamic, but a lot of establishment Republicans ran the same sort of campaign we did against Tea Party candidates. And every public poll and probably, their own internal poll, up until the last about week, showed them up by twenty points. Mike Castle, Jane Norton in Colorado, even Sue Loudon in Nevada, I remember Sharon Angle closely.

February 26, 2010

Paterson drops his campaign, raising his right hand to say “I give you this personal oath. I have never abused my office—not now, not ever.” *New York Magazine* declares Cuomo “will be the next governor of New York.”

March 3, 2010

Former Governor George Pataki endorses Lazio, saying “he brings a fresh approach to Albany.”

March 5, 2010

Quinnipiac Poll: Voters say 46-42 percent that Paterson should finish his term rather than resign, a substantial drop from a March 3rd survey. Forty-five percent of women say

Paterson should stay and 40 percent say he should resign. Men say 47-44 percent that he should stay. Black voters want the Governor to stay 55-36 percent, while white voters are split 44-44. Voters disapprove 61-21 percent of the job Paterson is doing—one of the lowest approval ratings ever recorded for an elected official in 18 years of Quinnipiac polling.

March 9, 2010

State GOP considers nominating Democrat Suffolk County Executive Steve Levy to the Republican ticket, if he changes parties.

March 11, 2010

Cuomo appoints former New York State Chief Judge Judith Kaye to conduct the two investigations involving Paterson, saying that the

MR. CHALIAN: Right.

MR. KELLER: I remember Mike Castle actually went down the same day that we did, so—

PALADINO'S CONTROVERSIES

MR. CHALIAN: I want to—Kevin was talking about some of the press surrounding your candidate shortly after he got in the race and what—can you take us through—it may have been some of the most negative press I've ever seen on a candidate ever entering a race. And emails, the comments—how did you guys put a plan in place and how did you begin to implement that in a way that you were able to get through the summer?

MR. CAPUTO: Well we polled them all, all the problems. We put a private investigator on Carl to find out what

we could find out as is wise, I think, in all races. We came up with what we thought that Lazio and Cuomo would come up with. We researched all of it and we found out that among many, there were different effects for different problems. I mean, we knew that it was public and an open secret in Buffalo that he had a child from a relationship outside of his marriage. We knew obviously that would be on the table. We polled that and we found that it really didn't affect things very much. Certainly not in the general, but in the Republican primaries, surprisingly it didn't affect it very much at all.

The e-mails. Carl, I think as most people know by now, had gotten in the habit of forwarding e-mails among a small group of friends from college that were distasteful in the very least and we polled that and we found that to be very problematic. Not the pornography but the perceived racism. We found that to be a bullet to the head and it was. It was something that we had to look at very carefully. I actually had the dubious honor of going through Carl's outbox. And I don't want to belittle this because there are a lot of people in this world who are involved in forwarding distasteful e-mails, people I've known in my own life, people in my own family. And the vast majority of those e-mails were chain e-mails about great stories of patriotism and all these things that went through there. And a very small group of them were distasteful and in some cases, racist. But our biggest problem coming in with all the things that Carl brought to this table was this spade of e-mails, and we brought him all of the problems and we laid it out in front of him. And with that, we laid out a strategy for victory. We thought it would be—the way we did it and we did a lot of research, we spent a lot of money.

MR. CHALIAN: You said, "a bullet to the head," but you never said it was a fatal bullet to the head.

MR. CAPUTO: Well, I'll tell you. At the end of the day, anyone in the Republican party that we spoke to said, this really could happen, but for the e-mails. This

Barney Keller, representing the Lazio campaign, speaks about the role of the chair of the Republican party in the primary.



preliminary investigation revealed "credible issues that need to be resolved." *Crain's New York Business* reports that Cuomo says he is recusing himself "out of an abundance of caution," although there is no technical reason for the move. The article says a current Marist poll shows Cuomo's support among nonwhites dropped by 22 percentage points in the last two weeks.

March 17, 2010

Levy switches parties.

Writing in *The Villager*, former NYC Mayor Ed Koch kicks off an effort he calls "New York Uprising" with a meeting convened with Citizens Union's Dick Dadey and Henry Stern of New York Civic. The group will focus on making incumbents publicly commit to good government principles: redistricting, balancing the

budget, and ethics oversight and enforcement.

March 19, 2010

Levy announces he is entering the race. Michael Long, chairman of the state Conservative Party, says this "this could ruin a perfect year for Republicans to win...by making this last-minute switch, he's going to empower and energize the Democratic Party

with all forces to come out to defeat him as a candidate." For his part, Cuomo responded with, "It is America, it is a democracy, you can run for whatever you want as whatever you want."

Within one day after Levy enters the race for governor, party chairmen from some of the state's largest counties—including Bronx, Onondaga, Queens and Suffolk—announce

I think the mistake that both Mike and the Levy campaign and our campaign made was trusting Ed, the party chairman, too much.

—Barney Keller

really could happen if he hadn't done that and, I think to a man and to a woman, that was the commentary coming into the party.

But we thought we had a straight shot to win the primary. In fact, we thought it was ours to lose and we damn near did. But it was going to be a much larger problem in the general. But we did believe that we had a very narrow, a very defined and very limited path to victory against Andrew Cuomo. We can talk more about that later.

PALADINO'S PATH TO VICTORY

MR. CHALIAN: Yeah, but talk about your path to victory against Rick Lazio. They talked about how it was so late when they really came to an awareness that there was a path there, that you guys were a potential threat. How—when did you guys see that?

MR. JOHN HAGGERTY: I thought we were going to win the primary about five weeks before. I think it's important to take a look back at the process about how we got there. To look at the process of how we got there, which created the energy to win that primary. you've got to remember Carl got in the race very late. He basically got in in March, Mike? Right?

MR. CAPUTO: March. Well, April 5th, but he was in by March.

MR. HAGGERTY: Yeah, he was in it. So I think it would have had a huge difference on the process if Carl had

been in the race ninety days earlier because I don't know if Levy would have gotten in in the Republican side of things. I think the conservative party might have had a straight up primary, so those two months made a huge difference. Carl had ground to make up, but he had also chosen that he wasn't going to do the normal things a candidate was going to do like kiss all the chairmen's rings and court everyone and do those things. He wanted to be, "If you believe what I believe and you like me, then support me." So the process was well down the road and we had already made a serious tactical decision that we were prepared to do petitions no matter what, knowing that it was probably a far reach to get 25 percent, but maybe it was going to happen. I think when a candidate goes around during the process and meets many of the chairs, it lays the groundwork for a relationship later on in the race, whether it's for the primary or the general to say "I like this guy."

Carl didn't meet many of the chairs because he did not go around to all the counties. So he jumps in—I think an important piece of the puzzle here that laid the groundwork for the primary is the conservative party as well. Mike Long was forced a little earlier out publicly for Lazio, who he was always with from the beginning because Levy came out, and so Carl Paladino was the candidate on the issues for the conservative party. Lazio was the candidate of politics for the conservative party because Mike had a relationship with him, and I think had committed to him early. And so Levy jumping in forces Mike's hand sooner than he wanted because I think if Carl had had time to develop in the conservative party, Mike might have been forced to let a primary run because the rank and file conservatives were with Carl on the issues.

MR. CHALIAN: But take us to five weeks out. You said five weeks out—

MR. HAGGERTY: So going petitions, our people, our Paladino supporters at the grassroots level were engaged from June 1st on. They did two petitions, we had a very active Internet, grassroots outreach. We formed our own committees in each county called Committees for Carl, so that the Carl voters who were

that they will switch their endorsements from Lazio to Levy.

March 26, 2010

Marist Poll: 66 percent of voters say that if Cuomo is elected, he would more likely be part of the solution to turning state government around than part of the problem. Twenty-two percent report he is more likely to be part of the problem.

Twelve percent are unsure. This perception of Cuomo crosses party lines. Not surprisingly, 74 percent of Democrats see Cuomo as someone who can improve state government and even half of Republicans say the same.

April 5, 2010

Buffalo developer Carl Paladino announces his candidacy at a rally in downtown Buffalo. The

anti-abortion, pro-gun and anti-gay marriage Paladino mocked Cuomo in his announcement, saying "My daddy was a governor," and pledged to slash spending and taxes and install a residency requirement for public health care and welfare benefits. The *New York Daily News* immediately points out that Paladino has 10-year-old love child born to a former staffer of his development company. Paladino's campaign

promptly removes a passage from his Web site that referred to Paterson's admitted past infidelities.

April 7, 2010

The *Staten Island Real-Time News* writes that Paladino blames Cuomo and his policies as President Clinton's housing secretary for the sub-prime mortgage crisis. Cuomo does not respond.

gravitating—I don't think the party, the network was that enthralled with Rick Lazio as a candidate, and I think after the convention, I think the Lazio campaign kind of disappeared politically. And maybe that was holding their fire, holding their resources, taking a rest, whatever you want to say.

MR. FULLINGTON: Yeah, see, I guess I do disagree. And it's funny how a storyline develops and then it's perpetuated then by the media or by others politically. And there is this image created that Rick Lazio wasn't aggressive enough or didn't work hard enough. I mean, he started January '09 and I traveled with him every other week—

MR. HAGGERTY: But that's not quite my point.

MR. FULLINGTON: No, I'm getting to that.

I don't think it's fair. I think after the convention, he was upstate. In fact, the week after the convention, we did Syracuse, Rochester, Buffalo, the whole thing, because I remember doing a strategy session where we compared Rick's ten days after the convention to Andrew Cuomo's. And Rick did in those, that first week and a half, thirteen political events. That's putting aside fundraising events, non-public events, he did thirteen public events in that week and a half. So I think we were really aggressive, but we couldn't raise the money and we didn't take the Paladino folks seriously enough. And the other piece of the puzzle is when we made the decision to not challenge the Paladino petitions, Rick turned to me and said, "Okay, we're not going to challenge, but we cannot get sucked into a bloody primary. We cannot get sucked to the right and keep our eye off the ball because if we win the primary but leave ourselves without money and no chance to win a general, then what is the point?"

MR. CHALIAN: Right. Sorry. We're running short on time.

MR. HAGGERTY: So I think the perception among Republicans was that they liked Rick, but Rick wasn't like, a great candidate. I think he was kind of, he was kind of a neutral milk toast candidate and Carl,

at the grassroots level, was seeking, was drawing out the base Republicans in New York state, you know, more conservative Republicans, his message was that of a conservative Republican. I think they liked his brashness. So as they're getting—what was happening was that as I was trying to flip, once we were on the ballot which, you know, there --were different levels of credibility throughout the process—once we were on the ballot and everybody knew we were going to be there, it gave me a reason to ask for chairs and committee people to take a risk and support Carl Paladino. And by the time we came down to the last thirty days, I had county chairs saying to me, "I'm voting for you. My wife's voting for you. I don't want to come out publicly," because they had taken enough of a beating between Levy and Cox and all the other stuff.

So I felt the momentum shifting amongst rank and file Republicans and that's still what drives a primary even statewide. I felt about ten days out, and I think Mike might remember me saying this, I felt all of a sudden the Lazio campaign panic. About ten days out, I felt Rick was calling people he had not talked to in six or seven weeks in the party and trying to grasp what I think they felt was slipping away from them and I think it was a very grassroots message that drew out the very base core of the Republican party in this state, because Carl Paladino stood for something, stood for it very strongly as opposed to Rick, who was a nice guy, but I don't think they felt he was a milk toast candidate.

MR. CAPUTO: David, I want to add something. I know we're falling behind, but you wanted candid and I'll give you candid.

MR. CHALIAN: Yes, please.

MR. CAPUTO: There were a couple of moments before—at the convention and during the convention which were very interesting. At the end of the day, we felt that the Levy campaign was just about ten, eight points shy of being able to get a Wilson Pakula. Not coincidentally, Erie County had the lion's share of that margin of difference. In Erie County, we saw

April 10, 2010

The *News Tribune* names Levy as a possible dark horse candidate, saying he "like [Republican Scott] Brown, could pull off an upset."

April 12, 2010

The *New York Times* runs an article on the tightly-orchestrated-feel of Cuomo's campaign with rare sit-down interviews and the candidate as

his own "image shaper."

WNYMedia.net releases a slew of offensive emails forwarded by Paladino to a long list of his associates. The emails included pornographic images and what appeared to be a video of African tribal people dancing in traditional dress captioned "Obama Inauguration Rehearsal." Another features bestiality pornography between a woman and a horse.

April 13, 2010

Quinnipiac Poll: Cuomo leads in possible general election—and he hasn't even announced his candidacy yet: 55-26 percent over Lazio; 60-24 percent over Paladino; 57-24 percent over Levy.

Meanwhile, the Tea Party Express turns its back on Paladino, with the group's chairman Mark Williams saying, "You've seen the emails ... so

what makes you think we would support him?" Levy picks up support from Allegheny County Republican Chairman Robert Christman.

Assemblywoman Teresa Sayward and Assemblywoman Janet L. Duprey endorse Lazio.

The *New York Times* reports that the Democratic Party has chosen Charlie King, a longtime friend of Cuomo's, to be their new executive director,

Levy in our camp. We also had a couple of other chairs who were interested in us and we started about a week before, getting calls from probably a mutual friends of the Levy camp and our camp saying, “We really—you ought to just throw your delegates to Steve on the Wilson Pakula, you know, because we can get that done.” And we kind of called it the Hugh Hefner strategy. You know, it’ll be much more fun with three of us, you know? And the way we looked at it, we would win in either direction, whether it was a three-way or a two-way. But at the end of the day, we weren’t in direct communication with the Lazio camp, but we thought Carl’s feeling, personally, was that Steve Levy didn’t belong in the Republican primary.

And that he under no circumstances was going to release his delegates. That meeting—the last meeting took place on the floor of the convention the night before and if you’ve never been to a convention before like Carl, it was a very gee whiz moment. The place was, I don’t know how much, how many thousands of dollars Chairman Cox spent on that room. It was wondrously beautiful and tragic at the same time. But we sat in there and all the tape was still up and all the seats were still stacked and we sat there in a meeting with John and myself and Carl and an interlocker for Levy and they’re giving us the Hugh Hefner strategy. And at the end of the day, John just advised Carl to reject it and it unfolded the way it did.

MR. CHALIAN: Ben has a very quick question.

THE MOSQUE

MR. SMITH: Yeah, I was just basically interested in—so I think a lot of people watching the race, that was when it became, “Wait, what’s going on here? I guess this guy isn’t that presumptive.” For somebody from my perspective watching the bid from the outside, that was when it took, for me, a very unexpected turn. When you, for a little while, made the Ground Zero mosque very central to the campaign, I wondered sort of what the thinking behind that was.

MR. FULLINGTON: So the timing on this is very important. The mosque issue began to percolate, if memory serves me correctly, in May, June. And by the end of June, we were getting questions and push about it, and Rick hadn’t taken a public position on it and we had a debate within the campaign and frankly, the campaign was divided about how to handle it. But Rick believed that the mosque didn’t belong there. So a decision was made to do that before the July 4th holiday. Now, we were talking to senior people within the fire department unions and they were going to join us at a press conference to say that.

And this was before July 4th and was important because, if memory’s right, and I might have the dates wrong but not the timeline, we couldn’t do it after the July 4th holiday because of timing and logistics. A poll comes out shortly after July 4th showing that a large number of New Yorkers oppose it. So the decision had been made before that poll to come out and do this. So it came out and so we? did the press conference, thought it was something important, saw the poll, thought it would be a good issue compared to the Cuomo campaign, because we’re thinking general election here, but didn’t—

MR. SMITH: So you were looking general election.

MR. FULLINGTON: Yeah, of course. And knew it would help to whatever degree in the Republican and give Rick, to some degree, more attention. But to your specific question, we didn’t expect it to become big an issue as it did, and Rick didn’t want it to become as big an issue. He knew that at the end of the day, people were voting on jobs and the economy. And so the media constantly said, “Well, you guys are talking too much about this. This is the whole campaign.” But that’s like the media, and they do this all the time, they complain about the weather but then they’re the ones that make the rain. So there’s not a politician I know or an elected official who doesn’t want to talk almost exclusively about issues and Rick Lazio in particular. He loves issues, he loves all that stuff. But the media—we—

signaling that Cuomo will have a trusted adviser in the party during the fall campaign.

April 14, 2010

The Paterson administration tries to determine whether the state can cancel its 27 leases with Paladino’s real estate company worth more than \$85 million.

April 15, 2010

Paladino launched an offensive on his blog. “The liberal elite are hysterical; they are panicking because they know we’re coming. If they want me to back down, they will be disappointed.” Republican Greater Capital Region County Chairs withdraw an invitation for Paladino to participate in a candidate forum, stating, “there is no chance Mr. Paladino will

be receiving our endorsement.”

Gubernatorial candidate Levy says he supports gas drilling. Lazio draws applause from a Massapequa Tea Party rally by bashing big government and high taxes, and praising immigrants from earlier generations.

April 16, 2010

Lazio and Levy vie for the Albany County Republican

party’s gubernatorial nomination. Tom Buchanan, chairman of the Schenectady County GOP says “everybody up here’s for Lazio except for John Graziano, as far as I know.” Mike Long, head of the state Conservative Party, says “Steve Levy’s not getting the Conservative Party line,” adding, “I could be wrong, I think there are a few people who haven’t made a decision, but I’m not about to endorse a



John Mollenkopf, director of CUNY's Center for Urban Research, provides a demographic analysis.

GENERAL ELECTION: DEMOGRAPHIC INTERLUDE

MR. JOHN MOLLENKOPF: This is just a very brief demographic interlude between sets of people who know a lot more about this than I do. And many of these points probably would be fairly obvious to you. And I'm looking at this election, the statewide election through the prism of New York City. And I'm interested in the impact of these larger trends on what might happen in New York, especially when we think about the 2013 mayoral election. And three quick points about—you have a chart hopefully that you picked up outside that shows the turn out numbers for a whole variety of elections and candidates, parsed by what the predominant demographic makeup is of the election district, the 6,600 election districts or so in New York City.

And the points that I would make, first of all, this was an extremely low turnout election. I think that was partly a function of the fact that people felt it was a one-sided race. Partly by the fact that there were two Italian-American candidates. And partly, you know, the issues weren't really as fully engaged as they might have been because of the perception it was a one-sided race. That has an enormous effect. What happens at the top of the ballot, it has been mentioned several times previously, has a big effect on what happens further down the ballot. But in New York City, only slightly more than a million people, 1,137,000 people voted. That was less than half of the number of people who turned out in the 2008 presidential election. And even somewhat less than, about 10 percent less than what happened in the previous gubernatorial race in 2006, which in many ways was similar because it was also perceived to be a somewhat lopsided contest.

It was also within New York City, it was a much wider electorate than in 2008, although a little less so than either 2009 or 2006. But it was a much more Catholic

MR. CHALIAN: We'll get to the media coverage at the lunch.

MR. FULLINGTON: So there was a two-week period where the campaign put out every single day a release on something in the economy and got next to no coverage even from the blogs. But as soon as you said anything about the mosque, that's all that was covered. So there was this impression that that's all Rick talked about, but that's because that was all that the media covered.

MR. CHALIAN: We will have lots of time at the lunch to bash the press, you guys can do so. But we're going to pivot to the general and—

party-switching Democrat from Long Island." State Senator Libous endorses Lazio for Governor.

Levy predicts victory in GOP gubernatorial primary.

April 17, 2010

In a Spanish-language editorial in *El Diario*, Democratic Attorney General candidate Sean Coffey criticizes Levy, saying "I have been worried about the hostile

way that Levy treats and speaks about immigrants, with or without documentation."

Lazio's Wall Street friends donate to his campaign

April 18, 2010

Former Bronx Borough President Adolfo Carrión denies reaching out to Cuomo regarding running for lieutenant governor. Democratic political consultant Hank Sheinkopf

says "It would certainly add ethnic balance to the ticket and it would get Adolfo Carrión right back in the thick of things."

April 19, 2010

Lazio, Levy and Paladino sign on to Koch's New York Uprising campaign. Cuomo, who hasn't officially declared for governor, signed his own separate letter.

Siena poll: Nearly two-thirds of voters think Cuomo will help

"clean up the mess in Albany," compared to 23 percent who think Cuomo is "part of what's wrong with Albany." Cuomo maintains at least a 35-point lead over Lazio, Levy and Paladino. Voters overwhelmingly believe Albany is fixable with the right people. This is Siena's first statewide poll since Paladino declared his candidacy. The poll shows Lazio in the lead with the support of 29 percent of Republican

race in terms of the voter turnout. And again, that reflects who was at the top of the ticket. But roughly 22 percent of the votes in New York City came from the predominantly Catholic areas of the city, which was a kind of high watermark in recent elections.

Conversely, especially compared to 2008, it was a much less minority electorate. At several points people have said that you can't win a primary election in New York, in New York State in the Democratic Party without strong minority support in New York City because of the prominence of that vote. And that's correct, but it's much less so in general elections than people might think. And certainly Mike Bloomberg's victories show why that's important. And I would challenge—I would be curious to know from people, can the right—the great campaign managers and media strategists that we've had speak to us, reflect on why there was sort of zero Obama effect, zero carry over from the very amazing mobilization that took place within the city in 2008 in any of these other races? The Obama campaign certainly talked about keeping the Obama team alive and having an impact on other races. But we simply don't see it here.

Now the final point that I would make is that even though the vote in New York City was almost 900,000 votes for Andrew Cuomo and less than 200,000

You can still see the same basic fault lines running through the city that occur in every city election with Catholic and outer borough Jewish constituencies on one side and African-American and various Latino constituencies on the other side, with white liberal areas of the city in between.

—John Mollenkopf

votes for Carl Paladino and obviously provided a very healthy margin for the statewide victory, and even though many areas that might have supported Mike Bloomberg just the year before ended up supporting Andrew Cuomo, you can still see the same basic fault lines running through the city that occur in every city election with Catholic and outer borough Jewish constituencies on one side and African-American and various Latino constituencies on the other side, with white liberal areas of the city in between. And even in this very lopsided race, we can see the contours of the underlying differences that are pervasive in continuing within the city. So those are the observations that I would make.

MR. SMITH: Thanks John. Thanks again for doing all of this. I thought what you said about the lack of an Obama—you know, of any sort of—you didn't see any evidence that there were people who had voted for the—the intense focus of organizing for America was to ensure that people who voted for the first time in '08, then turned out again in this race. You just didn't see that happening at all?

MR. MOLLENKOPF: I haven't had a chance to parse the voter history records for the 2010 race. But I did for the 2009 mayoral race. And there were a very large number of people, hundreds of thousands of people who registered as Democrats for the first time and voted in the '08 presidential elections. And only about less than 20 percent of those people voted in the '09 mayoral election.

MR. SMITH: What percentage of the new registrants for Jesse Jackson then went and voted for Dinkins, which was sort of what people were hoping to repeat?

MR. MOLLENKOPF: —that's a great question. I—

MR. SMITH: I assume you have all these numbers in your head.

MR. MOLLENKOPF: —it was enough in the distant history that I didn't have my hands on the voter history record in 1984. Clearly, I think there was a transfer effect from the Jackson campaign into the Dinkins

voters, followed by Levy with 15 percent and Paladino with 13 percent. The poll also found that Paladino is unknown to 76 percent of voters.

Paladino releases a web video saying that “like so many in the Tea Party, I'm being falsely called a racist, and worse.” At a Tea Party rally, organizer Kevin McCashion calls Paladino “toxic.”

April 20, 2010

Cuomo holds a fundraiser at the home of the head of the company that has a \$600 million contract to maintain the New York State lottery technology infrastructure.

Quinnipiac poll: With more than 55 percent in each scenario, Cuomo beats Lazio, Levy and Paladino in head-to-head match-ups for the governorship.

April 21, 2010

Schuyler County Republican Party switches from supporting Lazio to Levy. Democratic donors to Levy campaign want money back after he decides to run for Republican nomination.

April 22, 2010

A poll of Republican county chairs shows more support for Lazio than Levy, but support is anticipated to shift as the GOP convention approaches.

Buffalo News reports that while preaching anti-government rhetoric, Paladino's company has many multi-million dollar government contracts.

campaign. There was no such effect or maybe, perhaps that's a little too bold a statement, there's very little effect between the '08 Obama campaign and the '09 Thompson campaign, which is quite—you know, really surprising.

THE REPUBLICAN NOMINEE

MR. SMITH: Thanks John. So I think I'm gonna kind of jump into the timeline of the race here. We've got Phil Singer from Cuomo's campaign, Errol Louis from NY1 and Lee Miringoff from Marist are joining us in the last couple questions. And Mike Caputo and John Haggerty are back from the Paladino campaign. And just coming right out of the gate, the thing I think that—actually, let's see. Before you guys started, Phil, were you preparing in a specific way to run against Rick Lazio, to run against anybody? Had Andrew sort of chosen a portfolio of issues or of relationships based on an assumption that he was running against Rick Lazio?

MR. SINGER: Certainly when we first announced, I think there was a presumption that Lazio was going to be the nominee. At least the smart money was at that point, it was that Lazio was the likely nominee. I guess I should qualify that. Coming out of the Republican convention there was speculation as to whether or not Paladino would be able to get on the ballot with the requisite petitions, etcetera. And so the game—we were assuming that it was gonna be Lazio. And then obviously as we watched the race as everyone else did, we started to grow less certain that it was gonna be Lazio and thought about both of them.

And I think the general—we had a basic theory of the case for each one. In Lazio's case we were going to emphasize his record on Wall Street and as a lobbyist. And in Paladino's case we were going to recognize him as—or emphasize his extreme positions and viewpoints and his unfitness for office. So—

MR. SINGER: Yeah. I think if we had any preference, the calculus that we took going into the general was we looked at what happened in '09 in Westchester and in Long Island and we recognized that turning people out was going to be difficult, given the political climate. And so we were trying to figure out who was going to be best for our turnout program. And I think we eventually came to a conclusion over the summer that Paladino would be the better candidate to motivate our voters. Having said that, we didn't know if it was gonna be Paladino or Lazio.

MR. SMITH: Did you do anything to act on that? Did you try—I mean, they were going around refusing to mention Paladino's name. Did you guys think about or do anything to try to turn him into a more serious candidate?

MR. SINGER: You know, I've never been one to buy those conspiracy theories about the Republicans trying to boost Ralph Nader. And there's some element of truth to, I guess, that particular example, bad example. But I don't think that we had the power or the ability to boost one over the other. During that summer we were in an awkward position in the sense that we didn't have a primary challenge and yet we needed to fill our media space. And so we were trying to strike a calibration between being visible, getting out there and doing events, which we did, and allowing the Republican primary to play out. And I think it was a

If I had any surprise, I'm surprised that neither Paladino nor Lazio really set their sights on Andrew during that summer, those summer months in as intense a fashion as I would have thought they would have.

—Phil Singer

MR. SMITH: Did you prefer one to the other?

April 23, 2010

Attorney General Cuomo subpoenas State Senator Pedro Espada's staffers in connection with charges that he looted \$14 million from the hospital he founded. Espada vows to decrease Cuomo's standing with minority voters. Cuomo refuses to say when he will announce candidacy, citing intense workload as Attorney General.

April 24, 2010

Spitzer, a political rival, says Cuomo is guided by political interests, and is unlikely to take on difficult issues or interest groups.

April 26, 2010

The Black, Puerto Rican, Hispanic and Asian caucuses are publicly critical of Levy's anti-illegal immigration stance, and his views on immigration generally.

May 6, 2010

The cancellation of a campaign trip to New York City by Levy is hailed as a victory for immigrant groups, citing Levy's extreme anti-immigrant positions. Republican Governors Association chairman Haley Barbour denies promising Levy \$8-10 million in support if he wins GOP nomination.

May 22, 2010

Cuomo announces his candidacy for governor and releases his plan for cleaning up New York.

May 24, 2010

Siena poll : Cuomo maintains a strong lead going into the gubernatorial convention. Lazio has the lead in the run for GOP candidacy.

Phil Singer, of the Cuomo campaign, talks about their campaign as the Republican primary came to an end.

little—it was at times interesting to watch the interplay between Lazio and Paladino because it was almost as though—it wasn't almost as though—our perception of it was that Lazio was trying to do everything he could to avoid having a protracted primary fight with Paladino. And Paladino recognized that it was in his interest to have that kind of a fight with Lazio because nobody knew who he was, he needed to get out there, and that was the way to do it.

If I had any surprise, I'm surprised that neither Paladino nor Lazio really set their sights on Andrew during that summer, those summer months in as intense a fashion as I would have thought they would have. And I think that, I don't know if in retrospect, they think it was a mistake, but we never felt as though we were receiving an avalanche of fire from them. But like I said, that was a weird time. You had two audiences during the course of this campaign. I think somebody alluded to this earlier. During phase one over the summer you had a very small audience of political reporters, the junkies that follow this stuff, the elites. And voters really weren't paying attention. There was other stuff going on. It was the summer and people were living their lives. And then the race obviously shifted into the general when voters start paying attention and you could gauge the electorate in a more meaningful way.

And so most of those summer months were figuring out ways to keep filling the blog space and what not, while at the same time running the race that we wanted to run, which was being big on focusing on issues, and, when possible, emphasizing what he was doing as attorney general.

MR. SMITH: I think one of the things that surprised me the most about your campaign was after the Republican primary, which was surprising, but not really shocking at that point that Paladino had won, you guys effectively—you were very, very quiet for two weeks. And I mean as this increased, —which, I think, predictably produced a certain level of panic among



Democrats. But what were you thinking and what were you doing during those two weeks?

MR. SINGER: I'm not sure that it was two weeks that we were quiet. It was—

MR. CAPUTO: It was 13 and a half days.

MR. SINGER: 13 and a half days, three hours. First, during that time, like I said, nobody really knew that Paladino was a—we saw the Paladino threat emerging, but I don't think anybody saw it as—

MR. SMITH: So you were surprised?

MR. SINGER: —as a likely outcome until the weekend before, when Siena sort of quantified it as such. I think if anybody had followed this race closely, if you did a show of hands around the room and you asked them on the Sunday before the primary, "Who's gonna

June 8, 2010

The media reveals that Cuomo running mate Robert Duffy collects a salary and a public pension at the same time, a move Cuomo has criticized in the past as driving retirement costs up. Cuomo has collected more than \$320,000 from lobbyists in the last two years, more than any other politician in New York.

Republican gubernatorial nominee Paladino picks Thomas Ognibene, a former Queens city councilman, as running mate.

Primary petitioning begins.

June 17, 2010

City Councilman Charles Barron, upset at all-white Democratic slate, decides to run for governor on the all-black Freedom Party ticket.

June 22, 2010

A Quinnipiac poll says that Cuomo maintains huge approval ratings and leads the governor's race, but voters feel he is not explaining how he would address the state's ongoing budget crisis.

July 7, 2010

Cuomo criticizes the growth of local government spending, proposes a plan to consolidate

or dissolve many of the state's 10,000 local governments.

July 16, 2010

New York's GOP struggles to fundraise at all levels. Presumptive Republican nominee Lazio trails Cuomo's fundraising by \$20 million. The fundraising struggles are matched by an enthusiasm gap among GOP.



Ben Smith, of POLITICO, moderates the discussion of the Governor's race general election.

win?" you probably would have gotten a relatively split room. And so, you know, people were, I think, I wouldn't say surprised, but it certainly wasn't, if you'd gone back to July and said, "What do you think's gonna happen?" that wouldn't have been the outcome that people would have thought. Having said all that, during those first weeks, we recognize—and forget Paladino for a moment. But our theory of the case and our general approach to this campaign was that a campaign is about setting a rhythm and creating a dynamic that you build into as the time goes on. You don't want to go out too fast too early. It's a marathon, you don't want to go out too fast too early. You want to pace yourself early and build up speed and energy towards the end. And that was the strategic schedule that we laid out before the primaries were resolved. So I think we would have been, we would have had the same rhythm of activity whether it had been Lazio or Paladino the first couple of weeks, number one.

Number two, during those first couple of weeks our theory of the case with Paladino was we laid it out, I think, relatively early, it was summed up, as I said earlier, focusing on his extreme positions, his viewpoints, and then, banking on him to make the case against yourself. And those first weeks, I think if there was any surprise it was that either he managed to restrain himself somewhat, and when he didn't we were surprised that the media coverage of things he said didn't get bigger play. So, for example, there was an interview with *The New York Times* either the day after or the day—the Wednesday or the Thursday after the primary where he made some comment about—he made an allusion to training inner city people when he was in the military. And he made a reference to hygiene, repeated a reference that he'd already made once before to hygiene. And I remember being struck at how low in the story that was, and it didn't get much attention. And so there was a little bit of frustration that a comment like that was being given a pass, that there wasn't greater emphasis on the e-mail traffic for example, recognizing that in April there had been some emphasis when they first broke. But obviously in the scope of a general election where the nominee was now gonna get unprecedented attention, that that would not have been revisited in a more meaningful way. Eventually it was revisited for a variety of reasons. But that's what was going on that first week.

MR. SMITH: And was there during that period, were you guys arguing about whether to go up with negative ads or was it just—

MR. SINGER: No.

MR. SMITH: —a matter of timing? It was just—

MR. SINGER: No, we—as everybody has alluded to at one point or another during this panel, you want to define your opponent before they can define themselves. And so we always knew we were going to define whoever the opponent was.

July 18, 2010

Gubernatorial candidate Cuomo fundraises constantly because long-shot rival Paladino has deep pockets and can fund his own campaign with millions.

July 19, 2010

Paladino is encroaching on Lazio lead for GOP nomination, due to massive spending.

August 10, 2010

Cuomo and his running mate Duffy differ on the issue of the so-called "Ground Zero Mosque." Cuomo does not share Duffy's opinion that the site should be moved.

August 12, 2010

Cuomo runs a TV ad criticizing lobbyists and special interests as standing in the way of government's ability to create

jobs, cut taxes and fix the financial crisis.

August 18, 2010

Siena poll: Cuomo maintains his lead by more than 30 points.

September 12, 2010

A Siena poll shows that Lazio's early lead in Republican governor's race has eroded, and that Paladino is now only 1 percentage point behind.

September 15, 2010

Paladino, with 62 percent of the primary vote, claims GOP nomination for governor.

Paladino, the official GOP candidate for governor, is prepared to spend at will in race. The Cuomo team plans to focus voter attention on Paladino's lack of qualifications for office and anticipates that anti-Paladino sentiment will help Cuomo.

ANGER

MR. SMITH: Michael, you said that they're—you talked about how there was—you had seen this very narrow, very specific path for Paladino, what was it?

MR. CAPUTO: Well, I think that early on in our survey research we discovered that they're—we were talking about this theme of anger. We discovered that there is a significant number of citizens here in this state who are very angry at the circus that is Albany. But there's a larger number of people who are frustrated with the circus that is Albany. And the challenge for us was to convert the frustrated into the angry, number one. Number two, I believe that all of us on staff knew that we had a tiger by the tail and we knew that he had a predisposition to speak his mind, whether that was appropriate at the moment or not. We knew that coming out of the primary with such a significant victory, it shocked all of us. I remember that night, it's one of the things I'll remember for the rest of my life.

We knew that our tiger was gonna be gaining speed and that hanging on to his tail was gonna be more difficult. And for two weeks I believe that we ran a solid campaign. You know, we were going to be up against a \$25 million man. Carl was going to spend upwards of \$10 million. He said he would spend up to \$10 million of his own money to run this campaign. We also knew, by the way, that we were treated as a red-headed stepchild by the Republican party, that we weren't likely to be raising money hand over fist. So we had to take that huge bath after the primary victory by getting all the free media we could.

Carl did six hours and 45 minutes of live television without a gaff, without a mistake of any kind. And we would—John would go speak to the conservative

party leadership and they'd say, "Carl's gonna blow up." And John would say, "We've done six—you know, look how much live television he's done. Turn on your television." But we needed to shut that down at some point. But it was going so well. And I wish Maggie Haberman was here because I believe that she was present at the beginning of the downturn of the campaign.

MR. SMITH: So for you that was when it went off the rails, when it went off that path? When he told—I guess he sort of started talking to Maggie about, you know, having secret knowledge of Cuomo's past infidelities and things like that?

MR. CAPUTO: Right. And this, against all staff advice, John, especially was very hard on that.

MR. SMITH: Did he think that was a good idea to talk about? Or did that just come out 'cause he was chatting?

MR. CAPUTO: Carl doesn't always think what's coming out of his mouth is going to be a good idea. I love Carl Paladino, I must tell you that—I mean I'll just digress for one moment. One of the things as a political consultant that you want to do is rub off on your candidate, you know? Your good habits, your good messaging, the things that you want to do. And at some point in time I realized that he was rubbing off on me.

MR. SMITH: That's one way to explain it.

MR. CAPUTO: And I do believe that Carl fell in love with the kerplunk of the turd in the punch bowl. He had a lot of fun turning people's heads and raising their hair.

MR. SMITH: One specific thing he did that was less sort of flamboyant, but very early he said that he didn't plan to campaign in New York City. He didn't like New York City. And was that—what was that? Was that strategy?

And I do believe that Carl fell in love with the kerplunk of the turd in the punch bowl.

—Michael Caputo

September 16, 2010

Paladino sends out a garbage-scented mailer featuring pictures of seven democrats and the caption "Something stinks in Albany."

Asked to comment on the differences between himself and Paladino, Cuomo refuses to comment, saying his views of Paladino are irrelevant to voter decision.

September 20, 2010

Paladino stresses differences between NYC and upstate as part of campaign strategy. He will not campaign in the city for votes. However, Paladino can't win the governorship without votes from NYC.

September 22, 2010

A Quinnipiac poll shows a 6-point lead for Cuomo in the governor's race. This is in contrast to a Rasmussen poll showing a 16-point lead.

September 23, 2010

Democrats urge Cuomo to take more aggressive stance against Paladino as the gap is perceived to be narrowing.

September 24, 2010

Cuomo attacks Paladino for donations to Albany politicians and for failure to create jobs despite receiving government economic development funds.

Just days after the Quinnipiac poll showed Cuomo's lead had narrowed, Siena releases a poll showing Cuomo with a 33-point lead over Paladino.

MR. CAPUTO: Well, we can go back over all of this, but I can tell you that that's not—

MR. SMITH: But I mean that's not—

MR. CAPUTO: —what he said. That is not what he said. He was talking about traffic at that moment.

MR. SMITH: So he was just complaining? That wasn't campaign strategy?

MR. CAPUTO: He was complaining about traffic. He said it's a lot easier to get around in Queens and Staten Island than it is in Manhattan. And anybody here that doesn't agree with that, you know, I'd like some of what you're smoking.

THE POLLS

MR. SMITH: I wanted to bring Lee in here, 'cause right around the end of that two week period there was this Quinnipiac poll that showed it as a six point race. Rasmussen poll showing as a 16 point race. Two days later you guys showed it as a 33 point race.

MR. LEE MIRINGOFF: Siena. That was Siena.

MR. SMITH: You're right, sorry, Siena showed a 33 point race. What was going on there? Lee runs Marist.

MR. MIRINGOFF: There was a—that was a classic lesson in sort of the nuances of polling not being able to be communicated through the media or from the pollsters themselves. I mean, we were talking about three very different—I'm not as familiar with the Rasmussen poll, that's an IVR poll. The others are all telephone and I think all use cell. I'm not sure if Siena does. In any case, you did have a lot of characterizations of the race which were all over the map. And, as I recall, the Quinnipiac numbers were six or seven point spread and I think—

MR. SMITH: And just to pause, did you guys ever see numbers within ten points in your own polling?

MR. MIRINGOFF: No. And what you have in there, simply put, is in the case of the Siena 33, they had registered voters, which, if you don't talk about likely voters when you're coming into a very low turnout environment at John indicated, you're really not where you need to be. Siena at—I'm sorry, Quinnipiac and that poll, as I recall, did not include Rick Lazio into the mix. And that—

MR. SMITH: That seems appropriate though, right?

MR. MIRINGOFF: —as a conservative. And he was on the ballot at that point, so they did likely voters, didn't include Rick Lazio. We did likely voters and included Rick Lazio and ended up, I think, we were at 19 points at that point.

MR. SMITH: I guess that's why you got invited.

MR. MIRINGOFF: Yes, my staff gave me a hat, it's over there somewhere. But it's got "Great Decider." We felt we were in the role of trying to balance out a six and a 33 point spread at that point. But—

MR. SMITH: So it was to you—but that doesn't totally explain it. And, in fact, it's stuff like this that makes people like me tear our hair out about whether to write about polls at all, because those—

MR. MIRINGOFF: Well, those are very—

MR. SMITH: —differences are well beyond—

MR. MIRINGOFF: No, no, no, but if you're talking about—

I think one of the perceptions that emerged from this process was that every time a light switch got flipped on, Andrew had to say "Yes." That was not the case.

—Phil Singer

September 27, 2010

Black leaders criticize Cuomo for failing to take a stronger stand on issues that deal explicitly with race, and his former run against a black gubernatorial candidate. Cuomo responds by setting up talks with black leaders on how to woo votes in the fight with Paladino.

September 28, 2010

Lazio withdraws from third-party bid, hoping to prevent a split of Republican votes that would give Cuomo an easy victory.

September 29, 2010

Daily News/Marist Poll: 50-60 percent of likely voters do not believe that Paladino is fit to be governor.

September 30, 2010

Paladino is upset by perceived intrusions on his personal life and nearly comes to blows with a reporter, accusing him of sending a "goon" to take photographs of his daughter.

October 1, 2010

Paladino makes off-handed comment about Cuomo's former marriage and calls for deeper investigation into

Cuomo's past. The Cuomo campaign accuses Paladino of engaging in "gutter" politics.

October 3, 2010

Media reveals that Cuomo is the de facto manager for his own campaign, controlling strategy decisions himself.

So the one-two punch of wow, Paladino not only won, he kind of blew Lazio out, and then, combined with this poll, all of the sudden made him, well, maybe he is a real candidate.

—John Haggerty

MR. SMITH: —whether Lazio is—

MR. MIRINGOFF: —no, no, the registered voter that Siena had was not far off for what the registered voter was. What Quinnipiac had in those numbers, no one ever had.

MR. SMITH: You didn't figure out what was wrong with that poll?

MR. MIRINGOFF: No, we don't actually look a lot at all those. The reason we get to examine from a polling organization standpoint is when folks call and say, "Why are the polls all over the map?" I would like to comment on one other thing though, if I might, that was interesting 'cause Michael alluded to it and I think we've heard it in varying degrees this morning, campaigns doing polling, relying on political polls, having their own political intelligence. The Lazio folks probably didn't have the money to do a lot of their own polling themselves, and we're seeing a lot of that. We did a project early on with the *Daily News* and a partnership and found very similar results that Michael was finding about Paladino. And we did a whole series of questions asking first whether people thought Cuomo and Paladino were fit to be governor. Asked a bunch of these statements that were, you know, the e-mails and the baseball bat and all those things and found out, interestingly, some very similar results. Some of the stuff hurt, some of it didn't hurt. The net effect of all that was by the time you got done with the list, the number of people who were unsure about

Carl Paladino then went to, "He's unfit." The fit folks didn't change. They stayed in the mid-30s. But the unsure moved to unfit. By the end of the campaign his negatives were 63 percent compared to 38 percent for Cuomo.

So the notion that the Cuomo side could have used this, the extreme argument, and sort of let Paladino hang out there with a lot of these things he had said, done and otherwise thought, was gonna have a very receptive audience in terms of where public opinion is concerned. I think that was the whole dynamic of the campaign. When the Quinnipiac poll hit, and given we saw it also on page one, we knew two days later what our poll was gonna show, what Siena—it was gonna be that page 59 Marjorie Connelly story. And sure enough, there was that page 59 Marjorie Connelly story that talks about, "Well, polls have different methodologies..."

MR. SMITH: Did you try to talk them out of putting it on page one?

MR. SINGER: I'm not even sure we had the opportunity to make the argument about—

MR. SMITH: Between editions?

MR. SMITH: —placements.

MR. SMITH: You're falling down on the job.

MR. SINGER: Yeah.

MR. SMITH: You didn't call them after you saw the early edition?

MR. SINGER: No, we fire bombed 'em. But I thought that the—

MR. CAPUTO: No, we all thought you had a phone that went direct-line between them.

MR. SINGER: Yes, *The New York Times* is running our propaganda.

October 4, 2010

Paladino releases a series of policy plans, including the elimination of a capital-gains tax, a reduction of the corporate franchise tax rate, and lowering both corporate and income taxes.

October 5, 2010

Paladino has spent at least \$1.9 million of his campaign money hiring his own

companies to do work for his campaign. The practice is not illegal, as long as the companies are paid market rate. Paladino's campaign is largely self-funded.

A Siena poll shows that 59 percent of likely voters have an unfavorable view of Paladino.

October 5, 2010

Paladino accuses Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver of being a "criminal," saying he has blocked legislation that would adversely affect the firm for which he moonlights. A top adviser to the Paladino campaign says the candidate should focus more on issues, and less on the personal life of rival Cuomo.

Paladino attempts to re-boot his campaign by focusing on New York's fiscal spiral. It is an attempt to distract from his unpopular persona.

October 13, 2010

Paladino's gay nephew keeps quiet in response to candidate's homophobic remarks

MR. SMITH: So how did you respond?

MR. SINGER: Well, it was a little bit frustrating because I think we were probably on—this is true in all campaigns, you fight a media narrative that is not commensurate with the reality that you're seeing. And, on occasion, those narratives are either in the interest of one campaign at the expense of the other, vice versa, and sometimes they sync up together. In this case, obviously it was a godsend for the Paladino operation and an obstacle for the Cuomo campaign.

And so our focus was on, as I said earlier, we were waiting for Paladino to sort of make the case against himself, waiting for that to happen while at the same time dealing with this. And we threw up a couple of evasive maneuvers and tactics to change the storyline somewhat. The mayor's endorsement, for example, came either that—the day of the *Times* piece or the day after the *Times* piece. Things like that. And we just kept trying to fill the media space around us with our proactive argument in order to diffuse whatever was coming out on the other side.

MR. SMITH: And were you able to kind of take advantage of that poll even if you didn't think it was accurate?

MR. HAGGERTY: I think it—the one-two effect of coming—no one thought we were gonna win the primary except us and some Republicans. So I think the general perception was that people had written Paladino off, and his numbers for a statewide primary are actually very impressive, particularly against a candidate who was perceived as the nominee and had spent \$40 million running a US Senate race. So the one-two punch of wow, Paladino not only won, he kind of blew Lazio out, and then, combined with this poll, all of the sudden made him, well, maybe he is a real candidate. And I think the press wanted to see a fight. You know? I thought they thought, for nothing else but entertainment value, a Rick Lazio/Cuomo race would not be as entertaining as a Carl Paladino/Andrew Cuomo race under any circumstances. And I used to say that to the reporters. "Come on, you want us to win because you want to see the show." But I

That was a classic lesson in sort of the nuances of polling not being able to be communicated through the media or from the pollsters themselves.

—Lee Miringoff

don't think—it was certainly not six points. But I do think it might have been 12 points at that time—

MR. SMITH: And so were you able to raise money or generate any kind of momentum around that?

MR. HAGGERTY: It opened a lot of doors. It opened a lot of doors for us because I think we were taken very seriously for a short period of time because he did all that live TV. We got the conservative—we moved the conservative line as quickly as we could. He, all of the sudden, was a real candidate, and then we started a long slope down, a lot of it self-inflicted, obviously, by the candidate. But I think at that time we were perceived as—people were willing to listen to us for a change and not the kook from Buffalo.

And early on in the race, when I first met with Carl, I said, "There is a very, very short distance between kook from Buffalo and outsider." And I think what we had achieved by winning the primary with those numbers and also with the poll and everything was he's really a candidate who's an outsider, which was what everybody thought the people were looking for this year generally in the political climate, not only in New York, but across the nation.

October 18, 2010

The New York Post offers a cautious endorsement of Cuomo, citing his "detailed plans for New York's future which reveal a realistic understanding of the state's problems and prospects."

October 19, 2010

The gubernatorial debate is widely perceived as a farce, with little substantive discussion or policy ideas to distract from the larger-than-life personalities of Jimmy McMillan and Kristin Davis. Expert commentators criticize Paladino and Cuomo for a lack of specific policy ideas.

October 20, 2010

Paladino calls for a follow up debate, after complaining about the format of the first. Paladino's running mate becomes the clean-up man for the gaffe-prone candidate.

October 21, 2010

According to *The New York Times*, Paladino begins to lose support in his hometown of Buffalo, New York.

October 24, 2010

Paladino's hometown paper endorses Cuomo.

October 25, 2010

The intensity of advertising battle increases with Paladino ads targeting Cuomo for ties to controversial figures and Cuomo's ads targeting members of Paladino's campaign team.

NATIONAL CONTEXT

MR. SMITH: Errol had a—we were talking events, a sort of question about the nationals.

MR. ERROL LOUIS: Yes, thank you. And right around that same point, just to pick up on what John was saying, I thought the strongest case right at that point was also that, despite the White House's desire to see Andrew Cuomo at the top of the ticket, and it was public, it was published that their political director who we, a lot of us know, Patrick Gaspard, said, "What we really care about is making sure the top of the ticket is strong so that a bunch of Democrats running in House seats, in contested House seats are gonna get over the line." And, like much of what the White House wanted to have happen, that didn't materialize. My question for both sides really is, did the fact that these upsets in the making, more than in any other state, House seats flipping, did that factor into any of your calculations? Did you have a sense that, well, gee, we ought to put a lot of extra resources into Suffolk County, 'cause look at what's going on out there. Or maybe we ought to do a little extra more in Staten Island. Did the sort of two dynamics that were going on, it almost looks like two different states went to the polls that day, did you have any sense of that or about getting people to split tickets or anything like that?

MR. HAGGERTY: No, I think, going back to what Kevin and Barney said before, I think one of the root problems for Republican candidates this year was lack of a state party. They talked about, earlier on in the attorney general's race, the Democrats talked about a very effective coordinated campaign. That's a key to victory, particularly in a state like New York, for Republicans to help as a booster rocket with all the campaigns. The campaigns in this took all different—their own paths. Some of them ran away from Paladino for obvious reasons. I think that was to—I think a couple of them went too far and actually hurt themselves upstate.

Lee Miringoff, director of the Marist Institute for Public Opinion, speaks.

The House seats were very much driven by Washington, Obama Care, Pelosi. And I think what people realize, Republicans want all these seats back, but they were actually mostly Republican seats. They were drawn as Republican seats in reapportionment ten years ago and we lost them through a variety of bad candidates, good campaigns by the Democrats. So most of the seats that the Republicans took back in New York are actually Republican—drawn as Republican seats. There was an effort by the NRCC and the National RNC to help those seats, but they were not interested in the state races. Some people thought maybe these auxiliary activities that had—were not coordinated, had nothing to do with us, were gonna draw out some more Republicans, but it proved not to be true. I think the lack of a state party coordinating the effort from before the nomination, it just became total disarray. There were no additional resources organized by the state party. And therefore, I'm in the middle of doing a recount in Westchester,



October 26, 2010

Paladino's budget strategy is "Shut down the State!" Meanwhile, Cuomo attacks Paladino's military record and labor leaders look to Cuomo for cooperation.

October 27, 2010

Cuomo vows to clean up Albany and have legislators investigated. He also reveals a budget strategy for the coming tough year to *Albany Times Union*.

October 28, 2010

The New York Times reveals questions about Paladino's handling of his aunt's estate. Paladino signs pledge to support construction workers opposed to the Ground Zero mosque.

November 1, 2010

Rounding up a statewide tour, Cuomo releases his environmental plan.

November 2, 2010

Cuomo is elected governor.



John Haggerty, of the Paladino campaign, talks about the role of the Tea Party.

THE TEA PARTY

MR. SMITH: And did these new kind of Tea Party grassroots provide any infrastructure?

MR. HAGGERTY: Well, this is a debate that rages in the Paladino campaign. I think the Tea Party in New York—

MR. CAPUTO: We're on different sides of that debate.

MR. HAGGERTY: I think the Tea Party in New York, much less so than in other states, is a cluster of different groups. And just like a political party, whether Republican or Democrat or Tea Party, there's a cluster where there are people within it who are extremely dedicated and effective, and a lot of people like to make a lot of noise and nothing happens at 'em. I think the Tea Party in New York is both. There are some very great people in the Tea Party in New York—

MR. SMITH: But, so they weren't, like, bussing tons of voters to the polls for you on election day?

MR. HAGGERTY: No, and I gotta tell you, I was, I'm a believer in, you know, you see the result. They were certainly not as effective in terms of getting signatures for us as I thought they would be. They're probably most effective—you want to have a 200-person pitchforks and torch rally about something, they'll produce it. They like that kind of stuff. Again, they're not as sophisticated as party people, committee people, because they haven't done signatures before.

But the ones that were eager to do it and really wanted to work, there were some very, very good people in there and some very true believers in what they believe. And it's a mix of Republicans and angry tax payers. And it's not just a Republican thing. But they're—because they choose to take the position that we don't want to be too formal, it hurts their effectiveness. Because when you don't have the formality of having mailing lists, having regular meetings, having that kind of organization, it makes it harder to use as a tool for a candidate or for a campaign.

MR. SMITH: Actually we have about ten more minutes and—six more minutes, and a bunch more questions that I did want to get in. Specifically jumping to the debate—

MR. MIRINGOFF: I was just quickly gonna say on this national New York trend, New York was not immune from these national trends on the so-called “enthusiasm gap.” Republican voters were more enthusiastic in New York than Democrats, just like in the national

and when you look, there are no Republican line voters not voting for Paladino. But what you do see is Democratic line voters dropping down for Donovan and Wilson. Wilson a little more I think in Westchester than anywhere else. So obviously those campaigns, their message, a softer message, more moderate, drew some Democrats over for change. But I don't think that there was no court—the national scene was driven and people will say, “Well, how did statewide do so poorly and not win—you know, the numbers aren't that great. And there were national Tea—you know, you had the national change and all this stuff. And then we win these congressional seats.”

It's important to remember most of those congressional seats were Republican and they did a targeted effort in there that was not coordinated by the state party. Remember the state party was driving around in a bus for the majority of this general election. Okay? And I—instead of being in headquarters doing the things that need to be—the nuts and bolts politics that need to be done, absentee ballots, field, all those things. And I give the Democrats a lot of credit because those nuts and bolts things matter tremendously as an auxiliary to campaigns. And the Republican State Committee provided none of it for any of its candidates this year. The State Senate, one last thing, you look at the state, when the State Senate's in the majority, they're kind of in the majority by luck. Their targeted races, when you look at their top four targeted races, they only won two of them, I believe. And they lost two seats they didn't see really coming till the very end. So why they ended up in the majority, again, it was not conditions, it was not an effort, it's just the way it turned out.

trends, just in New York the Democratic registration advantages, they have so many more points to give.

THE DEBATE

MR. SMITH: On the—heading into that one final debate, what was your—obviously Paladino, came across kind of straight forward, but really clearly didn't breakthrough. Was there—what was the strategy going on? Did you guys prepare? Did it not work?

MR. CAPUTO: Well, I think first of all, Carl was largely responsible for the field of candidates on the stage that day. Carl refused to even talk about not allowing any of the other candidates because he had gone through, for the first time in his life, the pain of petitioning. It was a very huge and heavy lift. He was a—what, John, he was planning on spending \$1 million on petitioning, but it was done with an almost entirely volunteer force, and he was very personally impressed by that. When he found out that, you know, all the other candidates, Kristin Davis and Jimmy and all these other folks had also done that, he thought that it was counter to the principles of democracy to exclude them. Our advice to him was different.

No, but I did agree with the principle, but when we came into that debate we knew that, first of all, Carl had suffered several different self-inflicted wounds. We knew that New Yorkers were looking at him according to the Cuomo narrative. Most of the reporters who were at least pretending to play it straight in the early part of the game had already jumped into the Cuomo bandwagon. And what we needed to do at that point was prove to New Yorkers that Carl was just one of them, whether he was from upstate, downstate, west state, east state, it really was more about he's not crazy Carl Paladino. We asked him to hit a double. We knew if he swung for the fences that we had a real risk of ending it that night. We asked him for a double. We think he walked to second base, he didn't even slide. But—

MR. SMITH: So, to come across as an acceptable alternative, basically?

MR. CAPUTO: Right. And he was prepared. We had some very strong people preparing him. The one thing that—you can say what you will about Carl Paladino, but he is deep on almost all issues, especially economic issues. He's not deep on social issues, but—

MR. SMITH: I'm just—sorry to cut you off, just 'cause there's lots to be said. One of the things that I think we didn't get to that obviously was fascinating to everybody watching the campaign and watching the Cuomo governorship, was how personally Andrew ran it. And I wonder, there was a *Times* story which got a lot of attention saying that, was that different from other campaigns you've worked on? And then, what is it—what does it tell us—

CANDIDATE AS CAMPAIGN MANAGER?

MR. SINGER: Well, my experience has been—

MR. SMITH: —looking forward to the way he's gonna govern the state.

MR. SINGER: —has been that candidates who take an active interest in their operation tend to be good and effective elected officials. And candidates who need talking points before they go into the Boy Scouts generally tend not to be effective in office. I think Andrew obviously played a role in overseeing the campaign which bore his name, as he should have. But I don't think that he spent any amount of time that was any different than any other candidate that I've ever dealt with. So he was involved in making sure that the big programs were in place. He recognized very early in the process that having a viable turnout operation was going to be very important, given what happened in 2009. And he said, "Let's get a viable turnout operation in place," and then got the right people involved in the campaign to implement that kind of program.

And so you definitely recognize that the need for creating an effective organization was coming from the top. He had a line that I think a lot of people took to heart, which was that campaigns are 85 percent about execution and actually doing what you say you're gonna do and turning ideas into realities. And if I took anything away from this particular campaign, it's the importance of not just being a big BSer and saying, "Alright, yeah. Let's go do this." But actually making sure that, you know, the to-do list for Monday is checked off and everything is done by Tuesday night or by Monday night—

MR. CHALIAN: Every campaign—you've talked about that your slide began when there were self-inflicted wounds, a reflection of the personality of your candidate, and his abilities and what have you. And I agree with you Phil, every campaign, good campaign at least, right, effective campaign reflects its candidate in a lot of ways. But every candidate is a different kind of manager of the campaign, right? Even those that get involved allow others to run the campaign and some candidates hold the decision-making authority all the time for every decision big and small. Is there something about Andrew's character, his idiosyncrasies, his whatever it is, that allowed you guys—was an obstacle for you in dealing with the press or in dealing

This is a debate that rages in the Paladino campaign.

—John Haggerty

with the political world in terms of just the day-to-day, here's our plan, here's what we're gonna do, waiting for the one person to sort of make micro-decisions?

MR. SINGER: I think one of the perceptions that emerged from this process was that every time a light switch got flipped on, Andrew had to say "Yes." That was not the case. Andrew, I think, struck a good middle ground between weighing in on the big decisions as he should have, and delegating on medium-large to medium to small decisions that he didn't need to be involved with. Obviously the campaign goes in certain rhythms. During quieter moments, did he play more of a role on occasion? Sure.

MR. SMITH: So could you put out—you could put out a statement without his seeing it?

MR. SINGER: If we needed to, sure. Yeah. I mean, that was not—I don't think that there was any moment where something didn't get done because he didn't sign off on something. Something needed to get done, we did it and that was that.

ALBANY DYSFUNCTION

MR. SMITH: I think I'm gonna give us—since the whole event was Fred Hochberg's idea, I'll give him the last question here. But I'm gonna change it slightly just to make it slightly less high-minded. But I think he was struck, as people often are, about the extent to which a lot of the conversation through the primary, through the generals, about Albany dysfunction, which he describes here as a little elite and esoteric, as opposed to economic issues and issues of jobs. And it is striking that for all the talk about being an anti-insider year and people being fed up that in Albany a state senator and the son of the former governor are always the guys who got elected. Was it ultimately—was that something that voters did not ultimately care that much about?

MR. CAPUTO: Well, we haven't spoken much about the Tea Party. We haven't spoken much about the media. These are two things I really wanted to talk about, because I believe in the Tea Party.

MR. SMITH: You can eat the media for lunch, so—

MR. CAPUTO: Alright. But I will tell you I believe in—we put 53,000 miles on a car together, Carl and I. John was there for much of that. We met with—I think we went to 125 public events where there were at least 50 and sometimes hundreds and hundreds and even 1,000 people in the room. The sick and tired nature of the people of New York is really palpable. It's visceral. People are really fed up. I think the fed-up line changes at Westchester. I think that Carl always talked about how there is no upstate downstate thing. That's just a politician's excuse for not doing their job. And in fact there is. I think that the people Westchester and south

are maybe not just fine with the way its run, but they find it better than the alternative. I think people—

MR. SMITH: And that gives you maybe 51 percent of the state right there, right?

MR. CAPUTO: Indeed. Indeed. And that makes the ability for real change in Albany, it really hobbles that. And there's going to have to be a different kind of a candidate, a different kind of time and a different kind of opponent for anyone to be elected outside of the milieu of the Albany insiders.

MR. SMITH: What do you think Phil, was that—did that not cut as deeply as you thought it would?

MR. SINGER: I think ultimately people looked at the candidates and said, "Who's going to be able to deal with the dysfunction and disorder in Albany and fix it?" And I think Cuomo made a pretty compelling case that if his name had been Smith or Chalian, he would have been effective at doing so. And so the fact that he was the son of a former governor really didn't come into play that much.

MR. HOCHBERG: Which was a surprise to you or not?

MR. SINGER: I was—I don't think we were surprised by that because had that been an issue we would have heard about it way before the general. I mean that would have been something that came up months earlier, when people started speculating about him running.

MR. CAPUTO: And I believe that the myth that the people of New York don't have good memories of Mario Cuomo is false. I mean any polling—our internal polling showed that we do not beat up on Mario Cuomo. So the fact that he was the son of Mario Cuomo was not, in the end, a negative.

MR. MIRINGOFF: And people are very dissatisfied in New York and wanted major changes. But Andrew Cuomo's approval rating was almost 60 percent as attorney general. This was not an unpopular candidate.

MR. SMITH: Well thank you guys so much for doing this and for your candor. We're gonna now head over to a lunch, where you can be candid about—or some of the panelists are gonna head over to lunch, where they can be candid about the media. But thank everybody so much for coming, and I guess there'll be hard copies of this available at some point.

[Applause]

PARTICIPANT BIOGRAPHIES

EMILY ARSENAULT worked as the campaign manager for Eric Schneiderman's race for New York State attorney general. Previously, she was the deputy political director at Change to Win in Washington, DC, where she worked on national legislative campaigns and a 12-state coordinated labor effort for Barack Obama. She was a regional field director in New Hampshire for John Edwards' presidential primary campaign and worked to elect John Hall to US Congress in 2006. She has worked on other legislative and electoral campaigns including the 2004 Kerry/Edwards campaign with SEIU and America Coming Together in Michigan and Florida. Arsenault started her political career working at the Healthcare Education Project at 1199 SEIU and the Greater New York Hospital Association.

JOSH BRUMBERGER most recently served as chief of staff for Eric Dinallo's campaign for New York State attorney general. Before joining Dinallo, Brumberger was a vice president at Diamond Edge Capital Partners, LLC, a small investment advisory firm. Prior to that, he was a business development associate at Fortress Investment Group. Brumberger began his career in government and politics, first serving as a legislative aide to Congresswoman Nita Lowey (D-NY), then as finance director and traveling chief of staff to Senator John Edwards (D-NC).

MICHAEL CAPUTO served as campaign director for Carl Paladino, Republican candidate for governor. He is an international political consultant and a veteran of 73 political campaigns, 46 of them outside the United States. Today, he provides crisis communications services to companies, senior executives and political leaders at Caputo Public Relations, Inc. Caputo first entered politics as a field press liaison for Ronald Reagan's 1984 re-election. He worked as a writer for US Presidential candidate Jack Kemp and a media director for US President George H.W. Bush. In 1996, he created the winning "Rock the Vote" young voter appeal for Russian President Boris Yeltsin's election. He also worked as an adviser for the first democratically elected presidents of El Salvador and Nicaragua. Caputo served until February 2008 as founding director of a successful statewide campaign to defeat Hometown Democracy, an anti-development amendment to the Florida constitution. He has worked in many other high-profile statewide races.

EDUARDO CASTELL is a partner at the MirRam Group, a full service government relations and campaign consulting firm. Castell previously served as executive deputy comptroller for the City of New York and campaign manager of Bill Thompson's 2009 mayoral and 2001 Comptroller campaigns. Prior to these positions, Castell served three years as special assistant

to the president of the New York City Board of Education. From 1993 to 1997, Castell worked for U.S. Representative Nydia Velazquez (D-NY), eventually becoming her chief of staff. From 1989 to 1993, he served as legislative assistant and then legislative director to the late U.S. Representative Ted Weiss (D-NY).

DAVID CHALIAN is the political editor for PBS NewsHour. Prior to joining NewsHour, Chalian was the political director for ABC News. In addition, he provided political commentary and analysis for "World News with Diane Sawyer," "Good Morning America," ABC News Radio and NewsOne, the network's affiliate news service. At ABC News, Chalian received an Emmy Award nomination as part of the team that traveled to Alaska to produce Sarah Palin's first television interview as the GOP vice presidential nominee. Prior to joining ABC News, Chalian produced "Inside City Hall," a widely acclaimed nightly political program for NY1 News. There he covered the 2001 New York City mayoral campaign, the 2002 gubernatorial campaign in New York, and the tragic events of September 11.

KEVIN FULLINGTON served as Rick Lazio's campaign manager in the race for governor. He is counsel at midtown law firm Herrick, Feinstein LLP and co-chair of Herrick's government relations practice. He focuses on finding governmental and administrative solutions to clients' problems. Before joining Herrick, Fullington spent 10 years in government. Most recently, he was deputy director and general counsel for the New York City Mayor's Office of City Legislative Affairs. He also spent five years working for the New York City Council as chief of operations and general counsel to the minority leader. In addition, Fullington worked for the New York State Attorney General in various capacities, including as personal assistant to the attorney general. Fullington has experience on municipal, state and federal campaigns.

BRUCE GYORY brings decades of experience to his recent role in the Coffey campaign for attorney general. He helped coordinate the Election Day operations which led to three upset victories in special elections against the old Bronx organization in the late 1970s, two of which were building blocks for the Bronx's emerging minority vote. He ran and lost for city councilmember at-large from the Bronx in 1977. Gyory has done macro-vote targeting for three successful gubernatorial campaigns. He served first as assistant and then deputy appointments officer to the governor in the second Carey administration and more recently served as senior advisor to Governors Spitzer and Paterson. Gyory is now an adjunct professor of Political Science at SUNY Albany and is a political and strategic consultant at Corning Place Consulting.

BARNEY KELLER has worked in politics since he graduated from college. Most recently, he was deputy communications director on Pat Toomey's campaign for the United States Senate in Pennsylvania. Prior to that, he was press secretary for Rick Lazio during his run for governor. Keller was communications director for the Massachusetts Republican Party, press secretary for the New Hampshire Republican Party, and press secretary on Jim Ogonowski's campaign for Congress in Massachusetts's 5th Congressional District.

JOHN KENNY was the campaign manager and treasurer of Eric Dinallo's campaign for New York State Attorney General. Kenny's government experience includes serving as special counsel to the New York State superintendent of insurance and as deputy chief of staff of the New York Liquidation Bureau. He also worked on the Spitzer/Paterson campaign and transition. Prior to working in government and politics, Kenny practiced law for 13 years at a New York firm, with a focus on commercial finance. He began his career as an accountant and financial analyst.

VIRGINIA LAM started her career as a business development consultant at Deloitte and Touche in the public sector group. She moved into New York City politics nine years ago as an Urban Fellow, working in the FDNY's press office. After a stint as deputy press secretary for an Illinois Senate campaign, she returned to the FDNY. Following Bloomberg's re-election in 2005, Lam joined his press office, with subsequent positions at Rudder Finn and Howard Rubenstein's PR firm. This most recent election cycle, she served as communications director for Dan Donovan's campaign for attorney general and has since accepted an offer to return to Rubenstein as a senior executive in the Issues and Public Affairs group.

JON LIPSHUTZ managed Assemblyman Richard Brodsky's campaign for attorney general. Lipshutz has worked on various political campaigns and with political organizations for over 10 years. He started his career in Wisconsin working on the 2000 campaign for Al Gore and continued his work in the state, working for candidates up and down the ballot. He successfully helped Peg Lautenschlager win the election for attorney general of Wisconsin and served in her administration as a special assistant. As Wisconsin state political director for the AFL-CIO in 2006, Lipshutz helped re-elect Governor Jim Doyle and was instrumental in winning a highly targeted congressional race for Congressman Steve Kagen (D-WI) and other down-ballot Democrats. In 2007 and 2008, he worked on Hillary Clinton's campaign for president in numerous states, including serving as the state director in Wyoming. He finished the 2008 cycle as the western field director for the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee.

ERIC PHILLIPS is a senior advisor to Nassau County District Attorney Kathleen Rice. In 2010, Phillips served as the communications and policy director for Rice's campaign for attorney general. He has served in a number of senior government and campaign posts at the local, state and national level, including working for a district attorney, a mayor, an attorney general, the Democratic Party and a leading national advocacy organization. Phillips got his start in politics as a policy aide to an assembly member in the Wisconsin statehouse. In 2010, Albany's *The Capitol* newspaper named Phillips one of the state's political "Rising Stars" under 40 years old.

MIKE RABINOWITZ currently works at BerlinRosen and he consulted on several races this cycle, including Eric Schneiderman's race for attorney general. Before joining BerlinRosen, Rabinowitz played a major role in policy and electoral campaigns for UNITE HERE, the Hotel Trades Council and SEIU1199. He has also worked in government, handling complex health care issues for Assembly Health Committee Chair Dick Gottfried (D-Manhattan). Rabinowitz has worked on voter targeting, "get out the vote" and field strategy on over a dozen campaigns for offices ranging from county legislator to president.

MARCUS REESE most recently served as campaign manager to Republican attorney general candidate Dan Donovan. Reese began his career in politics working for Bush/Cheney in 2004 and then went on to work for the Republican National Convention in Washington, DC. Before joining the Donovan campaign, Reese was deputy campaign manager for Michael Steele's US Senate race in Maryland. He is now at Tusk Strategies, a political and strategic consulting firm.

PHIL SINGER has a decade of experience that includes two presidential campaigns and working on the team that orchestrated the Democratic takeover of the Senate in 2006. A veteran campaign strategist and public relations expert, he owns and operates Marathon Strategies LLC, a consulting firm with a presence in both New York and Washington, DC. Most recently, Singer served as a senior adviser and consultant to Andrew Cuomo's successful 2010 campaign for governor. He also worked for Senator Chuck Schumer (D-NY) in a variety of capacities from 2000 to 2006, counseling Schumer on all media-related matters. He served as the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee's communications director with Schumer during the 2006 campaign cycle. Singer also served as a top official for Senator Hillary Clinton's (D-NY) presidential campaign, where he ran the war room and was part of the senior group that directed the campaign. In 2004, he was the Kerry/Edwards campaign's national spokesperson. He has also worked for Congressman Steve Rothman (D-NJ) and former Senator Robert G. Torricelli (D-NJ).

BEN SMITH writes a blog about national politics for POLITICO. During the 2008 presidential campaign, he covered the Democratic primary. Before joining POLITICO, he was a political columnist for the *New York Daily News* and in 2005 and 2006 he started three of New York City's leading political blogs, The Politicker, The Daily Politics and Room Eight, for which he still writes occasionally about the New York scene. Smith has also been a reporter for the *Indianapolis Star* and the *Wall Street Journal Europe*. He grew up in New York City and attended Yale University.

TAMMY SUN was communications director for Sean Coffey's attorney general campaign. She is an expert communications strategist who has successfully managed and executed high-profile media campaigns for companies, political figures, international NGOs and think tanks. Sun is president & CEO of Let It Shine Inc., a media and communications consulting firm in New York City. Previously, she worked as executive vice president of Seeds of Peace, a global nonprofit that works on conflict resolution issues in the Middle East and South Asia. Sun has also served in senior communications positions for a variety of political and public figures, including former President Bill Clinton and Senator Joe Lieberman (I-CT), as well as the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC). She began her career as a staff assistant for Vice President Al Gore in the White House.

BRADLEY TUSK was Dan Donovan's campaign manager in the recent race for attorney general. He is the founder of Tusk Strategies, a political and strategic consulting firm based in New York City. Clients range from corporations like WalMart, Expedia, Camelot, Turner Broadcasting, and NBC Universal to issue-based groups like Education Reform Now, PENewark, New York Uprising, Americans for Safe Streets, and Success Charter Networks, as well as political campaigns and independent expenditures. In 2009, Tusk served as the campaign manager for New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg's successful re-election bid. Prior to serving as campaign manager for Bloomberg 2009, he served as deputy governor of the State of Illinois from 2003-2006, where he oversaw the state budget, policy, legislation, communications, and operations. After serving as deputy governor, Tusk served as senior vice president at Lehman Brothers, where he created the lottery monetization group. Before his deputy governor appointment, Tusk worked as special assistant to New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and, prior to that, as communications director for Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY). Tusk also served as senior advisor to New York City Parks Commissioner Henry Stern, and was an adjunct professor at Fordham University.

BLAKE ZEPP was a lead strategist on Eric Schneiderman's campaign for attorney general. For much of the last decade, he has served in senior positions in state and national politics, including communications director and senior advisor for Senator Chuck Schumer (D-NY); national spokesperson and manager of several state press operations for Hillary Clinton's presidential campaign; and communications director for Barack Obama's presidential campaign in New York. As communications director for the New York State Democratic Party in 2006, Zepp created and managed the war room that helped achieve the first Democratic sweep of all statewide elections in nearly 60 years, and the pickup of three congressional seats, leading the *New York Daily News* to publish a profile hailing him as the "Dems' Secret Election Weapon."

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